Don't give yourself away.
On September 12, 1966, I documented my insight on a stupid move that the great GE staff was setting up for the production of Carbon 14. Somebody figured out that Carbon 14 could be produced for very little money by loading some unused space in the General Electric Test Reactor with aluminum nitride, and after several cycles of exposure somebody could get a nice bonus as the Carbon 14 would yield $$$.
I wrote the following to my Manager, Kent Stratton:
Today I found out that four hollow filler pieces to be filled with aluminum nitride powder are being constructed for the GETR core. These are the four moon-shaped pieces for the periphery of the core. What if a leak develops in one of these pieces (intended for a 24 cycle life)? The aluminum nitride reacts with water to produce ammonia. Small amounts of water can leak in, ammonia gas can be produced and the filler piece can be filled with gas at about 150 psig (core operating pressure). Now, if there is an emergency cooling trip, the filler piece will deform substantially with the sudden decrease of surrounding pressure. Somebody should be looking into the consequences of such rapid deformation. One possibility is substantial release of a large C-14 inventory into the reactor water. Offhand, it doesn't appear likely that the control rods would bind, but is anyone certain of this? In summary,the plans need additional review. My guess is that further study will result in a finding of inadequate safety.
I discussed this with a member of the Nuclear Safety Group. He then wrote a memorandum to the head of the Nuclear Safety group with distribution to six others plus me. Here is his opening paragraph.
Here is a paragraph from my monthly report to Kent Stratton on September 30, 1966:
Aluminum Nitride Filler Pieces - On September 12 I wrote you a letter describing hazards associated with possible water in-leakage followed by an emergency cooling trip. My understanding is that this irradiation is being delayed indefinitely. The available safeguards analysis is not adequate for the depth of our hazards. This, of course is a problem that has been with us for several years.
I do not have the dates or the photographs or copies from the log at the General Electric Test Reactor. The aluminum nitride capsules were placed in the core and failed shortly after startup of the reactor. I saw the capsules in the hot lab at Vallecitos Nuclear Center and there were extensive splits along edge welds. I do not have facts on the amount of powder that was lost from the capsules, but it was substantial based on the extensive damage to the capsules; this was no mere pin hole leak.
Sometime after September 30, 1966, my Manager, Kent Stratton was relieved of his duties. One of my co-workers, G. L. Davis, was appointed as my Acting Manager. On November 2, 1966, I wrote the following in my October monthly report to G, L, Davis, Acting Manager.
Safety Attitude Within IPO: The attitude of management within IPO is that safety is to be merely a spectator sport. For example: My recommendations on the aluminum nitride irradiations were not only ignored, they were arrogantly ignored, and after the whole show was over (and $100,000 was down the drain), there was an attitude of resentment when I dragged out my correspondence which showed that I predicted the occurrence before it happened. As you know, Management always accused us of Monday morning quarterbacking when we were in Nuclear Safety when in reality predictions like the one I just cited often held true at that time even though they weren't as well documented. I think Management should take another look at the need for having common sense in the safety program, especially with regard to experiments in the GETR.
Below is an illustration of a moon shaped piece.
