Monday, October 27, 2008

Albert B. Leyse, Uncle Al

Here is some early history.

Wisconsin: Its Story and Biography, 1848-1913 - Google Books Result
by Ellis Baker Usher - 1914 - WisconsinALBERT B. LEYSE. A decided factor in the commercial and industrial life of ... The president of this concern, Albert B. Leyse, has not alone been active in ...books.google.com/books?id=HZ4UAAAAYAAJ...

Click on the first page below to enlarge, then hit yur return button to get back here, then do the same to read the second page.

Monday, October 20, 2008

Leyse, UCLA, NSF, Congress and the Great American Handshake: An update.

I want the Committee on Science and Technology to investigate this situation.

It appears that the cartel of university officials has succeeded in gaining a preferred and somewhat closed access to NSF funding.

MESSAGE TO HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Section 3(e) of the National Science Foundation (NSF) Act of 1950, as amended, states that: "...it shall be an objective of the Foundation to strengthen research and education in the sciences and engineering, including independent research by individuals, throughout the United States, and to avoid undue concentration of such research and education."

I took my great technology to UCLA. Our proposal (my technology) was declined:

CBET 0438436MICROSCALE HEAT TRANSFER IN FLUIDS AT SUPERCRITICAL PRESSURES: EXPERIMENTS AND MATHEMATICAL MODELING
U of Cal Los Angeles
Declined 08/19/2004

Without my knowledge, UCLA then submitted Proposal Number 0553571 which was a modification of the above declined proposal, but which still had my great technology as its keystone. UCLA won $399,740. I was surprised to find this out when I scanned active awards at NSF.This certainly amazed me.

I asked NSF's OIG to look into this and recently I was told, “We opened a file in response to your email received in this office on April 17, 2008. We have determined that there is insufficient substance to an allegation of misconduct to proceed in this case. The case has been closed and no further action will be taken.”

I want the Committee on Science and Technology to investigate this situation.It appears that NSF avoids funding independent research by individuals. It appears that NSF resents such applications for funding. It appears that the cartel of university officials has succeeded in gaining a preferred and somewhat closed access to NSF funding.

I received no reply from the House Committee on Science and Technology, So I asked my Congressman, Mike Simpson, to get after these birds. He has done so, and I suppose that at some point I will get some kind of response. Anyway, here is an early response from Mike.


After a while Congressman Simpson wrote me that NSF responded:Below is the letter from the Inspector General of NSF to Congressman Simpson:
So, in response, I have recently sent the following to Congressman Mike Simpson with copies to NSF and UCLA:

Robert H. Leyse
222 Elkhorn Road
Sun Valley, ID 83353

October 18, 2998

Congressman Mike Simpson
U. S. House of Representatives
1339 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mike:

Thank you for contacting NSF on my behalf. I have your letter of October 6, 2008, that included NSF’s response from its Inspector General.

She bottom lined, “I remain of the opinion that further investigation is unwarranted.”

Well Mike, a lot of further investigation of NSF by Congress is fully warranted. The NSF is effectively run by a cartel of university administrators.

The NSF statement that UCLA’s revised proposal did not include research proposed in the first proposal is false.

NSF sent you a copy of its recent Semiannual Report to Congress. The crimes that are disclosed in that report are trivial in comparison with what NSF and UCLA have done in my case. That report to Congress even refers to ethics. Well, NSF leadership as well as the Dean of Engineering at UCLA ought to be taught about the great American handshake.



Robert H. Leyse


Copy to:

Inspector General
NSF
4201 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, VA 22230

Dean of Engineering
UCLA
11000 Kinross Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1406


And I have sent the following to the Inspector General of NSF:

Robert H. Leyse
222 Elkhorn Road
Sun Valley, ID 83353

October 20, 2008

Inspector General
NSF
4201 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, VA 22230

Dear Inspector General:

Please audit the following claim by UCLA in its revised NSF PROPOSAL NUMBER 0553571, dated 09/14/2005, and let me know what you find out.

During the past decade we have always employed undergraduate students in our laboratory, giving many students from underrepresented groups the opportunity for hands-on experience in a state-of-the-art research facility. These students have left our laboratory better prepared for graduate level research.

That is, I would like to know how many undergraduate students were employed during each year, by year, from 1995 through 2004, their activities, the time worked, the fraction during each year from underrepresented groups, and the fraction from each year that went on to pursue graduate level research. Also, describe the coordination with UCLA’s Center for Excellence in Engineering and Diversity (CEED), founded during 1993, for each year.

As you may see below, NSF’s rejection of Proposal 0438436 was substantially based on the proposal’s lack of coverage of NSF’s Broad Impacts criteria.

Proposal Number:

0438436
Proposal Title:

MICROSCALE HEAT TRANSFER IN FLUIDS AT SUPERCRITICAL PRESSURES: EXPERIMENTS AND MATHEMATICAL MODELING
Received by NSF:

05/14/04
Principal Investigator:

Gopinath Warrier
Co-PI(s):

Robert Leyse


Vijay Dhir
Performing Organization:

U of Cal Los Angeles

The Program Director concurs with the findings of the Review Panel with respect to the Broad Impacts of the proposed research. This portion of the proposal is deficient. The PIs should refer to the Grant Proposal Guide so that they may properly address these issues. As it is, they have merely restated in one sentence the intellectual merit of the study in the Project Summary. The Project Description does not contain any discussion at all concerning the Broad Impacts criteria.

UCLA responded with claims as follows in its revised Proposal 0553571.

From the PROJECT SUMMARY:

Broader Impact of Proposed Activity

The project will support at least two undergraduate students from underrepresented groups to come and work in the laboratory each summer. This will give the students a chance to gain valuable hands on experience and stimulate their interest in the field of thermal science and engineering. Two Ph.D. students will also be supported as part of this project. The research accomplished will be presented at conferences and published in archival journals for general dissemination to the technical community.

From the body of the Proposal, Page C-13:

BROADER IMPACT

As part of this research project, we intend to support at least two undergraduate students from underrepresented groups to come and work on the project each summer. During the past decade we have always employed undergraduate students in our laboratory, giving many students from underrepresented groups the opportunity for hands-on experience in a state-of-the-art research facility. These students have left our laboratory better prepared for graduate level research. This program will be coordinated with the Center for Excellence in Engineering and Diversity (CEED) within the UCLA School of Engineering and Applied Science. Two Ph.D. students will also be supported – one for the experimental part and another for the mathematical modeling. Results of this study will be presented at conferences and published in archival journal for general dissemination to the technical community.

So, Inspector General, I believe you will agree that UCLA claims that it complies with NSF’s Broad Impacts criteria in its revised proposal 0553571. Certainly, this vital factor must be audited. Again, please let me know what you find out.



Robert H. Leyse


Copy to:

Congressman Mike Simpson
U. S. House of Representatives
1339 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Saturday, October 11, 2008

Sheenan and Her Gang

Click on the picture to enlarge, Use your back key to return here. SHEENAN AND HER GANG
Here I am still in Manhattan and it is a great place indeed. I've told about how I saved the pigeon at Radio Shack. And late today I had the chance to act it all out to a very appreciative group at the Heidelberg on 2nd Avenue. Sheenan had her gang racing to down their 2 liter boots when I walked by with my 500 cubic centimeters and admired their skill. Of course, I was introduced to all, however, only Sheenan's name became embedded among my vast memories, and I am not even certain that I have that right.

Anyway, we talked about this and that. One of the experts told me about derivatives and I wanted to talk about Warren Buffet and his reference to CDO's or whatever as the mother of all catastrophes, but I could not think of CDOs. I said the only thing I knew about derivatives was that the differential of x squared is 2xdx. And so we rambled all over the place.

I mentioned that I had a blog and the gang was amazed that I knew about such things. Next I identified this blog and one of the young geniuses dragged out his whatever and invited me to bring up the blog. I pleaded that the keys were too small, however, I dictated the address and we were soon on line right there on 2nd Avenue.

I could have driven that kind gang nuts by drifting all over this blog, but I focused on the pigeon at Radio Shack. As the text was read to the gang, I moved in view of all and acted out the capture and release of the pigeon with my great felt hat. As I left the scene to get back to my base at 400 East 85th, the gang allowed me to photograph the scene. What a great gang!

This quote from Mark Twain's PUDD'NHEAD WILSON, Chapter 19 has nothing to do with Sheenan and Her Gang, but I've been reading Mark Twain and decided to tuck away this great quote right here: Few things are harder to put up with than the annoyance of a great example.

A repeat note to the House Committee on Science and Technology

Please let me know what the Committee is doing to get NSF to support individual investigators. Here is a note that I sent to the Committee some time ago. This is serious business.

MESSAGE TO HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Section 3(e) of the National Science Foundation (NSF) Act of 1950, as amended, states that: "...it shall be an objective of the Foundation to strengthen research and education in the sciences and engineering, including independent research by individuals, throughout the United States, and to avoid undue concentration of such research and education."

I took my great technology to UCLA. Our proposal (my technology) was declined:
CBET 0438436
MICROSCALE HEAT TRANSFER IN FLUIDS AT SUPERCRITICAL PRESSURES: EXPERIMENTS AND MATHEMATICAL MODELING
U of Cal Los Angeles
Declined 08/19/2004

Without my knowledge, UCLA then submitted Proposal Number 0553571 which was a modification of the above declined proposal, but which still had my great technology as its keystone. UCLA won $399,740. I was surprised to find this out when I scanned active awards at NSF.

This certainly amazed me. I asked NSF's OIG to look into this and recently I was told, “We opened a file in response to your email received in this office on April 17, 2008. We have determined that there is insufficient substance to an allegation of misconduct to proceed in this case. The case has been closed and no further action will be taken.”

I want the Committee on Science and Technology to investigate this situation.

It appears that NSF avoids funding “independent research by individuals.” It appears that NSF resents such applications for funding. It appears that the cartel of university officials has succeeded in gaining a preferred and somewhat closed access to NSF funding.

Thursday, October 9, 2008

Boiling Heat Transfer Gang

I reported my great discoveries in abbreviated form during 2002:

http://www.millpress.nl/shop/abooks/THERMES/THERMES/195.pdf and



http://www.foresight.org/Conferences/MNT9/Abstracts/Leyse/index.html

Next, I intoduced UCLA (Dhir) to this field and I presented a more detailed paper at the Montego Bay Boiling Conference during 2003.



Leyse, R.H., Meduri, P.K., Warrier, G.R. and Dhir, V.K., “MICROSCALE PHASE CHANGE HEAT TRANSFER AT HIGH HEAT FLUX,” Proceedings of the 5th International Boiling Heat Transfer Conference, Montego Bay, Jamaica, May 4-8, 2003.





http://boiling.seas.ucla.edu/Publications/Conf_LMWD2003



Previous Boiling Conferences and their corresponding chairs:
YEAR
Country
Chair

1992
Santa Barbara, CA, USA
V.K. Dhir (UCLA)

1995
Banff, Canada
J. Chen (Lehigh University)

1997
Irsee, Germany
F. Mayinger (University of Munich)

2000
Girdwood, Alaska, USA
A. Bar-Cohen (University of Minnesota)

2003
Montego Bay, Jamaica
J. Klausner (University of Florida)

2006
Spoleto, Italy
G.P. Celata (ENEA)

Tuesday, October 7, 2008

Bob Leyse, Bird Lover

Or, maybe I'm a criminal for releasing a pigeon in Manhattan. Here I am visiting this great place. I have been here for less than 24 hours and already I've saved a pigeon. The weather is great and Radio Shack at 1st Avenue and 77th Street had its front door open. I was doing business when the workers talked about a pigeon that flew in. It had been there several hours and was the object of the rapt attention of a five year old young man.

Well, for some reason I got involved. I took off my quality black Pendleton wool hat and moved toward its perch on a higher shelf. The bird flew toward the front window, fluttered against that barrier and wound up on a lower ledge. I covered it with my hat, and with my other hand I captured the poor thing and then released it via the open front door.

A small crowd witnessed the scene and cheered as the pigeon flew to freedom. The young man smiled.

The weather is a great, clear and crisp; it is an ideal October day in Manhattan.

Thursday, October 2, 2008

Temporary reference

http://www.regulations.gov/ NRC-2008-0332 ML081350225 ML081780360


Accession Number
ML082660533
Title
Comment (11) of James H. Riley on Behalf of Nuclear Energy Institute on Technical Basis for New Performance-Based Emergency Core Cooling System Requirements.
Document Date
09/11/2008
Author Name
Riley J H
Author Affiliation
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)
Date Declared
09/22/2008 1:17:58 PM
Document/Report Number

Estimated Page Count
17
File Size
2113221
Keyword
exb3 stt
SUNSI Review Complete
Availability
Publicly Available to be released 09/30/08

Accession Number
ML082660611
Title
Comment (10) of Robert H. Leyse Opposing Research Information Letter (RIL) 0801, "Technical Basis for New Performance-Based Emergency Core Cooling System Requirements."
Document Date
09/06/2008
Author Name
Leyse R H
Author Affiliation
- No Known Affiliation
Date Declared
09/22/2008 2:47:30 PM
Document/Report Number

Estimated Page Count
3
File Size
115399
Keyword
jef1 lxk1
SUNSI Review Complete
Availability
Publicly Available to be released 09/30/08

Accession Number
ML082700230
Title
Comment (12) of James F. Harrison on Behalf of GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) and Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas (GNF) on Documents Under Consideration to Establish the Technical Basis for New Performance-Based Emergency Core Cooling. System Requirement.
Document Date
09/11/2008
Author Name
Harrison J F
Author Affiliation
GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas, LLC
Date Declared
09/26/2008 11:42:03 AM
Document/Report Number

Estimated Page Count
12
File Size
557390
Keyword
jef1 laf1
SUNSI Review Complete
Availability
Publicly Available to be released 10/06/08
Some reminders:
Plesset remarks to ACRS following witnessing the inadvertent LOFT uncovery following the TMI meltdown. File is somewhere. Also hydrogen impact proposal.
http://www.nea.fr/html/nsd/docs/2008/csni-r2008-2.pdf

1 INTRODUCTION
On the 10th April 2003 severe damage of fuel assemblies took place during an incident at
Unit 2 of Paks Nuclear Power Plant in Hungary. The assemblies were being cleaned in a
special tank below the water level of the spent fuel storage pool in order to remove crud
buildup. That afternoon, the chemical cleaning of assemblies was completed and the fuel rods
were being cooled by circulation of spent fuel storage pool water. The first sign of fuel failure
was the detection of some fission gases released from the cleaning tank during that evening.
The cleaning tank cover locks were released after midnight and this operation was followed
by a sudden increase in activity concentrations. The visual inspection revealed that all 30 fuel
assemblies were severely damaged. The first evaluation of the event showed that the severe
fuel damage happened due to inadequate coolant circulation within the cleaning tank. The
damaged fuel assemblies were removed from the cleaning tank in 2006 and are stored in
special canisters in the spent fuel storage pool of the Paks NPP.


the formation of water level in the cleaning tank took only some minutes after saturation was
reached. The fuel behaviour calculations proved that the loss of fuel integrity in 5 hours after
the initiation of intermediate cooling mode was a result of fuel rod ballooning and burst [18].
The fuel rods could heat up above 800 ºC by that time and the high internal pressure in some
rods resulted in plastic deformation and burst. The calculation of zirconium oxidation pointed
out that the volume of produced hydrogen could be much larger, than the volume of the

The validity of safety analyses performed earlier was reviewed. The Russian firm Hydropress
performed the analysis of the operation with magnetite deposits burdened fuel assemblies [1]
for both normal and incidental conditions of the reactor units. These investigations have
shown that the deformations of the fuel assembly shrouds might be attained much easier if the
shroud temperature exceeds 355°C.
The Hydropress report suggested new operational limits: the relative mass flow of the
assemblies could not fall under 86% of the average value, because at lower mass flow rates,
the shroud temperatures might exceed the problematic temperature value of 355°C. For
controlling the mass flow limitations, the modification of the VERONA reactor core
monitoring system was also necessary. In addition, the Hydropress suggested to plan the
refuelling with extreme caution.
As a consequence of the above drafted events, the plant management decided to clean the
affected fuel assemblies, first time on the turn of the millennium. In the years 2000 and 2001,
the chemical cleaning of a total sum of 170 fuel assemblies was performed successfully in an
instrument designed by Siemens KWU, which was capable for housing 7 fuel assemblies
simultaneously [15]. In accordance with the preliminary expectations, this instrument
operated effectively. (From the viewpoint of the events discussed below, it is important to
mention that the cleaned fuel assemblies were removed from the core two years before the
cleaning process started and they had low residual heat. Furthermore, this equipment would
have been able to ensure the cooling of fuel assemblies of much higher thermal power. This
cleaning tank had inlet junction in the bottom and outlet junction on the top of the vessel. The
safety criteria specified by the Paks NPP experts were fulfilled for this equipment as it was
proved by the main constructor Hydropress.)

In November of 2002, the Paks NPP commissioned a reputed Western-European nuclear
company to design, construct and operate a new chemical cleaning equipment of larger
dimensions. With this new cleaning tank the operators were able to perform the chemical
cleaning of 30 fuel assemblies simultaneously with the same permanganate-oxalic-acid
method. The instrument arrived to Hungary in the beginning of 2003 and was placed into the
refuelling pit beside the reactor of Unit 2 in the Phase 1 of the Paks NPP (see Figure 2.2). The cleaning of the first batch of 30 fuel assemblies was started on 20th of March. Prior to the
incident, five batches were cleaned successfully. The 1st, 2nd, and 4th batches consisted of fuel
assemblies removed a few years earlier, but the 3rd and 5th batches contained fuel assemblies
with significant residual power (removed from the reactor on those days).

References to Chapter 2.
[1] OKB Hydropress: Analysis of operation of fuel assemblies with reduced flow rate due
to deposit in the Paks NPP (final technical report), U-213-TI-1762, 2003, in Hungarian
2.3.2 Plastic deformation of cladding and high temperature oxidation
Continuous temperature increase started in the tank, when the upper part of the fuel rods was
not cooled by water. The heat removal from the tank to the surrounding water was very low,
because the vessel was isolated by the double wall system. The temperature increase led to the
increase of pressure inside of the fuel rods. At 800-900 ºC the internal pressure could reach
30-40 bars. In this range of pressure and temperature plastic deformation of the cladding can
take place and the ballooning can lead to bursts and activity release from the fuel. It is very
probable that this type of fuel failure was responsible for the activity release measured by the
85Kr detectors. (Very long ballooned areas were found in the later visual inspection of the
fuel.) The first fuel rod ruptures were detected at 21:50, when the 85Kr measurement of the
AMDA system showed an unexpected jump in the signal (see Fig. 2.8) and a few minutes
later the noble gas detectors of the unit were also alerted.
However, with heavy crud and oxide layers on the cladding (the conditions of cycle 8)
the ECCS design basis for River Bend is substantially non-conservative in at least the
following aspects: 1) the cladding surface temperature (at some locations) at River Bend
Cycle 8 has been reported to have reached temperatures approaching 1200°F; therefore,
the starting temperature in the event of a LOCA would be almost 1200°F, not the
licensing basis for temperatures around 578°F; 2) the stored energy in the fuel with
cladding that had surface temperatures approaching 1200°F (at some locations) would be
substantially greater than that of fuel with cladding surface temperatures in the range of
578°F at the onset of a LOCA; 3) the amount of coolant in the vicinity of cladding with
heavy crud and oxide layers at the onset of a LOCA would be substantially less than if
the cladding were clean; 4) during blowdown and also during reflood the amount of
coolant flow past cladding with heavy crud and oxide layers would be substantially less
than the flow past clean cladding; 5) the increased quantity of the stored energy in the
fuel and the delay in the transfer of that stored energy to the coolant caused by a heavy
crud layer (mentioned by Klapproth in his letter to the NRC) would cause the cladding to
be subjected to extremely high temperatures for a substantially longer time duration than
the time duration used in the licensing basis, providing more time for heatup and
degradation of the fuel and cladding; 6) the severity of the fuel and cladding degradation
occurring in the event of a LOCA and its effect on obstructing coolant flow would be
substantially greater than those calculated by an ECCS design based on clean cladding; 7)
the increased quantity of the stored energy in the fuel and the delay in the transfer of that
stored energy to the coolant would increase the time until quench; 8) at the onset of a
LOCA, there would already be severe cladding degradation, massive oxidation and
absorption of hydrogen at some locations, which would contribute to a loss of cladding
ductility. (These same deficiencies in the design basis for the ECCS at River Bend-for
situations where cladding is heavily crudded and oxidized-also apply to the design basis
for the ECCS at other nuclear power plants.)
Because the ECCS design basis for River Bend is substantially non-conservative
when it comes to calculating the PCT for a postulated LOCA for conditions where there
are heavy crud and oxide layers on the cladding, there is reason to believe that with high
probability the PCT in the event of a LB LOCA at River Bend Cycle 8 would have
exceeded 2200°F (and that the plant would have violated other requirements of 10 C.F.R.
9 50.46(b)).

Wednesday, October 1, 2008

NRC paper on UO2 - Zry4 reactions

Note: Following is an NRC paper. Figures are not here, however, all text is. Followng this paper I have posted Figure 5 along with comments.

Effects of ID Oxide on Embrittlement After LOCA Scenario

Harold Scott and Ralph Meyer

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
+1 301 415 6771, fax 5160, hhs@nrc.gov

Abstract
The NRC's cladding performance program at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) is testing high-burnup cladding segments subjected to LOCA temperature transients. Tests have been conducted with segments from Limerick (9×9 Zircaloy-2) and H.B. Robinson (15×15 Zircaloy-4) reactors. Companion tests are conducted with unirradiated cladding to generate baseline data for comparison with the high-burnup fuel results.

Recent presentations by Ralph Meyer of NRC (RIC, March 2006, ANS-Reno, June 2006, and TopFuel, Spain, October 2006) have described embrittlement mechanisms that cause loss of ductility. The retention of post-quench ductility is the basis for NRC’s licensing criteria. This paper discusses mechanism Number 6, “Oxygen Pickup from the Cladding Inside Diameter.”
It would be desirable to examine those Halden IFA-650 tests that experience cladding temperatures >1000º C for evidence of ID oxygen diffusion. Metallography at ID locations far from the balloon could be examined in order to measure the depth of the alpha layer.


1. Introduction

During a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), the cladding temperature will rise and several phenomena will occur as illustrated in Fig. 1.

Fig. 1. Schematic cladding temperature during LOCA

At about the temperature that rupture occurs, the cladding metal will change from the alpha phase (HCP) to the beta phase (BCC). Above that temperature, oxidation on the surface of the metal and diffusion of oxygen into the metal become rapid. Increased concentrations of oxygen in the metal lead to loss of ductility or embrittlement.
Recent presentations by Ralph Meyer of NRC (RIC, March 2006 [1], ANS-Reno, June 2006 [2], and TopFuel-Spain, October 2006 [3]) have described embrittlement mechanisms that cause loss of ductility. They are :
· Beta-layer Embrittlement by Oxygen
· Beta-layer Thinning
· Localized Hydrogen-induced Embrittlement in the Balloon
· Hydrogen-enhanced Beta-layer Embrittlement by Oxygen
· Hydrogen-induced Embrittlement from Breakaway Oxidation
· Oxygen Pickup from the Cladding Inner Surface at Locations away from the Balloon
2. Oxygen Distribution
After going through a temperature transient such as illustrated in Fig. 1, the oxygen distribution in the cladding will be as shown in Fig. 2.

Fig. 2. Oxygen concentration in Zircaloy after oxidation in steam and cooling to room temperature.

Oxygen has diffused into the beta phase metal, and after a short time at high temperature the concentration in the beta phase has exceeded its solubility limit. The portion of the beta phase that is above this limit converts back to the alpha phase, which can hold more oxygen. At room temperature, the beta layer converts back to the alpha phase, but both the prior beta layer and the oxygen stabilized alpha layer are readily visible under the microscope as seen in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Unirradiated Zircaloy cladding after oxidation in steam at 1200̊ C for 600 seconds.

Notice from Fig. 2, that the oxygen concentration at the boundaries of the alpha layer are well defined at about 7% on the outside and 0.6% on the inside, depending somewhat on temperature.
3. Early Observations of ID Oxygen Pickup
In 1977, Hobbins and coworkers conducted power-cooling mismatch (PCM) tests in the Power Burst Facility in Idaho. [4] They observed an inside diameter (ID) oxide layer everywhere except in the neighborhood of a pellet chip, where the pellet and cladding were not in hard contact, as shown in Fig. 4.


Fig. 4. Cladding collapse into void in PBF test, showing presence of alpha-Zircaloy except in cladding adjacent to void. Cladding temperature about 1025̊ C. OD is at top of figure.

Hobbins observed that the thickness of the ID alpha layer was of comparable magnitude as the outside diameter (OD) alpha layer, which developed as a result of the reaction with steam in the test. Hobbins noted that oxygen diffusion into the Zircaloy was producing embrittlement, and that only where good contact between fuel and cladding was maintained was the reaction observed on the inside. Using embrittlement criteria, Hobbins concluded that a “two-sided reaction model is appropriate for these PCM tests in which almost as much oxygen is entering the cladding on the inside surface from the Zircaloy-UO2 reaction as is coming from the outside surface and the Zircaloy-H2O reaction.”
Two years later, Hofmann and Politis performed laboratory experiments at Karlsruhe to confirm Hobbins observations. [5] They put fresh UO2 pellets inside sealed unirradiated Zircaloy tubes and heated them in argon under various pressures. These investigators found a reaction between the Zircaloy cladding and the UO2 fuel pellet when there was sufficient pressure to cause solid contact, and they noted that oxygen from the UO2 also diffuses into the Zircaloy to form the alpha phase as shown in Fig. 5.


Fig. 5. UO2 -Zircaloy interaction after 30 minutes at 1200̊ C under an argon pressure of 10 bars.

Hofmann and Politis compared their observed alpha layer with that in steam oxidation experiments performed in the same laboratory by Leistikow and Schanz and concluded “that the thickness of reaction zones formed in the Zircaloy- UO2 reaction experiments and the Zircaloy/steam oxidation experiments is nearly identical.”

4. Recent Observations of ID Oxygen Pickup
Although most of the samples used in the Argonne program have been oxidized on two sides, a short series of 1-sided tests were run with irradiated rods from the H. B. Robinson PWR having a burnup of about 65 GWd/t. These defueled specimens were oxidized at 1200̊ C with steam flowing over the outside and argon flowing through the inside of the tube segment. Microscopy was done on two of these specimens, and both show a substantial ID alpha layer. One sample has a measured ID alpha layer of 36±5 microns compared with an OD alpha layer of 42±4 microns, and this specimen is shown in Fig. 6.


Fig. 6. Inner surface of 64 GWd/t H. B. Robinson PWR cladding after 1-sided oxidation at 1200̊ C, showing well developed alpha layer.

The other specimen had a measured ID alpha layer of 35±8 microns compared with an OD alpha layer of 58±7 microns. It is presumed that this oxygen came from the ZrO2 bonding layer on the ID of the cladding. It can be noted that these specimens had been etched to remove all traces of UO2 , which was attached to the other side of the bonding layer. Thus the somewhat smaller thickness of the ID alpha layer compared with the OD layer is probably the result of removing much of the ID oxygen source, leaving a limited amount in the bonding layer that was totally consumed.
A number of 1-sided tests were also run with irradiated rods from the Limerick BWR having a burnup of about 55 GWd/t. These specimens had also been etched to remove all traces of UO2, which was attached to the other side of the bonding layer. The specimens had a bonding layer that was not uniform around the cladding ID and no ID alpha layer was seen after holding at 1200̊ C for about 300 seconds. However, calculations show that oxygen from an alpha layer would have continued to diffuse into the beta layer until its oxygen content were too low to stabilize the alpha phase.

Four integral tests were run with the irradiated Limerick rods, and three of them were run at high temperature in steam (300 seconds at 1200̊ C). Steam was present on the ID only in the balloon region. Away from the balloon, only one local region in one of the tests (ICL#2) exhibited an ID alpha layer as shown in Fig. 7. Although not conclusive, these results are consistent with (a) incomplete bonding in BWR fuel at ~55 GWd/t, (b) formation of an alpha layer only in the bonded regions, and (c) diffusion of oxygen from the bond layer resulting in both reduction of the bond layer and disappearance of the alpha layer.

Fig. 7. Evidence of an ID alpha layer at location B and absence of such a layer at location A in a fuel rod specimen (including fuel) that was held at 1200̊ C for 300 seconds in an integral LOCA test.

Bonding occurs earlier in PWR fuel than in BWR fuel because the higher system pressure in PWRs results in more cladding creepdown. Bonding between the fuel and the cladding eventually occurs in BWRs as well. From ANL characterization work performed for Limerick BWR high-burnup (55-57 GWd/MTU) fuel, Surry low-burnup (36 GWd/MTU) fuel, TMI-1 PWR intermediate-burnup (48 GWd/MTU), and H. B. Robinson PWR high-burnup (63-67 GWd/MTU) fuel, it appears that bonding (and hence ID oxygen ingress during a LOCA) would begin at ≈30 GWd/t in PWR fuel and be complete around ≈50 GWd/t, whereas it would not begin in BWRs until ≈40-50 GWd/t.
5. Conclusion and Recommendation
It is clear that if oxygen sources are present on the OD and the ID of the cladding, oxygen will diffuse into the metal equally from both sides as in a multi-layer diffusion “couple” such as illustrated in Fig. 8.

Fig. 8. multi-layer diffusion “couple”

It is also clear that bonding between the UO2 fuel and the zirconium-alloy cladding can provide the good contact that is needed. What is not clear are the conditions under which this bonding is sufficiently complete to promote ID oxygen diffusion.

It would be very valuable if microscopy could be done on IFA-650 specimens at locations away from the balloon to compare the OD alpha layer with any ID alpha layer that might be present.

6. References
[1] R. O. Meyer, http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/conference-symposia/ric/past/2006/ slides/t1bc-meyer.pdf
[2] Ralph O. Meyer (NRC), Michael C. Billone (ANL), Technical Basis for Revision of LOCA Embrittlement Criteria, 2006 ANS Annual Meeting June 6, 2006, Reno, Nevada, USA http://www.ans.org/meetings/docs/2006/am2006-official.pdf
[3] R. O. Meyer, http://www.euronuclear.org/events/topfuel/transactions/Topfuel-Technical-Session.pdf
[4] R. R. Hobbins, G. R. Smolik, and G. W. Gibson, “Zircaloy Cladding Behavior During Irradiation Tests Under Power-Cooling-Mismatch Conditions,” Zirconium in the Nuclear Industry, ASTM STP 633, 1977, pp. 182-208.

[5] P. Hofmann and C. Politis, “Chemical Interaction Between Uranium Oxide and
Zircaloy-4 in the Temperature Range Between 900 and 1500̊ C,” Zirconium in the Nuclear Industry, ASTM STP 681, 1979, pp. 537-560. see also Journal of Nuclear Materials, Volume 189, July 1992, Pages 46-64.

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