Old News: Flooding of Containment at Indian Point Unit 2

This is a very interesting event. On October 17, 1980, with the Indian Point 2 at full power, the containment was flooded very severely and the reactor pressure vessel was partially submerged. On October 24, 1980, the NRC issued Information Notice No. 80-37 that is copied below. The Notice refers to an unanalyzed thermal stress condition of potential safety significance.

However, by April 7, 1981, the technical staff of the N.R.C. said the Indian Point 2 nuclear reactor apparently suffered no damage from the flooding incident, and cleared the way for the unit to be restarted. But one month later, Con Edison announced that it had run another mechanical problem with Indian Point 2 and that if would not be able to put plant back in service until the end of May.

May 26, 1981. Indian Point 2 resumes service.

Here is the Information Notice of October 24, 1980:

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

October 24, 1980
Information Notice No. 80-37:

CONTAINMENT COOLER LEAKS AND REACTOR CAVITY FLOODING AT INDIAN POINT UNIT 2

Description of Circumstances: This Notice contains information regarding multiple service water leaks into containment with resulting damage to reactor instrumentation and potential damage to the reactor pressure vessel.

Upon containment entry on October 17, 1980 at Indian Point Unit 2, to repair a malfunctioning power range nuclear detector, it was discovered that a significant amount of water was collected (approximately 100,000 gal) on the containment floor, in the containment sumps, and in the cavity under the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). This collected water probably caused the detector malfunction, and the water in the cavity under the RPV is believed to have been deep enough to wet several feet of the pressure vessel lower head, causing an unanalyzed thermal stress condition of potential safety significance. This condition resulted from the following combination of conditions: (1) Both containment sump pumps were inoperable, one due to blown fuses from an unknown cause and the other due to binding of its controlling float; (2) The two containment sump level indicating lights which would indicate increasing water level over the water level range present in the containment were stuck(on) and may have been for several days, leaving the operator with no operable instrumentation to measure water level in the containment; (3) The moisture level indicators in the containment did not indicate high moisture levels, apparently because they are designed to detect pressurized hot water or steam leaks (i.e., a LOCA), and are not sensitive to the lower airborne moisture levels resulting from relatively small cold water leaks; (4) The hold-up tanks which ultimately receive water pumped from the containment sump also receive Unit 1 process water, lab drain water, etc. These other water sources masked the effect of cessation of water flows from the Unit 2 sump; (5) There were significant, multiple service water leaks from the containment fan cooling units directly onto the containment floor. These coolers have a history of such leakage, which cannot be detected by supply inventory losses since the supply system (service water system) is not a closed system; (6) The two submersible pumps in the cavity under the Reactor Pressure Vessel were ineffective since they pump onto the containment floor for ultimate removal by the (inoperable) containment sump pumps. There is no water level instrumentation in the cavity under the RPV, nor was there any indication outside the containment when these pumps are running.

The licensee has installed redundant sump level annunciated alarms in the , control room and has installed an annunciated alarm in the control room to indicate if either submersible pump in the reactor cavity activates. The licensee has also repaired the service water leaks, installed guide bushings on the sump pump control floats to prevent their binding, and has repaired the containment sump water level indicators. .

Page 2 0f 2 IN 80-37 October 24, 1980

The licensee plans in the longer term to replace the containment fan unit cooling coils.

It is anticipated that results of a continuing NRC investigation into this incident will result in issuance of an IE Bulletin and/or an NRR Generic Letter in the near future which will recommend or require specific licensees and applicant actions. In the interim, we recommend that all licensee ascertain that the potential does not exist for undetected water accumulation in the containment.

This Information Notice is provided to inform licensees of a possibly significant matter. No written response to this Information Notice is required.

America's first private nuclear power plant.

The Indian Point Reactors: a revealing list of events through January 10, 2003.

Here is the prime event from the list:

Oct. 17, 1980. A major water leak in a joint of a pipe carrying nonradioactive water at Indian Point 2 releases about 100,000 gallons of water, flooding a containment building of Indian Point 2.

Oct. 24, 1980. The N.R.C. orders Indian Point 2 shut down until Con Edison determines how the leak went unnoticed. Five days later, the commission initiates an investigation to determine why Con Edison failed to notify the commission about the leak.

Dec. 10, 1980. The N.R.C. fines Con Edison $210,000 for the flooding in October.

April 7, 1981. The technical staff of the N.R.C. says the Indian Point 2 nuclear reactor apparently suffered no damage from the flooding incident, clearing the way for the unit to be restarted. But one month later, Con Edison announces it has run into still another mechanical problem with Indian Point 2 and will not be able to put plant back in service until the end of May.

May 26, 1981. Indian Point 2 resumes service.


And here is the list copied from the New York Times.

Indian Point: From Amusement Park to Power Plant

NY TIMES 8apr03

Consolidated Edison built the first privately financed, commercial nuclear power plant in the United States in Buchanan, N.Y. That plant and the two others eventually built on the site have had troubled histories.

Oct. 8, 1954. Con Edison announces the purchase of a 260-acre site in Buchanan, the former Indian Point amusement park and adjacent land, 35 miles north of midtown Manhattan, to construct an atomic power plant.

Sept. 16, 1962. The reactor that would become known as Indian Point 1 begins generating power.

Dec. 10, 1962. Con Edison applies for a permit to build another reactor, in Ravenswood, Queens. The application is withdrawn on Jan. 6, 1964, after public protests.

May 27, 1965. Seven Congressmen from New York State accuse state officials of covering up the killing of fish in the Hudson River near the Indian Point power plant. The fish kills are blamed on hot water the plant discharges into the river from its cooling systems.

Nov. 23, 1965. Con Edison's directors approve plans to build a second nuclear reactor at Indian Point. Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller calls the move "of major importance to our state and its expanding atomic industry."

April 1967. Con Edison applies for permission to build a third nuclear plant at Indian Point. Permission is granted in August 1969.

May 13, 1970. The state charges Con Edison with serious violations of state conservation laws in the operation of its nuclear generating plant and asks that the plant be closed until "suitable methods" to protect the Hudson River can be developed. State seeks $5 million in damages for the loss of fish.

June 30, 1970. Indian Point 1 is shut down because of defects in the stainless steel piping used to help keep the reactor cool. Meanwhile, the plant is fined $1.6 million for fish kills in Hudson caused by its hot water discharge.

May 1972. The state levies $1.5 million in fines against Con Edison for "massive" fish kills in the Hudson. The total fine is based on a civil penalty of $500 plus $10 for each fish killed.

June 26, 1973. In a test, Indian Point 2 produces power for the first time. It goes into full operation more than a year later in October 1974, after repairs to the steel liner in the reinforced concrete dome protecting the reactor.

Dec. 1, 1973. Con Edison acknowledges that its new power plant, Indian Point 2, has significant problems, after an accident forced it to shut down. Con Edison officials says the problems centered around a buckling and bulging of the steel liner in the reinforced concrete dome in which the nuclear plant is housed.

Sept. 18, 1974. The State Legislature votes to allow the Power Authority of the State of New York to take over Con Edison's Indian Point 3 plant, which is still under construction, to help save the financially ailing Con Edison.

Oct. 14, 1974. Indian Point 1 is permanently shut down, 12 years after going into operation, because it lacks an emergency cooling system for the reactor core, which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission insists be added. The plant is retired but not decommissioned.

Dec. 30, 1975. Under pressure from Gov. Hugh L. Carey, Con Edison agrees to sell Indian Point 3 to the State Power Authority. The action disappoints environmentalists who hoped the sale could be blocked and the plant closed down as a threat to the Hudson River and adjacent areas of Westchester County.

Jan. 20, 1976. William N. Anders, chairman of the N.R.C., orders two separate investigations of two Indian Point reactors a week after Robert D. Pollard, the commission's project manager for Indian Point 3, questioned plant safety and resigned from the N.R.C. staff. After hearings in Washington, the N.R.C. decided to take no action.

Aug. 30, 1976. Indian Point 3 goes into operation.

October 1979. An accident occurs at the Three Mile Island power plant in Middletown, Pa. President Carter appoints a commission to investigate, and to consider whether any of the nation's existing reactors should be shut down.

Dec. 18, 1979. The N.R.C. says that emergency evacuation plans for Indian Point are "lacking." The commission gives Con Edison and the State Power Authority two months to submit revisions.

Jan. 29, 1980. The two nuclear plants at Indian Point have been shut down for five months for refueling, maintenance and repairs, and the N.R.C. says safety improvements must be completed before they can resume operation. Indian Point 2 is restarted in early February and Indian Point 3 returns to service on Feb. 16.

Feb. 27, 1980. Con Edison accedes to the wishes of the N.R.C. and retires Indian Point 1 permanently.

Oct. 17, 1980. A major water leak in a joint of a pipe carrying nonradioactive water at Indian Point 2 releases about 100,000 gallons of water, flooding a containment building of Indian Point 2.

Oct. 24, 1980. The N.R.C. orders Indian Point 2 shut down until Con Edison determines how the leak went unnoticed. Five days later, the commission initiates an investigation to determine why Con Edison failed to notify the commission about the leak.

Dec. 10, 1980. The N.R.C. fines Con Edison $210,000 for the flooding in October.

Jan. 31, 1981. The State Power Authority shuts down Indian Point 3 because of malfunction in the plant's steam turbine section. Meanwhile, officials from the four-county area within 10 miles of Indian Point testify that an emergency evacuation plan presented by the utilities contains major flaws and urges that they not be approved.

April 7, 1981. The technical staff of the N.R.C. says the Indian Point 2 nuclear reactor apparently suffered no damage from the flooding incident, clearing the way for the unit to be restarted. But one month later, Con Edison announces it has run into still another mechanical problem with Indian Point 2 and will not be able to put plant back in service until the end of May.

May 26, 1981. Indian Point 2 resumes service.

Dec. 11, 1981. Con Edison is fined $40,000 by the N.R.C. for not protecting workers from radiation at its Indian Point 2 plant.

March 3, 1982. Indian Point simulates a major accident to test emergency evacuation plans. Federal officials say later that the drill was "generally good," although there were areas that need strengthening.

Aug. 2, 1982. The N.R.C. threatens to close Indian Point unless flaws in the emergency evacuation plans for the area surrounding the plant are corrected within four months. The commission cites deficiencies in provisions for notifying residents in the area, for educating the public in advance about what to do, for making agreements with bus companies to provide emergency service and for limiting exposure of emergency workers to radiation.

Sept. 2, 1982. The chairman of a three-judge panel conducting hearings on safety of the two Indian Point plant resigns, saying the N.R.C. was not giving opponents of the plant a fair chance to state their case. The chairman, Administrative Law Judge Louis J. Carter, had been presiding at hearings ordered by the commission.

Dec. 17, 1982. The Federal Emergency Management Agency, which is charged with evaluating preparations to cope with an accident at Indian Point, says the emergency plants were "not feasible" because of significant deficiencies. The agency says it will decide whether to fine the utility operators, suspend the plant's operating licenses or take other action.

Dec. 22, 1982. The N.R.C. votes 3 to 2 to permit the Indian Point nuclear reactors to operate and to wait until an accident drill in March to determine whether deficiencies in emergency planning had been corrected.
March 9, 1983. Two thousand people, from bus drivers to county executives, test their ability to respond to a major accident at the Indian Point plants, under the observation of 55 Federal inspectors and one of the five members of N.R.C.

April 15, 1983. FEMA issues a report based on the March drill that concludes the area around Indian Point is not prepared for a possible accident at the nuclear reactors, and the safety for the 288,000 people living in the area cannot be assured.

Aug. 26, 1983. FEMA says officials had remedied deficiencies in the plans for coping with an accident at Indian Point and prepares a report for the N.R.C., ending what was then the plant's most serious threat to its license.

Dec. 30, 1993. Ten months after Indian Point 3 was shut down because of mismanagement and safety problems, Federal regulators tell plant managers they are concerned that personnel there cannot handle the plant safely even when it is shut down. It does not reopen until July 1995.

Feb. 14, 2000. In the most serious incident since the plant opened in 1974, a rupture in a steam generator tube at Indian Point 2 releases a minute amount of radioactive steam, though federal regulators and company officials say public health was not threatened. The reactor is shut until December.

Jan. 10, 2003. With anxiety about the the plant growing in the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, a consultant hired by Gov. George E. Pataki calls emergency plans inadequate to protect the public from a disastrous leak of radiation at Indian Point. The consultant, James Lee Witt, former director of FEMA, says the plans fail to take into account the possibility of a terrorist attack.

From the man who created the largest, smallest, and most efficient pure fission bombs produced:

I copied the following from ArmsControlWonk.com

Finally, from the man who created the largest, smallest, and most efficient pure fission bombs produced:

Utility of Reactor Grade Plutonium in Nuclear Weapons
Theodore B. Taylor
Visiting FellowCenter for Energy and Environmental Studies
Princeton University, Princeton NJ 08544
June 10, 1998

Contrary to opinions expressed by many nuclear engineers that are not familiar with the still secret intimate details of nuclear weapon design and operation, plutonium extracted from all types of spent fuel removed from nuclear power plants or research reactors can be used for making modern fission or thermonuclear weapons that are reliabily predictable in performance, over a very wide range of yields, from fractions of a kiloton to megatons of high explosive equivalent. This has been true for decades, and confirmed by numerous nuclear weapon tests.

It is true that the first generation of implosion type fission bombs, such as the one that destroyed Nagasaki in 1945, could “fizzle” and produce much lower than the design yields if the plutonium they contained were of “reactor grade.” This could be the result of premature initiation of a fission chain reaction by spontaneous fission neutrons emitted by Pu-240 or other isotopes that are more abundant in reactor grade than weapon grade plutonium. But ways to avoid this problem, by use of plutonium in different designs that could be reliably used for fission and thermonuclear weapons were developed and demonstrated before the end of the 1950s. The performance of these weapons is not significantly degraded by using reactor grade plutonium instead of weapon grade plutonium.

And, here is what has been reported regarding Taylor's skills:
"He was famous in the community of bomb experts as the most creative and imaginative of the designers," said Freeman Dyson, a physicist, author and retired Princeton University professor who was a friend of Dr. Taylor's. "His bomb designs were the smallest, the most elegant and the most efficient. He was able to draw his designs freehand, without elaborate calculations. When they were built and tested, they worked."

Engineer Accused of Taking Codes to Iran (Copied from AOL)

Engineer Accused of Taking Codes to Iran
AP April 21, 2007
PHOENIX (AP) - A former engineer at the nation's largest nuclear power plant has been charged with taking computer access codes and software to Iran and using it to download details of plant control rooms and reactors, authorities said. The FBI said there's no indication the plant employee had any terrorist connections.

Mohammad Alavi, who worked at the triple-reactor Palo Verde power plant west of Phoenix, was arrested April 9 at Los Angeles International Airport when he arrived on a flight from Iran, authorities said. Alavi, 49, is a U.S. citizen and denies any wrongdoing, said his attorney, Milagros Cisneros of the Federal Defender's Office in Phoenix.

He is charged with a single count of violating a trade embargo that prohibits Americans from exporting goods and services to Iran. If convicted, he would face up to 21 months in prison.

According to court records, the software is used only for training plant employees, but allowed users access to details on the Palo Verde control rooms and the plant layout. In October, authorities alleged, the software was used to download training materials from Tehran, using a Palo Verde user identification.

The FBI said there was no evidence to suggest the software access was linked to the Iranian government, which has clashed with the West over attempts to develop its own nuclear program. "The investigation has not led us to believe this information was taken for the purpose of being used by a foreign government or terrorists to attack us," said Deborah McCarley, a spokeswoman for the FBI in Phoenix.

Officials of Arizona Public Service Co., the Phoenix-based utility company that operates the Palo Verde Nuclear Generation Station, said the software does not pose a security risk because it doesn't control any of the nuclear plant's operating systems. However, the utility said it has changed software security procedures since Alavi quit in August after working there for 16 years. "The health and safety of the public was never compromised and there was no threat to the security of Palo Verde," APS spokesman Jim McDonald said Saturday.

A federal judge in Phoenix denied him bail at a hearing on Friday, saying Alavi had more ties to Iran than the United States and could easily flee. Alavi, who was born in Tehran, has family, a house and a job lined up in Iran, Judge Neil Wake said.

Palo Verde has been plagued by outages and equipment problems for the past several years. The plant, located about 50 miles west of downtown Phoenix, supplies electricity to some 4 million customers in Arizona, New Mexico, Texas and California.

Correction to Arpril, 7, 2007, Entry in this BLOG

On April 7, 2007, in this blog, I reported that the following reference was not available to the public. I was wrong. It became available on April 3, 2007. Apparently it was unintentionally referenced in the ACRS letter of March 22, 2007, and that led to its release to the public. The document is dated January 31, 2007. Why the long delay in its release? Below is extracted from page 1 of the 5 page document. And it reveals that after decades of spending, TRACE is a mess!


Memo to F. Gillespie,
TRACE V5.0 Documentation and Support - ML070260005. January 31, 2007

MEMORANDUM TO: Frank Gillespie, Executive DirectorAdvisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

FROM: Farouk Eltawila, Director /RA/Division of Risk Assessment and Special ProjectsOffice of Nuclear Regulatory Research

SUBJECT: TRACE V5.0 DOCUMENTATION AND SUPPORT

We have recently completed work on TRACE Version 5.0 and have made it available to the NRC staff to finalize assessment for this version and perform audit calculations. This is an important but not necessarily final step in the TRACE consolidation and development effort that has been ongoing for several years. The next steps in this development are to complete the documentation and provide the support necessary to make TRACE an efficient and effective tool for agency use.

The purpose of this memorandum is to
a) summarize the current status of TRACE development,
b) identify specific documentation and the expected completion dates,
c) communicate our plans for a peer review
d) list the activities to help integrate TRACE into the regulatory process

Disgusting

So, I'm repeating myself.

Somebody should collect all of the letters about TRACE and its relatives that the ACRS has written over the decades.

And now a new Chairman, NRC gets yet another duplication of decades of recommendations. He is told that with all of the great video games on the street, TRACE must get up to speed, and we need yet another set of peer reviews.

He is not told about the endless and useless test programs that are purported to feed TRACE.

Hiding the mammouth SMOKESCREEN

On February 28, 2007, I blogged, "The full ACRS meets March 8, 9 and 10, 2007, and will include the preparation of several ACRS reports in open sessions. One of the reports is "TRACE Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis Code. It will be interesting to find out what ACRS thinks about this chaotic situation."

And now, on April 7, 2007, I observe, indeed it is interesting to note that the ACRS handled the chaotic TRACE situation by hiding its evaluations of the mammoth smokescreen. Indeed, the ACRS produced its report, TRACE Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis Code. However, the report is not available to the public, and there is no transcript of the ACRS proceedings that produced that report. And that is what I mean by Hiding a mammoth SMOKESCREEN!

Following is the very sketchy ACRS letter report in italics (ML070810911) and the reference, the Eltawila memorandum, is not available to the public.

ACRSR-2242
March 22, 2007
The Honorable Dale E. KleinChairman
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRACE THERMAL-HYDRAULIC SYSTEM ANALYSISCODE

Dear Chairman Klein:

During the 540th meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), March 8-9, 2007, we completed our report on the development of the TRACE thermal-hydraulic (T/H) system analysis code. We also discussed this matter during our 539th meeting, February 1-3, 2007. Our Thermal-Hydraulic Phenomena Subcommittee discussed this matter on December 5, 2006. During these reviews, we had the benefit of discussions with representatives of the NRC staff and its contractors. We also had the benefit of the document referenced.

RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The schedule for documenting, validating, and peer reviewing TRACE should beaccelerated and the work completed expeditiously.
2. The development of a representative set of TRACE plant models and user testing onapplications should also be accelerated to facilitate timely incorporation of TRACE intothe regulatory process.

BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION
In the mid-1990s, the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, working with the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, determined that the four primary reactor system T/H codes that were in use at that time should be consolidated into one code. These codes included RELAP5 (LOCA), TRAC-P(PWR-LOCA), TRAC-B(BWR LOCA), and RAMONA (BWR Stability).
The models, correlations, and solution methodologies in these codes did not reflect the state-of-the- art and required in-depth review and modification. It was also recognized that they had been designed at a time when computer capabilities were limited and included many structural aspects, such as memory management, that were no longer needed and increased the cost of code maintenance and development. The availability of graphical user interfaces and their wide acceptance also suggested the desirability of incorporating similar capability in NRC codes. All these considerations led to extensive code consolidation, model improvements, and implementation efforts culminating in the development of TRACE .

TRACE is intended to serve as the main tool for confirmatory analyses of a broad range of thermal-hydraulic problems for current and future reactor designs. It has the potential to offer significantly enhanced capabilities for state-of-the-art analyses of thermal-hydraulic issues. Applications include certification of new reactor designs and the regulatory review of power uprates for currently operating reactors. Therefore, the schedule for documenting, validating, and peer reviewing TRACE, as well as the development of plant input decks, should be accelerated. The work should be completed expeditiously to enable the incorporation of the code into the regulatory process.

Sincerely,
/RA/
William J. Shack Chairman

Reference:
1. Memorandum from Farouk Eltawila, Director, Division of Risk Assessment and SpecialProjects, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, to Frank Gillespie, Executive Director,ACRS, “TRACE V5.0 Documentation and Support”, January 31, 2007

Note: The following paragraphs are extracted from my other blog, http://nuclearenergyblog.blogspot.com/

It is not a TRACE; it is a mammoth SMOKESCREEN
Wednesday, February 28, 2007

Somewhat periodically the NRC's ACRS reviews activities in the production of the massive so-called thermal hydraulics code, TRACE. The most recent review by the ACRS Thermal-Hydraulics Phenomenon Subcommittee , December 5, 2006, page 9, includes the following remark by MEMBER WALLIS: We recommended in our research report that TRACE becomes the tool for the agency. We recommend TRACE should actually become the mature code used by the agency all over the place and we wanted to see it mature and you say it's going to be universal documentation in 2007, but was sent to us to review seemed to be a hodgepodge of all kinds of stuff. What I want to review is a draft final document, not a hodgepodge of stuff which I have to figure out - not even dated. I don't even know whether some of the documents are old or new or what they are. That's not very helpful to us.

The entire transcript may be viewed at:

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/acrs/tr/subcommittee/2006/th120506.pdf

Going back to January 11, 2001, The ACRS issued a letter, Issues Associated With Industry-Developed Thermal-Hydraulics Codes. It is a lengthy tome with a very lengthy appendix.

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/acrs/letters/2001/4781926.html

The appendix includes the following section; I am quoting only the heading and the last sentence:

4. Codes have evolved, but the development process is hard to trace.This situation supports the need for the staff to have its own code and to maintain a clear record of why design choices were made in its development.

Now, the TRACE racket has been proceeding under various guises for decades.

Fortunes have been cast to the winds, not only in the software extravaganzas, but in the vast array of American as well as international test programs. The connections and relevance of the test programs to TRACE are obscure at best. The most recent disclosure of a link between testing and TRACE is from Staudenmeier in his slide presentation to the ACRS Thermal-Hydraulics Phenomenon Subcommittee on February 15, 2005. He discussed four test series; FLECHT, CCTF, SCTF, THTF, but these are a very small sample of the vast test programs that have been conducted, largely on the basis that they were needed for code development and proof testing. There is no mention of extensive LOFT and SPERT projects that were conducted decades ago at the presently named Idaho National Laboratory. This 2005 transcript may be viewed at:

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/acrs/tr/subcommittee/2005/th021505.pdf

There is no mention of the "... more than 50 tests ..." that are discussed in my entry of February 20, 2007. Returning to that matter, here are some extractions from the NRC Memo that predates the Staudenmaier slide show by almost one year.

Memo to Matthews/Black-Technical Safety Analysis of PRM-50-76,
A Petition for Rulemaking to Amend Appendix K to 10 CFR Part 50 and Regulatory Guide 1.157
ML041210109. 18 pagesApril 29, 2004

Mr. Leyse states that:“Petitioner is aware that more experiments with Zircaloy cladding have not been conducted on the scale necessary to . . . overcome the impression left from run 9573.”

In the above Memo, the NRC responded to its quote of Leyse as follows:

In the early 1980's, the NRC through Pacific Northwest Laboratories (PNL) contracted with National Research Universal (NRU) at Chalk River, Ontario, Canada to run a series of LOCA tests in the NRU reactor. More than 50 tests were conducted to evaluate the thermal-hydraulic and mechanical deformation behavior of a full length 32-rod nuclear bundle during the heatup, reflood and quench phases of a large break LOCA. Two tests were initially selected (References 17 and 18) for COBRA/TRAC (Reference 19) simulation to assess the applicability of that code. The NRC is reviewing the data from this program to determine the value of using it to assess the current generation of codes such as TRAC-M (Reference 20), now renamed TRACE.

The full ACRS meets March 8, 9 and 10, 2007 and will include the preparation of several ACRS reports in open sessions. One of the reports is "TRACE Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis Code." It will be interesting to find out what ACRS thinks about this chaotic situation.