Monday, September 9, 2019

Appeal the denial of INPO SER 76-84 (Lightning)


Subject:               FOIA Appeal NRC-2019-000418 Submitted

Date:     9/9/2019 11:20:50 AM Mountain Standard Time

From:    admin@foiaonline.gov

To:          bobleyse@aol.com

This message is to notify you of a new appeal submission to the FOIAonline application. Appeal information is as follows:

  • Appeal Tracking Number: NRC-2019-000418
  • Request Tracking Number: NRC-2019-000354
  • Requester Name: Robert Leyse
  • Date Submitted: 09/09/2019
  • Appeal Status: Submitted
  • Description: Appeal the denial of INPO SER 76-84, referenced in NRC Information Notice No. 85-86: Lightning Strikes at Nuclear Power Generating Stations, in
    response to NRC-2019-000354

From the Kemeney Commission, October 1979


speedy flow of this information
The Kemeny Commission – which president Jimmy Carter formed to investigate the March 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant – had recommended the following:
·         The (nuclear power) industry should establish a program that specifies appropriate safety standards including those for management, quality assurance, and operating procedures and practices, and that conducts independent evaluations.
·         There must be a systematic gathering, review and analysis of operating experience at all nuclear power plants, coupled with an industrywide international communications network to facilitate the speedy flow of this information to affected parties.
In addressing those recommendations, the nuclear power industry:
·         established INPO – the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
·         charged INPO with a mission that we continue to pursue today:
o    To promote the highest levels of safety and reliability – to promote excellence – in the operation of commercial nuclear power plants.

Report Of
The President’s Commission On
THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND
The Need For Change:
The Legacy Of TMI
October 1979   Washington, D.C>
FROM PAGE 68
b.
There must be a systematic gathering, review, and
analysis of operating experience at all nuclear power plants coupled
with an industry-wide international communications network to facilitate
the speedy flow of this information to affected parties. If such
experiences indicate the need for modifications in design or operation,
such changes should be implemented according to realistic deadlines.

Clearly, there has been no speedy flow of lightning strike information.  INPO  led the charge to delete Leyse’s systematic gathering, review and analysis of operating experience at Salem 1 on June 8, 1980.  It was not until years later that the Salem experience was addressed by the NRC and that reporting was incomplete.


Thursday, July 24, 2008




Lightning, NSAC and INPO, (how things work!)

NSAC: Nuclear Safety Analysis Center, A defunct branch of the Electric Power Research Institute.

INPO: Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, A very active and somewhat secretive group that is funded by operators of nuclear power plants.

Right after the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 during April, 1979, the nuclear utility members of EPRI mandated the immediate formation of NSAC at Palo Alto, California. INPO was formed several months later, headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia.

I was with NSAC when I classified the consequences of a lightning strike at Salem Unit 1 on June 8, 1980, as a Significant Event and my report was entered into our communications system on August 12, 1980, as an NSAC/INPO SIGNIFICANT EVENT. See the first slide below, click on the slide to enlarge, and use your back arrow to return here.


INPO immediately objected to my entry and worked overtime to demand its rejection. See the second slide. I insisted that the entry should be maintained.




My writeup was indeed deleted, as I found out on March 11, 1982, a few months short of two years later when NSAC's file manager gave me the hard copy (slide 1) from her personal files. (NSAC management did not appreciate her diligence and she was assigned to another group at EPRI.)

Well, it is really amazing, HOW THINGS WORK! It turns out that on November 5, 1985, the NRC issued an Information Notice regarding lightning strikes. In contrast to INPO's rejection of my above SER that is dated 12-Aug-8o, the NRC included the lightning strike at Salem on June 9, 1980, in this Information Notice that is dated November 5, 1985.

BUT WHAT IS EVEN MORE FUN: the NRC referenced INPO report, INPO SER 76-84, in its Information Notice. Very likely, the INPO Signifcant Event Report, SER 76-84, includes the Salem event that INPO effectively censored on 12-AUG-80. It is also interesting that it apparently was not until 1984 that INPO admitted that lightning strikes induced significant events. And, very likely, the NRC became aware of the significance of lightning strikes when it became aware of INPO SER 76-84 in the course of its confidential communications with INPO.
Here is NRC Information Notice 85-86; note the reference to INPO SER 76-84. Also, the NRC's writeup of the lightning strike at Salem is less inclusive than my Significant Event Report of August 12, 1980.

SSINS No.: 6835 IN 85-86
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555


November 5, 1985 Information Notice No. 85-86:
LIGHTNING STRIKES AT NUCLEAR POWER GENERATING STATIONS
Addressees: All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a construction permit (CP).
Purpose: This notice is provided to alert recipients of a potentially significant problem of reactor trips and instrument damage caused by lightning strikes. It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicabilityto their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude a similar problem occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required. The NRC is continuing to evaluate pertinent information. Recipients of this notice will be notified of additional information or if specific actions are required.

Description of Circumstances: A number of plant trips and instrumentation problems attributable to lightning have occurred over the past 6 years. Since solid state circuitry designs are being increasingly employed in safety related systems, the impact of lightning induced line surges on those circuits is emphasized in this notice. Descriptions of several of the more significant events are presented below. Events involving lightning strikes of switchyards and the consequential impact on power distribution systems are not covered by this notice. However, INPO SER 76-84 covers this latter subject as well as summarizing earlier INPO documents dealing with lightning strikes at nuclear power plants.

Zion Power Station Units 1 and 2
On August 17, 1979, both units tripped simultaneously during a severe lightning storm. Investigation indicated that a lightning strike in close proximity to the plant caused either a momentary surge or interruption in the ac power supply circuits to the rod control power supply cabinets. This transient tripped the overload protection devices for the dc power supply cabinet, resulting in a power interruption to the control rod stationary gripper coils, 8511010020 . IN 85-86 November 5, 1985 Page 2 of 4 which caused the rods to drop into the core. The resulting high, negative flux rate initiated the reactor trip signal. Tests verified that noise induced on the ac input to one power supply would actuate the overvoltage protection trips on the main and auxiliary power supplies. In addition to the noise spikes, one Unit 2, 24-V positive power supply was damaged by the lightning strike and had to be replaced. The following corrective actions were initiated:

o The control rod system neutral was isolated from the station ground.
o The overvoltage protection trip setting was changed from 27 to 29 V. o A low-pass filter was installed on the input to each 24-V positive power supply.
o A volt trap (a voltage suppressor circuit designed to reduce large voltage surges and noise induced by lightning strikes) was installed across the 50-ohm motor generator neutral resistor.
o A volt trap was installed across the power feed to the auxiliary power supply.
o The power feed for the auxiliary power supply was changed from the 480-V system to the control rod drive (CRD) motor generators.

Zion Unit 2 experienced additional reactor trips attributed to lightning on April 3 and July 16, 1980, before the above listed corrective actions were implemented. In these cases it was determined that the transient tripped the overload protection devices, as was the case in the trip of both units on August 17, 1979. However, no power supplies or other equipment were damaged during the latter two trips.
Again, on December 2, 1982, Zion Unit 2 reactor tripped from 100% power during an electrical storm. It was concluded that lightning induced a disturbance in the electrical system causing a reactor trip from a generator trip. Additional lightning protection for the containment building was provided and the static wire associated with the 345-kV line was isolated from the power station structural steel.

Salem Power Station Unit 1

On June 9, 1980 the reactor tripped during an electrical storm. Lightning struck at the south penetration area of reactor containment causing a transient on seven main steam pressure transmitters. Two of these pressure transmitters were damaged and had to be replaced. The transient caused a high steam line pressure differential reactor trip signal and a safety injection signal. The licensee believes the lightning strike hit main steam vent pipes which extend above the penetration area roof and the surge was carried into the building via piping connections.

Kewaunee Power Station
On August 19, 1980, two of four instrument busses lost power during an electrical storm. This resulted in a spurious safety injection (SI) actuation signal, and the unit tripped from full power. In addition to inducing the instrumentation transients, the inverter fuses were blown. These fuses were replaced, and no other evidence of equipment failure was observed.

Byron Power Station Unit 1

On July 13, 1985, when lightning struck the Unit 1 containment, the reactor tripped from approximately 11% power because of induced voltage surges in instrument and control cables in one of four containment penetration areas. The induced voltage caused failure of four rod drive power supplies, including 1 redundant pair. The failure of the redundant supplies resulted in 10 control rods dropping into the core. A power range negative-flux-rate reactor trip resulted from the rod insertion. In addition to the reactor trip, damage occurred to 30 plant instruments. The following systems were affected by the damaged instrumentation: protection channel II, one train ofthe 48-volt power supply for the solid state protection system, the meteorological tower, control rod drive, and loose-parts monitoring.

A review of cable routings showed that a significant common denominator existed in containment penetrations. All damaged instruments were associatedwith cables passing through penetrations located in one containment region. In addition to the damaged instrumentation, the lightning damaged a significant amount of security equipment.
The licensee determined that an improved lightning protection system was required to prevent recurrence of a similar incident. By installing copper conductors, external to containment, from the roof mounted lightning rods directly to ground rods in the earth, a low impedance path to ground was provided for future lightning strikes. This modification is similar to the Zion modification described above.

Arkansas Power Station Unit 2

On August 5, 1985, the reactor tripped from 100% power on a low departure- from-nucleate-boiling ratio (DNBR) signal as the result of a lightning strike transient induced in two of the core protection system channels. The licensee's followup investigation revealed no damage to the plant's electrical equipment or instrumentation measuring systems.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.
Edward L. Jordan, Director, Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response, Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
So, I sent the following request to the NRC asking them to allow me to have copy of INPO SER 76-84. Here is the e-mail and it is followed by the NRC's denial.
FOIA request for INPO SER 76-84
Date:6/22/2008 11:44:16 A.M. Mountain Daylight Time
From:Bobleyse
To:FOIA.resource@nrc.gov
AttachedInformation Notice No. 85-86: Lightning Strikes at Nuclear Power references INPO SER 76-84. This discloses that NRC has INPO SER 76-84. This is my request under FOIA to be provided with a copy of INPO SER 76-84.
Information Notice No. 85-86: Lightning Strikes at Nuclear Power ...However, INPO SER 76-84 covers this latter subject as well as summarizing earlier INPO documents dealing with lightning strikes at nuclear power plants. ...www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1985/in85086.html - 23k - Cached - Similar pages
Robert H. Leyse bobleyse@aol.com
The NRC denied this request arguing that, "The information is considered to be confidential business (proprietary) Information."
This denial does not have a reasonable basis.

Wednesday, August 28, 2019

GETR Levy Heat Transfer

The following items are extracted from the lengthy dissertation, GETR Levy Heat Transfer, from the 1960s.  GE’s boys were not that smart.  The following extracted paragraphs show that the Bettis boys were smarter, because they recognized the need for a reduced metal cross section in the corners; a fundamental need that was totally missed by GE 's boys.

GE's Boys, Levy, Fuller and Niemi conclude:

 “5  Burnout heat fluxes were measured with heat generation around the entire periphery of the rectangular channels.  Burnout occurs at the corners and the values there are correlated by a McAdams type equation.  Values one third of those obtained in circular pipes were measured.”  (Page 140)

Discussion by S. J. Green and B. W. LeTourneau of the Bettis Plant, Pittsburgh, Pa. included:

 “It would seem overly conservative in most cases to apply these data directly to the coolant channels in nuclear reactors.  In conventional reactor fuel plates, the fueled region is of slightly less width than the coolant channels.  While there is a significant amount of gamma heating in the extreme ends of the fuel plates and in the side plates, the geometry and the heating rates are normally such that the heat flux through the narrow edges, and the portions of the wide sides nearest the corners, is much less than that opposite the fueled region.

For this reason, the rectangular channel test sections used for electrically heated burnout tests [28, 29] at the Bettis Plant have been designed with a reduced metal cross section in the corners, such that the heat flux at the narrow edges and on the part of the wide faces nearest the corners was about 20 percent of that in the main part of the channel.  With this type of channel (and at pressures form 2000 to 600 psia) the burnout heat flux was found to be in fact higher than that for a round tube at the same conditions, and the burnouts did not occur preferentially at the corners.”


Here is the lengthy dissertation:

GETR Levy Heat Transfer

S. Levy       R. Niemi      R. Fuller

Heat Transfer to Water in Thin Rectangular Channels

ASME Transactions

Journal of Heat Transfer, Volume 81, Series C, Number 2, May 1959, pages 129-140, discussion pages 141-143.

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Levy, Fuller and Niemi conclude:

 “5  Burnout heat fluxes were measured with heat generation around the entire periphery of the rectangular channels.  Burnout occurs at the corners and the values there are correlated by a McAdams type equation.  Values one third of those obtained in circular pipes were measured.”  (Page 140)

Discussion by S. J. Green and B. W. LeTourneau of the Bettis Plant, Pittsburgh, Pa. included:

 “It would seem overly conservative in most cases to apply these data directly to the coolant channels in nuclear reactors.  In conventional reactor fuel plates, the fueled region is of slightly less width than the coolant channels.  While there is a significant amount of gamma heating in the extreme ends of the fuel plates and in the side plates, the geometry and the heating rates are normally such that the heat flux through the narrow edges, and the portions of the wide sides nearest the corners, is much less than that opposite the fueled region.

For this reason, the rectangular channel test sections used for electrically heated burnout tests [28, 29] at the Bettis Plant have been designed with a reduced metal cross section in the corners, such that the heat flux at the narrow edges and on the part of the wide faces nearest the corners was about 20 percent of that in the main part of the channel.  With this type of channel (and at pressures form 2000 to 600 psia) the burnout heat flux was found to be in fact higher than that for a round tube at the same conditions, and the burnouts did not occur preferentially at the corners.”

Responding to the Bettis remarks, the GE investigators address the burnout data as follows:

“With regard to the burnout data it is very hard to see how the local heat flux can be three times as large as the average heat flux.  Conduction effects along a 28-mil wall could never produce such extreme peaking.  It is also important to note that the proposed data apply to test reactors as noted in the first sentence of the introduction and not to power or propulsion reactors referred to by the discussers.”

Remarks from Leyse:

Within 6 months of my employment during 1960 at General Electric’s Vallecitos Atomic Laboratory, I recognized the error in the General Electric burnout correlation for nuclear test reactors and I did not use it in studies that were aimed at increasing the power level of the General Electric Test Reactor (GETR).   In their response to the Bettis engineers, Levy, Fuller and Niemi state, “… it is very hard to see how the local heat flux can be three times as large as the average heat flux.  Conduction effects along a 28-mil wall could never produce such extreme peaking.”

Indeed, in 1960 I recognized that it is not at all hard to see how, with an unrelieved corner, the local heat flux can be three times as large as the average heat flux.  As observed by Green and LeTourneau , Levy, Fuller and Neimi did not provide a reduced metal cross section the corners.

The heat generation within the volume of the corner adds very substantially to the corner heat flux and conduction effects have nothing to do with it.  In fact, with the relatively low thermal conductivity of stainless steel, heat conduction away from the corner hot spot is not sufficient to overcome the intense peaking of heat flux at the corner.  Thus, it is obvious that the GE test section will always burn out at a corner.

Furthermore, the remark by the GE investigators that their work applies to test reactors in contrast to power reactors is specious at best, and more accurately, it is unambiguously absurd.

In 1960 I introduced the Vallecitos staff to the Bernath correlation for burnout heat flux for capsules for the GETR, and I must say it had a chilly reception.  However, in the safety analysis for increasing the power level of GETR, publication APED 5000-A, July 1965, I reference three separate burnout correlations: Bernath, McAdams and Mirshak. If I had been forced to apply the GE burnout correlation, the power level increase would not have gotten off the ground!   

In an internal memo, Interpretation of Burnout Margin Requirements for GETR Capsules, May 16, 1967, J. E. Morrissey of GE’s Irradiation Processing Operation (IPO), declared, “APED 5000 A uses the Bernath correlation.”  Morrissey does not mention the GE burnout correlation, it is ignored without evaluation.










Saturday, August 24, 2019

email to Chatanooga Times Free Press (LIGHTNING)


Subject:               Storm temporarily cuts power output at TVA nuclear plant

Date:     8/23/2019 3:56:20 PM Mountain Standard Time

From:    bobleyse@aol.com

To:          rant@timesfreepress.com

Sent from the Internet (Details)

TVA asserts that, "reactor safety was not compromised by the incident and it was not a reportable event to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission."  This is the sort of lean thinking that is likely among the preludes to Fukushima.

Robert H. Leyse
Sun Valley, Idaho 


Storm temporarily cuts power output at TVA nuclear plant


Storm temporarily cuts power output at TVA nuclear plant

August 22nd, 2019 by Staff Report in Breaking News Copyright 2019


The Tennessee Valley Authority's biggest nuclear power plant was forced to reduce power generation this week when a lighting strike cut power to the plant's seven cooling towers and temporarily limited the ability to cool the heated water in the plant's condensers.

TVA Nuclear Chief Tim Rausch said today the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant is back to full power generation, but two of the reactors were cut to 50% power and the other was reduced to 90% power after the lightning strike Monday night cut off operation of some of the cooling towers at the plant near Athens, Alabama. Rausch said he unaware if such an incident had ever previously occurred at the plant, which has been in operation since TVA spokesman Jim Hopson said the "freak accident" cut power to the cooling towers, which in turn required TVA to scale back operation of its Browns Ferry reactors during some of the hottest days of the summer for part of Monday and Tuesday. Hopson said reactor safety was not compromised by the incident and it was not a reportable event to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Power has since been restored to all of the cooling towers and the reactors are operating at full power.

Earlier this summer, TVA completed its $475 million uprate of the three reactors at Browns Ferry, which boosts the power output of the plant by another 465 megawatts.

With 3.4 megawatts of generation capacity, Browns Ferry is the nation's second biggest nuclear power plant.

Thursday, August 22, 2019

Licensing Topical Report (LTR) NEDO-33262,


Here is a significant report that shows how the regulators have been focusing on junk while the obvious preludes to Fukushima sailed  by:


Licensing Topical Report (LTR) NEDO-33262, ESBWR Human Factors Engineering Operational Experience Review Implementation Plan (OER), Revision 2









From: bobleyse@aol.com <bobleyse@aol.com>
Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2019 12:38 PM
To: Gaylord, Daniel <Daniel.Gaylord@nrc.gov>
Subject: [External_Sender] FOIA request 2019-000390

Your ACK Letter -2019-000390.pdf has the wrong date, It should be August, not July.

Also, Licensing Topical Report (LTR) NEDO-33262, ESBWR Human Factors Engineering Operational Experience Review Implementation Plan (OER), Revision 2,also  has endless listings of the references that I want NRC to place in its PDR.

From: Daniel.Gaylord@nrc.gov
To: bobleyse@aol.com
Sent: 8/19/2019 4:37:32 AM Mountain Standard Time
Subject: RE: FOIA request 2019-000390
Good morning Mr. Leyse,

My apologies for the clerical error and thank you for the additional information.

Thanks,

Dan

Friday, August 16, 2019

Submittal of ESBWR Licensing Topical Report NEDO-33262

GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy
James C. Kinsey Vice President, ESBWR Licensing
PO Box 780 M/C A-55 Wilmington, NC 28402-0780 USA
T 910 675 5057 F 910 362 5057 jim.kinsey@ge.com
MFN 08-257 Docket No. 52-010
May 31, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
Subject: Submittal of ESBWR Licensing Topical Report NEDO-33262, ESBWR Human Factors Engineering Operating Experience Review Implementation Plan (OER), Revision 2
Licensing Topical Report (LTR) NEDO-33262, ESBWR Human Factors Engineering Operational Experience Review Implementation Plan (OER), Revision 2, is being submitted for your review and use in accordance with the corresponding HFE program element identified in Reference 1.
Attachment 1 of this letter contains LTR NEDO-33262, Revision 2, dated May
2008.
If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact me.
Sincerely,
mes C. Kinsey Vice President, ESBWR Licensing
:1)C).0
MFN 08-257 Page 2 of 2
Reference:
1. NUREG-071 1, Revision 2, Human Factors Engineering Program Review Model, issued February 2004
Attachment:
1. MFN 08-257 - ESBWR Licensing Topical Report - NEDO-33262ESBWR Human Factors Engineering Operating Experience Review Implementation Plan (OER), Revision 2
cc: AE Cubbage RE Brown DH Hinds GB Stramback eDRF
USNRC (with enclosures) GEH/Wilmington (with enclosures) GEH/Wilmington (with enclosures) GEH/San Jose (with enclosures) 0000-0049-8918, Rev. 3