Licensing of Nuclear Power Plants and Fabricated Science

The one percent game and venting of BWR containments

I've been here before, next week I'll again go after the NRC for the basis of the one percent.  As usual, I'll get no response or the equivalent of no response.  Maybe I'll again go after some answers during early March, the third anniversary of Fukushima, which has turned out far worse than anything that was ever forecasted.

Hundreds sue makers of Fukushima nuclear plant

This may not be the first, and it will likely not be the last.

Hundreds sue makers of Fukushima nuclear plant

TOKYO (The Associated Press) - Jan 31 - MARI YAMAGUCHI 

About 1,400 people filed a joint lawsuit Thursday against three companies that manufactured reactors at Japan's Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant, saying they should be financially liable for damage caused by their 2011 meltdowns.

Lawyers for the plaintiffs said the lawsuit, filed at Tokyo District Court, is a landmark challenge of current regulations that give manufacturers immunity from liability in nuclear accidents. Under Japan's nuclear damage compensation policy, only the operator of the plant, Tokyo Electric Power Co., has been held responsible for the accident, which was triggered by a powerful earthquake and tsunami.

The 1,415 plaintiffs, including 38 Fukushima residents and 357 people from outside Japan, said the manufacturers — Toshiba, GE and Hitachi — failed to make needed safety improvements to the four decade-old reactors at the Fukushima plant. They are seeking compensation of 100 yen ($1) each, saying their main goal is to raise awareness of the problem.

Akihiro Shima, a lawyer for the group, said the manufacturers have not been held responsible "and their names are not even mentioned." The lawsuit intends to bring attention to the system that protects the nuclear industry around the world, he said.

The four reactors all began operation in the 1970s. Units 1, 3 and 4 were built by GE, Toshiba and Hitachi, respectively, while Unit 2 was a joint GE-Toshiba project. GE and Hitachi later established GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy.

Several accident investigation reports, including one published by a parliament-appointed panel, have generally agreed that the tsunami was the primary cause of the disaster, but also criticized TEPCO's underestimation of potential tsunami damage and collusion between regulators and the nuclear industry.

Citing those reports, Christopher White, spokesman for GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy, said the accident was caused by the tsunami and the resulting loss of power and reactor cooling, not reactor design.

The design of the four affected Fukushima reactors "has proven to be safe for more than 40 years around the globe," White said. He said the nuclear industry is working to further improve "an already safe set of technologies," including the installation of better backup power supplies and cooling systems.

Toshiba and Hitachi declined to comment on the lawsuit, saying they have not received the legal documents.

The Fukushima plant has largely stabilized since the accident, but TEPCO continues to struggle with leaks of massive amounts of radioactive water from the wrecked reactors into the Pacific Ocean. The decommissioning of the four damaged reactors, including three with melted cores, is unprecedented in terms of its extent and complexity, and could take decades.

Lots of Spent Fuel "R&D" but no inpact of crud

Our great feds throw around a lot of dough including the following:

http://www.nwtrb.gov/reports/eds_rpt.pdf
  
Evaluation of the Technical Basis for Extended Dry Storage and Transportation of Used Nuclear Fuel

The report claims to be comprehensive, however, there is no consideration of the impact of crud.

 On page 125 you will find the following table:

Table 9. Top Research Needs for Long‐term Used‐Fuel Storage
1.
Understanding long-term changes in the mechanical cladding behavior and fuel cladding degradation mechanisms potentially active during extended dry storage, including those that will act on the materials introduced in the last few years for fabrication of high-burnup fuels
2.
Understanding and modeling the time-dependent conditions that affect aging and degradation processes such as temperature profiles, in situ material stresses, quantity of residual water, and quantity of helium gas
3.
Modeling of age-related degradation of metal canisters, casks, and internal componentss during extended dry storage
4.
Inspection and monitoring of fuel and dry storage systems to verify the actual conditions and degradation behavior over time, including techniques for assuring the presence of helium cover gas
5.
Verification of the predicted mechanical performance of fuel after extended dry storage during cask and container handling, normal transportation operations, fuel removal from casks and containers, off-normal occurrences and accident events
6.
Design and demonstration of dry-transfer fuel systems for removal of fuel from casks and canisters following extended dry storage

The final paragraph of the report is on page 126:

At this point, the nuclear waste management policy of the United States is unclear, with the result that used fuel will be stored at reactor sites for longer than originally foreseen. It is thus essential that the appropriate research and development programs, and monitoring and inspection programs, are implemented as a matter of priority in order to demonstrate that used fuel can be safely stored for extended periods and then transported and handled as part of a future waste management program.

Again, the report claims to be comprehensive, however, there is no consideration of the impact of crud.

UHI and ICS (Upper Head Injection and InCore Spray]

RANK, RISK, and RESPECT

A recent Fukushima release via ENFORMABLE; note the members of the Consortium.

Here is a recent release of early stuff, April 29, 2011 (from ENFORMABLE on December 16, 2013).  NOTE THAT THE CONSORTIUM INCLUDES General Electric Company.  I wonder if SANDIA was involved via DOE or NRC.

One essential function among five listed is:

Maintain reactors and spent fuel pools subcritical and adequately shielded.

April 29th, 2011 – Consortium of Industrial and Governmental Organizations analysis of TEPCO Roadmap at Fukushima Daiichi

Posted: 16 Dec 2013 01:39 PM PST

In April of 2011, a consortium of industrial and governmental organizations established to provide advice to Japan in its efforts to stabilize the conditions at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, authored an analysis of Tokyo Electric’s roadmap to restore stability at the crippled facility. The consortium was made up of representatives from General Electric, Hitachi, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), Naval Reactors, United States Department of Energy / Nuclear Energy, and the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The roadmap which had been released by TEPCO gave examples of the near-term actions that TEPCO deemed necessary to minimize radiation releases and reestablish safety.
The consortium established five essential functions necessary for achieving the near term goal for improving plant conditions.
The five essential functions are as follows:

• Remove decay and chemical heat from reactors, containment, and spent fuel pools.
• Maintain reactors and spent fuel pools subcritical and adequately shielded.
• Ensure structural integrity for all units (e.g. containment and spent fuel pools).
• Provide reliable indication of essential parameters.
• Terminate (or render insignificant) uncontrolled radioactive releases.

The consortium was also very concerned about the spent fuel pools in nearly all of the units.  The consortium largely dismissed the thermographic work that TEPCO had carried out, because it only indicated the surface temperature of the first obstacle encountered, and did not indicate the actual spent fuel pool temperature.
At Unit 1, the consortium was concerned that water being sprayed on the spent fuel pool was not actually reaching the pool.  They advised that TEPCO investigate and confirm that the spent fuel in the spent fuel pool was being cooled.
In Unit 1, Unit 2, and Unit 4, the consortium felt that TEPCO should install independent redundant backup systems for cooling.
While the consortium expressed concern about the Unit 4 spent fuel pool, experts were also concerned about the structural integrity of the Unit 3 building after being ripped apart by the explosions.
The consortium analysis pointed out that TEPCO’s roadmap was glaringly silent on maintaining the fuel sub-critical.  Further, the experts even questioned TEPCO’s ability to detect and monitor inadvertent criticality.
After using sea water for emergency cooling in the reactors, experts felt that consideration should be given to biological growth which may occur in the reactor vessels, containments, and spent fuel pools.  This had been witnessed at Three Mile Island, where it had been learned that the growth of such life forms could reduce visibility in the waters at best, or even worse could affect coolability of the fuel by reducing flows or heat transfer coefficients from surfaces.
To view the TEPCO Roadmap follow the link below:
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11041707-e.html