Sunday, April 22, 2007

From the man who created the largest, smallest, and most efficient pure fission bombs produced:

I copied the following from ArmsControlWonk.com

Finally, from the man who created the largest, smallest, and most efficient pure fission bombs produced:

Utility of Reactor Grade Plutonium in Nuclear Weapons
Theodore B. Taylor
Visiting FellowCenter for Energy and Environmental Studies
Princeton University, Princeton NJ 08544
June 10, 1998

Contrary to opinions expressed by many nuclear engineers that are not familiar with the still secret intimate details of nuclear weapon design and operation, plutonium extracted from all types of spent fuel removed from nuclear power plants or research reactors can be used for making modern fission or thermonuclear weapons that are reliabily predictable in performance, over a very wide range of yields, from fractions of a kiloton to megatons of high explosive equivalent. This has been true for decades, and confirmed by numerous nuclear weapon tests.

It is true that the first generation of implosion type fission bombs, such as the one that destroyed Nagasaki in 1945, could “fizzle” and produce much lower than the design yields if the plutonium they contained were of “reactor grade.” This could be the result of premature initiation of a fission chain reaction by spontaneous fission neutrons emitted by Pu-240 or other isotopes that are more abundant in reactor grade than weapon grade plutonium. But ways to avoid this problem, by use of plutonium in different designs that could be reliably used for fission and thermonuclear weapons were developed and demonstrated before the end of the 1950s. The performance of these weapons is not significantly degraded by using reactor grade plutonium instead of weapon grade plutonium.

And, here is what has been reported regarding Taylor's skills:
"He was famous in the community of bomb experts as the most creative and imaginative of the designers," said Freeman Dyson, a physicist, author and retired Princeton University professor who was a friend of Dr. Taylor's. "His bomb designs were the smallest, the most elegant and the most efficient. He was able to draw his designs freehand, without elaborate calculations. When they were built and tested, they worked."

Saturday, April 21, 2007

Engineer Accused of Taking Codes to Iran (Copied from AOL)

Engineer Accused of Taking Codes to Iran
AP April 21, 2007
PHOENIX (AP) - A former engineer at the nation's largest nuclear power plant has been charged with taking computer access codes and software to Iran and using it to download details of plant control rooms and reactors, authorities said. The FBI said there's no indication the plant employee had any terrorist connections.

Mohammad Alavi, who worked at the triple-reactor Palo Verde power plant west of Phoenix, was arrested April 9 at Los Angeles International Airport when he arrived on a flight from Iran, authorities said. Alavi, 49, is a U.S. citizen and denies any wrongdoing, said his attorney, Milagros Cisneros of the Federal Defender's Office in Phoenix.

He is charged with a single count of violating a trade embargo that prohibits Americans from exporting goods and services to Iran. If convicted, he would face up to 21 months in prison.

According to court records, the software is used only for training plant employees, but allowed users access to details on the Palo Verde control rooms and the plant layout. In October, authorities alleged, the software was used to download training materials from Tehran, using a Palo Verde user identification.

The FBI said there was no evidence to suggest the software access was linked to the Iranian government, which has clashed with the West over attempts to develop its own nuclear program. "The investigation has not led us to believe this information was taken for the purpose of being used by a foreign government or terrorists to attack us," said Deborah McCarley, a spokeswoman for the FBI in Phoenix.

Officials of Arizona Public Service Co., the Phoenix-based utility company that operates the Palo Verde Nuclear Generation Station, said the software does not pose a security risk because it doesn't control any of the nuclear plant's operating systems. However, the utility said it has changed software security procedures since Alavi quit in August after working there for 16 years. "The health and safety of the public was never compromised and there was no threat to the security of Palo Verde," APS spokesman Jim McDonald said Saturday.

A federal judge in Phoenix denied him bail at a hearing on Friday, saying Alavi had more ties to Iran than the United States and could easily flee. Alavi, who was born in Tehran, has family, a house and a job lined up in Iran, Judge Neil Wake said.

Palo Verde has been plagued by outages and equipment problems for the past several years. The plant, located about 50 miles west of downtown Phoenix, supplies electricity to some 4 million customers in Arizona, New Mexico, Texas and California.

Monday, April 9, 2007

Correction to Arpril, 7, 2007, Entry in this BLOG

On April 7, 2007, in this blog, I reported that the following reference was not available to the public. I was wrong. It became available on April 3, 2007. Apparently it was unintentionally referenced in the ACRS letter of March 22, 2007, and that led to its release to the public. The document is dated January 31, 2007. Why the long delay in its release? Below is extracted from page 1 of the 5 page document. And it reveals that after decades of spending, TRACE is a mess!


Memo to F. Gillespie,
TRACE V5.0 Documentation and Support - ML070260005. January 31, 2007

MEMORANDUM TO: Frank Gillespie, Executive DirectorAdvisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

FROM: Farouk Eltawila, Director /RA/Division of Risk Assessment and Special ProjectsOffice of Nuclear Regulatory Research

SUBJECT: TRACE V5.0 DOCUMENTATION AND SUPPORT

We have recently completed work on TRACE Version 5.0 and have made it available to the NRC staff to finalize assessment for this version and perform audit calculations. This is an important but not necessarily final step in the TRACE consolidation and development effort that has been ongoing for several years. The next steps in this development are to complete the documentation and provide the support necessary to make TRACE an efficient and effective tool for agency use.

The purpose of this memorandum is to
a) summarize the current status of TRACE development,
b) identify specific documentation and the expected completion dates,
c) communicate our plans for a peer review
d) list the activities to help integrate TRACE into the regulatory process

Sunday, April 8, 2007

Disgusting

So, I'm repeating myself.

Somebody should collect all of the letters about TRACE and its relatives that the ACRS has written over the decades.

And now a new Chairman, NRC gets yet another duplication of decades of recommendations. He is told that with all of the great video games on the street, TRACE must get up to speed, and we need yet another set of peer reviews.

He is not told about the endless and useless test programs that are purported to feed TRACE.

Saturday, April 7, 2007

Hiding the mammouth SMOKESCREEN

On February 28, 2007, I blogged, "The full ACRS meets March 8, 9 and 10, 2007, and will include the preparation of several ACRS reports in open sessions. One of the reports is "TRACE Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis Code. It will be interesting to find out what ACRS thinks about this chaotic situation."

And now, on April 7, 2007, I observe, indeed it is interesting to note that the ACRS handled the chaotic TRACE situation by hiding its evaluations of the mammoth smokescreen. Indeed, the ACRS produced its report, TRACE Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis Code. However, the report is not available to the public, and there is no transcript of the ACRS proceedings that produced that report. And that is what I mean by Hiding a mammoth SMOKESCREEN!

Following is the very sketchy ACRS letter report in italics (ML070810911) and the reference, the Eltawila memorandum, is not available to the public.

ACRSR-2242
March 22, 2007
The Honorable Dale E. KleinChairman

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRACE THERMAL-HYDRAULIC SYSTEM ANALYSISCODE

Dear Chairman Klein:

During the 540th meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), March 8-9, 2007, we completed our report on the development of the TRACE thermal-hydraulic (T/H) system analysis code. We also discussed this matter during our 539th meeting, February 1-3, 2007. Our Thermal-Hydraulic Phenomena Subcommittee discussed this matter on December 5, 2006. During these reviews, we had the benefit of discussions with representatives of the NRC staff and its contractors. We also had the benefit of the document referenced.

RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The schedule for documenting, validating, and peer reviewing TRACE should beaccelerated and the work completed expeditiously.
2. The development of a representative set of TRACE plant models and user testing onapplications should also be accelerated to facilitate timely incorporation of TRACE intothe regulatory process.


BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION
In the mid-1990s, the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, working with the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, determined that the four primary reactor system T/H codes that were in use at that time should be consolidated into one code. These codes included RELAP5 (LOCA), TRAC-P(PWR-LOCA), TRAC-B(BWR LOCA), and RAMONA (BWR Stability).
The models, correlations, and solution methodologies in these codes did not reflect the state-of-the- art and required in-depth review and modification. It was also recognized that they had been designed at a time when computer capabilities were limited and included many structural aspects, such as memory management, that were no longer needed and increased the cost of code maintenance and development. The availability of graphical user interfaces and their wide acceptance also suggested the desirability of incorporating similar capability in NRC codes. All these considerations led to extensive code consolidation, model improvements, and implementation efforts culminating in the development of TRACE .

TRACE is intended to serve as the main tool for confirmatory analyses of a broad range of thermal-hydraulic problems for current and future reactor designs. It has the potential to offer significantly enhanced capabilities for state-of-the-art analyses of thermal-hydraulic issues. Applications include certification of new reactor designs and the regulatory review of power uprates for currently operating reactors. Therefore, the schedule for documenting, validating, and peer reviewing TRACE, as well as the development of plant input decks, should be accelerated. The work should be completed expeditiously to enable the incorporation of the code into the regulatory process.


Sincerely,
/RA/
William J. Shack Chairman

Reference:
1. Memorandum from Farouk Eltawila, Director, Division of Risk Assessment and SpecialProjects, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, to Frank Gillespie, Executive Director,ACRS, “TRACE V5.0 Documentation and Support”, January 31, 2007


Note: The following paragraphs are extracted from my other blog, http://nuclearenergyblog.blogspot.com/

It is not a TRACE; it is a mammoth SMOKESCREEN
Wednesday, February 28, 2007

Somewhat periodically the NRC's ACRS reviews activities in the production of the massive so-called thermal hydraulics code, TRACE. The most recent review by the ACRS Thermal-Hydraulics Phenomenon Subcommittee , December 5, 2006, page 9, includes the following remark by MEMBER WALLIS: We recommended in our research report that TRACE becomes the tool for the agency. We recommend TRACE should actually become the mature code used by the agency all over the place and we wanted to see it mature and you say it's going to be universal documentation in 2007, but was sent to us to review seemed to be a hodgepodge of all kinds of stuff. What I want to review is a draft final document, not a hodgepodge of stuff which I have to figure out - not even dated. I don't even know whether some of the documents are old or new or what they are. That's not very helpful to us.

The entire transcript may be viewed at:

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/acrs/tr/subcommittee/2006/th120506.pdf

Going back to January 11, 2001, The ACRS issued a letter, Issues Associated With Industry-Developed Thermal-Hydraulics Codes. It is a lengthy tome with a very lengthy appendix.

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/acrs/letters/2001/4781926.html

The appendix includes the following section; I am quoting only the heading and the last sentence:

4. Codes have evolved, but the development process is hard to trace.This situation supports the need for the staff to have its own code and to maintain a clear record of why design choices were made in its development.

Now, the TRACE racket has been proceeding under various guises for decades.

Fortunes have been cast to the winds, not only in the software extravaganzas, but in the vast array of American as well as international test programs. The connections and relevance of the test programs to TRACE are obscure at best. The most recent disclosure of a link between testing and TRACE is from Staudenmeier in his slide presentation to the ACRS Thermal-Hydraulics Phenomenon Subcommittee on February 15, 2005. He discussed four test series; FLECHT, CCTF, SCTF, THTF, but these are a very small sample of the vast test programs that have been conducted, largely on the basis that they were needed for code development and proof testing. There is no mention of extensive LOFT and SPERT projects that were conducted decades ago at the presently named Idaho National Laboratory. This 2005 transcript may be viewed at:

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/acrs/tr/subcommittee/2005/th021505.pdf

There is no mention of the "... more than 50 tests ..." that are discussed in my entry of February 20, 2007. Returning to that matter, here are some extractions from the NRC Memo that predates the Staudenmaier slide show by almost one year.

Memo to Matthews/Black-Technical Safety Analysis of PRM-50-76,
A Petition for Rulemaking to Amend Appendix K to 10 CFR Part 50 and Regulatory Guide 1.157
ML041210109. 18 pagesApril 29, 2004

Mr. Leyse states that:“Petitioner is aware that more experiments with Zircaloy cladding have not been conducted on the scale necessary to . . . overcome the impression left from run 9573.”

In the above Memo, the NRC responded to its quote of Leyse as follows:

In the early 1980's, the NRC through Pacific Northwest Laboratories (PNL) contracted with National Research Universal (NRU) at Chalk River, Ontario, Canada to run a series of LOCA tests in the NRU reactor. More than 50 tests were conducted to evaluate the thermal-hydraulic and mechanical deformation behavior of a full length 32-rod nuclear bundle during the heatup, reflood and quench phases of a large break LOCA. Two tests were initially selected (References 17 and 18) for COBRA/TRAC (Reference 19) simulation to assess the applicability of that code. The NRC is reviewing the data from this program to determine the value of using it to assess the current generation of codes such as TRAC-M (Reference 20), now renamed TRACE.


The full ACRS meets March 8, 9 and 10, 2007 and will include the preparation of several ACRS reports in open sessions. One of the reports is "TRACE Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis Code." It will be interesting to find out what ACRS thinks about this chaotic situation.

Friday, April 6, 2007

It is not a TRACE; it is a mamouth SMOKESCREEN

TRACE review at ACRS in not revealed to the public. The discussions at ACRS as it finalized its repot on TRACE as well as the report itself are not availaable.

This is copied from nuclearenergyblog.blogspot.com entry of
Wednesday, February 28, 2007
It is not a TRACE; it is a mamouth SMOKESCREEN

Somewhat periodically the NRC's ACRS reviews activities in the production of the massive so-called thermal hydraulics code, TRACE. The most recent review by the ACRS Thermal-Hydraulics Phenomenon Subcommittee , December 5, 2006, page 9, includes the following remark by MEMBER WALLIS: We recommended in our research report that TRACE becomes the tool for the agency. We recommend TRACE should actually become the mature code used by the agency all over the place and we wanted to see it mature and you say it's going to be universal documentation in 2007, but was sent to us to review seemed to be a hodgepodge of all kinds of stuff. What I want to review is a draft final document, not a hodgepodge of stuff which I have to figure out - not even dated. I don't even know whether some of the documents are old or new or what they are. That's not very helpful to us.

The entire transcript may be viewed at:

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/acrs/tr/subcommittee/2006/th120506.pdf

Going back to January 11, 2001, The ACRS issued a letter, Issues Associated With Industry-Developed Thermal-Hydraulics Codes. It is a lengthy tome with a very lengthy appendix.

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/acrs/letters/2001/4781926.html

The appendix includes the following section; I am quoting only the heading and the last sentence:

4. Codes have evolved, but the development process is hard to trace.

This situation supports the need for the staff to have its own code and to maintain a clear record of why design choices were made in its development.


Now, the TRACE racket has been proceeding under various guises for decades. Fortunes have been cast to the winds, not only in the software extravaganzas, but in the vast array of American as well as international test programs. The connections and relevance of the test programs to TRACE is obscure at best. The most recent disclosure of a link between testing and TRACE is from Staudenmeier in his slide presentation to the ACRS Thermal-Hydraulics Phenomenon Subcommittee on February 15, 2005. Two slides follow:

Note: The slides have not been copied, the reader is referred to nulearenegyblog.blogspot.com, February 28, 2007.










The four test series in the slide above are a very small sample of the vast test programs that have been conducted, largely on the basis that they were needed for code development and proof testing. There is no mention of extensive LOFT and SPERT projects that were conducted decades ago at the presently named Idaho National Laboratory. This 2005 transcript may be viewed at:

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/acrs/tr/subcommittee/2005/th021505.pdf


There is no mention of the "... more than 50 tests ..." that are discussed in my entry of February 20, 2007. Returning to that matter, here are some extractions from the NRC Memo that predates the Staudenmaier slide show by almost one year.

Memo to Matthews/Black-Technical Safety Analysis of PRM-50-76, A Petition for Rulemaking to Amend Appendix K to 10 CFR Part 50 and Regulatory Guide 1.157 - ML041210109. 18 pages
April 29, 2004
Mr. Leyse states that:
“Petitioner is aware that more experiments with Zircaloy cladding have not been conducted on the scale necessary to . . . overcome the impression left from run 9573.”


In the above Memo, the NRC responded to its quote of Leyse as follows:

In the early 1980's, the NRC through Pacific Northwest Laboratories (PNL) contracted with National Research Universal (NRU) at Chalk River, Ontario, Canada to run a series of LOCA tests in the NRU reactor. More than 50 tests were conducted to evaluate the thermal-hydraulic and mechanical deformation behavior of a full length 32-rod nuclear bundle during the heatup, reflood and quench phases of a large break LOCA. Two tests were initially selected (References 17 and 18) for COBRA/TRAC (Reference 19) simulation to assess the applicability of that code. The NRC is reviewing the data from this program to determine the value of using it to assess the current generation of codes such as TRAC-M (Reference 20), now renamed TRACE.

The full ACRS meets March 8, 9 and 10, 2007 and will include the preparation of several ACRS reports in open sessions. One of the reports is "TRACE Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis Code." It will be interesting to find out what ACRS thinks about this chaotic situation.

Blind faith in single tube tests in the production of TRACE; This entry is copied from March 3, 2007, nuclearenergyblog.blogspot.com

Blind faith in single tube tests in the production of TRACE

The following text in italics is copied from the transcript of the full ACRS meeting on February 1, 2007. It is a very small part of the part of the transcript that covers TRACE, however, it reveals significantly more than the previous lengthy discussion of the TRACE activities.

MEMBER ABDEL-KHALIK: But philosophically, if you had a perfect code, and you understand the physics, then it doesn't matter what the scale is because you're verifying phenomena. And therefore, by this process, you're essentially saying the code is nothing more than an empirical fitting tool for the experimental data. Is that true?

MEMBER BANERJEE: It cannot predict new phenomena.

MEMBER ABDEL-KHALIK: Because you are limiting the range of applicability of the code, essentially, to a rather narrow range around where the experiment is. So the code, you philosophically by doing this, you're viewing the code as nothing more than an empirical fitting tool.

MR. BAJOREK: I think that's an accurate statement.

MEMBER POWERS: Do you really want to say that though? I think that's what he was getting at.
MEMBER BANERJEE: It's not predictive of new phenomena.MR. BAJOREK: That's the -- these codes are not based on first principles. They are based on and held together by closure relations which are based on sub-scale experiments. A lot of those correlations come from single tube tests and you are using that at faith when you start to look at larger and larger scales. Assessment helps to benchmark and let you know whether those correlations are truly applicable with those other conditions but going back to the experiments, we all in integral tests in particular, you want to try to establish a basis for that system global-wide behavior and is it going to behave much like you'd expect in something with much larger scale. But the smaller scale test, that's all you have to run the full test.

MEMBER BANERJEE: As we come to full scale tests.

MR. BAJOREK: If we had full scale tests the --

MEMBER BANERJEE: The assemble system, we can do it in components.

MR. BAJOREK: Components, yes. That's all

The complete transcript from which the above was extracted may be found at:

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/acrs/tr/fullcommittee/2007/ac020107.pdf

However, all of the single tube tests, and also the larger scale tests were conducted with clean (unfouled) heat transfer surfaces. Faith in those tests is blind faith. More later on this.