Saturday, May 26, 2007

Old News: Flooding of Containment at Indian Point Unit 2

This is a very interesting event. On October 17, 1980, with the Indian Point 2 at full power, the containment was flooded very severely and the reactor pressure vessel was partially submerged. On October 24, 1980, the NRC issued Information Notice No. 80-37 that is copied below. The Notice refers to an unanalyzed thermal stress condition of potential safety significance.

However, by April 7, 1981, the technical staff of the N.R.C. said the Indian Point 2 nuclear reactor apparently suffered no damage from the flooding incident, and cleared the way for the unit to be restarted. But one month later, Con Edison announced that it had run another mechanical problem with Indian Point 2 and that if would not be able to put plant back in service until the end of May.

May 26, 1981. Indian Point 2 resumes service.

Here is the Information Notice of October 24, 1980:

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

October 24, 1980
Information Notice No. 80-37:

CONTAINMENT COOLER LEAKS AND REACTOR CAVITY FLOODING AT INDIAN POINT UNIT 2

Description of Circumstances: This Notice contains information regarding multiple service water leaks into containment with resulting damage to reactor instrumentation and potential damage to the reactor pressure vessel.

Upon containment entry on October 17, 1980 at Indian Point Unit 2, to repair a malfunctioning power range nuclear detector, it was discovered that a significant amount of water was collected (approximately 100,000 gal) on the containment floor, in the containment sumps, and in the cavity under the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). This collected water probably caused the detector malfunction, and the water in the cavity under the RPV is believed to have been deep enough to wet several feet of the pressure vessel lower head, causing an unanalyzed thermal stress condition of potential safety significance. This condition resulted from the following combination of conditions: (1) Both containment sump pumps were inoperable, one due to blown fuses from an unknown cause and the other due to binding of its controlling float; (2) The two containment sump level indicating lights which would indicate increasing water level over the water level range present in the containment were stuck(on) and may have been for several days, leaving the operator with no operable instrumentation to measure water level in the containment; (3) The moisture level indicators in the containment did not indicate high moisture levels, apparently because they are designed to detect pressurized hot water or steam leaks (i.e., a LOCA), and are not sensitive to the lower airborne moisture levels resulting from relatively small cold water leaks; (4) The hold-up tanks which ultimately receive water pumped from the containment sump also receive Unit 1 process water, lab drain water, etc. These other water sources masked the effect of cessation of water flows from the Unit 2 sump; (5) There were significant, multiple service water leaks from the containment fan cooling units directly onto the containment floor. These coolers have a history of such leakage, which cannot be detected by supply inventory losses since the supply system (service water system) is not a closed system; (6) The two submersible pumps in the cavity under the Reactor Pressure Vessel were ineffective since they pump onto the containment floor for ultimate removal by the (inoperable) containment sump pumps. There is no water level instrumentation in the cavity under the RPV, nor was there any indication outside the containment when these pumps are running.

The licensee has installed redundant sump level annunciated alarms in the , control room and has installed an annunciated alarm in the control room to indicate if either submersible pump in the reactor cavity activates. The licensee has also repaired the service water leaks, installed guide bushings on the sump pump control floats to prevent their binding, and has repaired the containment sump water level indicators. .

Page 2 0f 2 IN 80-37 October 24, 1980

The licensee plans in the longer term to replace the containment fan unit cooling coils.

It is anticipated that results of a continuing NRC investigation into this incident will result in issuance of an IE Bulletin and/or an NRR Generic Letter in the near future which will recommend or require specific licensees and applicant actions. In the interim, we recommend that all licensee ascertain that the potential does not exist for undetected water accumulation in the containment.

This Information Notice is provided to inform licensees of a possibly significant matter. No written response to this Information Notice is required.

Friday, May 25, 2007

America's first private nuclear power plant.

The Indian Point Reactors: a revealing list of events through January 10, 2003.

Here is the prime event from the list:

Oct. 17, 1980. A major water leak in a joint of a pipe carrying nonradioactive water at Indian Point 2 releases about 100,000 gallons of water, flooding a containment building of Indian Point 2.

Oct. 24, 1980. The N.R.C. orders Indian Point 2 shut down until Con Edison determines how the leak went unnoticed. Five days later, the commission initiates an investigation to determine why Con Edison failed to notify the commission about the leak.

Dec. 10, 1980. The N.R.C. fines Con Edison $210,000 for the flooding in October.

April 7, 1981. The technical staff of the N.R.C. says the Indian Point 2 nuclear reactor apparently suffered no damage from the flooding incident, clearing the way for the unit to be restarted. But one month later, Con Edison announces it has run into still another mechanical problem with Indian Point 2 and will not be able to put plant back in service until the end of May.

May 26, 1981. Indian Point 2 resumes service.


And here is the list copied from the New York Times.

Indian Point: From Amusement Park to Power Plant

NY TIMES 8apr03

Consolidated Edison built the first privately financed, commercial nuclear power plant in the United States in Buchanan, N.Y. That plant and the two others eventually built on the site have had troubled histories.

Oct. 8, 1954. Con Edison announces the purchase of a 260-acre site in Buchanan, the former Indian Point amusement park and adjacent land, 35 miles north of midtown Manhattan, to construct an atomic power plant.

Sept. 16, 1962. The reactor that would become known as Indian Point 1 begins generating power.

Dec. 10, 1962. Con Edison applies for a permit to build another reactor, in Ravenswood, Queens. The application is withdrawn on Jan. 6, 1964, after public protests.

May 27, 1965. Seven Congressmen from New York State accuse state officials of covering up the killing of fish in the Hudson River near the Indian Point power plant. The fish kills are blamed on hot water the plant discharges into the river from its cooling systems.

Nov. 23, 1965. Con Edison's directors approve plans to build a second nuclear reactor at Indian Point. Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller calls the move "of major importance to our state and its expanding atomic industry."

April 1967. Con Edison applies for permission to build a third nuclear plant at Indian Point. Permission is granted in August 1969.

May 13, 1970. The state charges Con Edison with serious violations of state conservation laws in the operation of its nuclear generating plant and asks that the plant be closed until "suitable methods" to protect the Hudson River can be developed. State seeks $5 million in damages for the loss of fish.

June 30, 1970. Indian Point 1 is shut down because of defects in the stainless steel piping used to help keep the reactor cool. Meanwhile, the plant is fined $1.6 million for fish kills in Hudson caused by its hot water discharge.

May 1972. The state levies $1.5 million in fines against Con Edison for "massive" fish kills in the Hudson. The total fine is based on a civil penalty of $500 plus $10 for each fish killed.

June 26, 1973. In a test, Indian Point 2 produces power for the first time. It goes into full operation more than a year later in October 1974, after repairs to the steel liner in the reinforced concrete dome protecting the reactor.

Dec. 1, 1973. Con Edison acknowledges that its new power plant, Indian Point 2, has significant problems, after an accident forced it to shut down. Con Edison officials says the problems centered around a buckling and bulging of the steel liner in the reinforced concrete dome in which the nuclear plant is housed.

Sept. 18, 1974. The State Legislature votes to allow the Power Authority of the State of New York to take over Con Edison's Indian Point 3 plant, which is still under construction, to help save the financially ailing Con Edison.

Oct. 14, 1974. Indian Point 1 is permanently shut down, 12 years after going into operation, because it lacks an emergency cooling system for the reactor core, which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission insists be added. The plant is retired but not decommissioned.

Dec. 30, 1975. Under pressure from Gov. Hugh L. Carey, Con Edison agrees to sell Indian Point 3 to the State Power Authority. The action disappoints environmentalists who hoped the sale could be blocked and the plant closed down as a threat to the Hudson River and adjacent areas of Westchester County.

Jan. 20, 1976. William N. Anders, chairman of the N.R.C., orders two separate investigations of two Indian Point reactors a week after Robert D. Pollard, the commission's project manager for Indian Point 3, questioned plant safety and resigned from the N.R.C. staff. After hearings in Washington, the N.R.C. decided to take no action.

Aug. 30, 1976. Indian Point 3 goes into operation.

October 1979. An accident occurs at the Three Mile Island power plant in Middletown, Pa. President Carter appoints a commission to investigate, and to consider whether any of the nation's existing reactors should be shut down.

Dec. 18, 1979. The N.R.C. says that emergency evacuation plans for Indian Point are "lacking." The commission gives Con Edison and the State Power Authority two months to submit revisions.

Jan. 29, 1980. The two nuclear plants at Indian Point have been shut down for five months for refueling, maintenance and repairs, and the N.R.C. says safety improvements must be completed before they can resume operation. Indian Point 2 is restarted in early February and Indian Point 3 returns to service on Feb. 16.

Feb. 27, 1980. Con Edison accedes to the wishes of the N.R.C. and retires Indian Point 1 permanently.

Oct. 17, 1980. A major water leak in a joint of a pipe carrying nonradioactive water at Indian Point 2 releases about 100,000 gallons of water, flooding a containment building of Indian Point 2.

Oct. 24, 1980. The N.R.C. orders Indian Point 2 shut down until Con Edison determines how the leak went unnoticed. Five days later, the commission initiates an investigation to determine why Con Edison failed to notify the commission about the leak.

Dec. 10, 1980. The N.R.C. fines Con Edison $210,000 for the flooding in October.

Jan. 31, 1981. The State Power Authority shuts down Indian Point 3 because of malfunction in the plant's steam turbine section. Meanwhile, officials from the four-county area within 10 miles of Indian Point testify that an emergency evacuation plan presented by the utilities contains major flaws and urges that they not be approved.

April 7, 1981. The technical staff of the N.R.C. says the Indian Point 2 nuclear reactor apparently suffered no damage from the flooding incident, clearing the way for the unit to be restarted. But one month later, Con Edison announces it has run into still another mechanical problem with Indian Point 2 and will not be able to put plant back in service until the end of May.

May 26, 1981. Indian Point 2 resumes service.

Dec. 11, 1981. Con Edison is fined $40,000 by the N.R.C. for not protecting workers from radiation at its Indian Point 2 plant.

March 3, 1982. Indian Point simulates a major accident to test emergency evacuation plans. Federal officials say later that the drill was "generally good," although there were areas that need strengthening.

Aug. 2, 1982. The N.R.C. threatens to close Indian Point unless flaws in the emergency evacuation plans for the area surrounding the plant are corrected within four months. The commission cites deficiencies in provisions for notifying residents in the area, for educating the public in advance about what to do, for making agreements with bus companies to provide emergency service and for limiting exposure of emergency workers to radiation.

Sept. 2, 1982. The chairman of a three-judge panel conducting hearings on safety of the two Indian Point plant resigns, saying the N.R.C. was not giving opponents of the plant a fair chance to state their case. The chairman, Administrative Law Judge Louis J. Carter, had been presiding at hearings ordered by the commission.

Dec. 17, 1982. The Federal Emergency Management Agency, which is charged with evaluating preparations to cope with an accident at Indian Point, says the emergency plants were "not feasible" because of significant deficiencies. The agency says it will decide whether to fine the utility operators, suspend the plant's operating licenses or take other action.

Dec. 22, 1982. The N.R.C. votes 3 to 2 to permit the Indian Point nuclear reactors to operate and to wait until an accident drill in March to determine whether deficiencies in emergency planning had been corrected.
March 9, 1983. Two thousand people, from bus drivers to county executives, test their ability to respond to a major accident at the Indian Point plants, under the observation of 55 Federal inspectors and one of the five members of N.R.C.

April 15, 1983. FEMA issues a report based on the March drill that concludes the area around Indian Point is not prepared for a possible accident at the nuclear reactors, and the safety for the 288,000 people living in the area cannot be assured.

Aug. 26, 1983. FEMA says officials had remedied deficiencies in the plans for coping with an accident at Indian Point and prepares a report for the N.R.C., ending what was then the plant's most serious threat to its license.

Dec. 30, 1993. Ten months after Indian Point 3 was shut down because of mismanagement and safety problems, Federal regulators tell plant managers they are concerned that personnel there cannot handle the plant safely even when it is shut down. It does not reopen until July 1995.

Feb. 14, 2000. In the most serious incident since the plant opened in 1974, a rupture in a steam generator tube at Indian Point 2 releases a minute amount of radioactive steam, though federal regulators and company officials say public health was not threatened. The reactor is shut until December.

Jan. 10, 2003. With anxiety about the the plant growing in the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, a consultant hired by Gov. George E. Pataki calls emergency plans inadequate to protect the public from a disastrous leak of radiation at Indian Point. The consultant, James Lee Witt, former director of FEMA, says the plans fail to take into account the possibility of a terrorist attack.