Friday, December 27, 2013
Sunday, December 22, 2013
A recent Fukushima release via ENFORMABLE; note the members of the Consortium.
Here is a recent release of early stuff, April 29, 2011 (from ENFORMABLE on December 16, 2013). NOTE THAT THE CONSORTIUM INCLUDES General Electric Company. I wonder if SANDIA was involved via DOE or NRC.
One essential function among five listed is:
Maintain reactors and spent fuel pools subcritical and adequately shielded.
One essential function among five listed is:
Maintain reactors and spent fuel pools subcritical and adequately shielded.
Posted:
16 Dec 2013 01:39 PM PST
In April of 2011, a consortium of industrial and governmental organizations
established to provide advice to Japan in its efforts to stabilize the
conditions at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, authored an analysis of
Tokyo Electric’s roadmap to restore stability at the crippled facility. The
consortium was made up of representatives from General Electric, Hitachi,
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), Naval Reactors, United States
Department of Energy / Nuclear Energy, and the United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
The roadmap which had been released by TEPCO gave examples of the near-term actions that TEPCO deemed necessary to minimize radiation releases and reestablish safety.
The consortium established five essential functions necessary for achieving the near term goal for improving plant conditions.
The five essential functions are as follows:
At Unit 1, the consortium was concerned that water being sprayed on the spent fuel pool was not actually reaching the pool. They advised that TEPCO investigate and confirm that the spent fuel in the spent fuel pool was being cooled.
In Unit 1, Unit 2, and Unit 4, the consortium felt that TEPCO should install independent redundant backup systems for cooling.
While the consortium expressed concern about the Unit 4 spent fuel pool, experts were also concerned about the structural integrity of the Unit 3 building after being ripped apart by the explosions.
The consortium analysis pointed out that TEPCO’s roadmap was glaringly silent on maintaining the fuel sub-critical. Further, the experts even questioned TEPCO’s ability to detect and monitor inadvertent criticality.
After using sea water for emergency cooling in the reactors, experts felt that consideration should be given to biological growth which may occur in the reactor vessels, containments, and spent fuel pools. This had been witnessed at Three Mile Island, where it had been learned that the growth of such life forms could reduce visibility in the waters at best, or even worse could affect coolability of the fuel by reducing flows or heat transfer coefficients from surfaces.
To view the TEPCO Roadmap follow the link below:
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11041707-e.html
The roadmap which had been released by TEPCO gave examples of the near-term actions that TEPCO deemed necessary to minimize radiation releases and reestablish safety.
The consortium established five essential functions necessary for achieving the near term goal for improving plant conditions.
The five essential functions are as follows:
- Remove decay and chemical heat from reactors, containment, and spent fuel pools.
- Maintain reactors and spent fuel pools subcritical and adequately shielded.
- Ensure structural integrity for all units (e.g. containment and spent fuel pools).
- Provide reliable indication of essential parameters.
- Terminate (or render insignificant) uncontrolled radioactive releases.
At Unit 1, the consortium was concerned that water being sprayed on the spent fuel pool was not actually reaching the pool. They advised that TEPCO investigate and confirm that the spent fuel in the spent fuel pool was being cooled.
In Unit 1, Unit 2, and Unit 4, the consortium felt that TEPCO should install independent redundant backup systems for cooling.
While the consortium expressed concern about the Unit 4 spent fuel pool, experts were also concerned about the structural integrity of the Unit 3 building after being ripped apart by the explosions.
The consortium analysis pointed out that TEPCO’s roadmap was glaringly silent on maintaining the fuel sub-critical. Further, the experts even questioned TEPCO’s ability to detect and monitor inadvertent criticality.
After using sea water for emergency cooling in the reactors, experts felt that consideration should be given to biological growth which may occur in the reactor vessels, containments, and spent fuel pools. This had been witnessed at Three Mile Island, where it had been learned that the growth of such life forms could reduce visibility in the waters at best, or even worse could affect coolability of the fuel by reducing flows or heat transfer coefficients from surfaces.
To view the TEPCO Roadmap follow the link below:
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11041707-e.html
Tuesday, December 17, 2013
Spent Fuel Pool LOCAs and Censorship by NRC
Censorship continues. NRC will not open up. Here is my email to my Idaho Senator dated November 20, 2013:
From: Bobleyse@aol.com
To: kari_emond@risch.senate.gov
CC: chairman@nrc.gov, cmrapostolakis@nrc.gov, cmrostendorff@nrc.gov, cmcmrmagwood@nrc.gov, cmrsvinicki@nrc.gov
Sent: 11/20/2013 1:34:10 P.M. Mountain Standard Time
Subj: The NRC lied to Senator Risch
From: Zigh, Ghani
From: Bobleyse@aol.com
To: kari_emond@risch.senate.gov
CC: chairman@nrc.gov, cmrapostolakis@nrc.gov, cmrostendorff@nrc.gov, cmcmrmagwood@nrc.gov, cmrsvinicki@nrc.gov
Sent: 11/20/2013 1:34:10 P.M. Mountain Standard Time
Subj: The NRC lied to Senator Risch
Senator Risch:
On March 1, 2012, Buchanan of NRC wrote: The NRC has a long
history of, and commitment to, transparency, participation, and collaboration in
our regulatory activities.
I’ll concede that is likely that Buchanan’s letter
is sufficiently weasel-worded so that lawyers at NRC could prove that nobody
lied.
For years I have been trying to get details of NRC
sponsored work at Sandia in the area of spent fuel pool fires. NRC has stiff-armed my attempts. It turns out that even GE and NEI have been
stiff-armed; the following e-mail at NRC in the time frame of the shock of
Fukushima is
revealing:
From: Zigh, Ghani
To: Gibson, Kathy; Scott, Michael
Sent: Wed Mar
16 14:01:31 2011
Subject: FW: Spent Fuel
Experiments
What is our decision on sharing the BWR zirc fire data with GE and NEI.
They are classified as OUO documents.
In order to
keep this brief, I’ll go right to the bottom line. I want to know what is going on and what has
been going on and what will be going on.
There are or have been a lot of non-American participants who apparently
have full access to this activity. How
in the world did American taxpayers get stuck in a situation that requires that
the work be classified as OUO and that stiff-arms American taxpayers, while a
league of foreigners not only has access to the work, but may control
it?
Finally, I am an expert in these matters. On
Mayday, 2002, I sent PRM-50-76 to NRC, NRC denied it, and I am continuing to
work in the field. Fukushima on the Columbia would be no fun and the
Columbia Generating Station is not worth the risk.
Robert H. Leyse
222 Elkhorn Road
P. O. Box 2850
Sun Valley, ID 83353
I have not received any reply. I'll send further requests during early January 2014.
Sunday, December 1, 2013
SANDIA Spent Fuel Pool Fires and the Need-to-Know
Here are interesting SANDIA documents in the area of spent
fuel pool accidents. These are heavily sanitized and I want the original
reports.
Here is a GAO report that is not sanitized:
The above GAO report refers to access to classified reports as
follows:
The draft report recommends that the NRC Chairman direct the agency staff to develop a mechanism that allows individuals with appropriate clearances and the need-to-know to easily identify and access classified studies and help ensure that institution knowledge is not lost.
So, if I want to find out what is going on at SANDIA and
elsewhere I'll have to become one of tthe "... individuals with appropriate
clearances and the need-to-know ... ."
Wednesday, November 27, 2013
Significant links for the 1% in BWR Mark I and Mark II venting II
and
Also we have these from NEI:
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1321/ML13217A440.pdf
And this is from NRC, released November 14, 2013:
I sent this email today
| Fwd: The circle | |
| Date: | 11/29/2013 8:33:35 A.M. Mountain Standard Time |
| From: | |
Hello Again:
I found the problem. ML13304B838 is incorrect. ML13304B836
works. I believe that the sentence in ML13326B085 should be improved as
follows:
For additional information, on November 14, 2013, the NRC
has issued the interim staff guidance (ISG) document JLD-ISG-2013-02
(ML13304B836) for the implementation of Order EA-13-109, which
endorses
the industry guidance in NEI 13-02 (ML13316A853) with some clarifications.
the industry guidance in NEI 13-02 (ML13316A853) with some clarifications.
I have not studied ML13304B836 and ML13316A853. However, it
is interesting that a word search on "1 percent" yields zero findings in
ML13304B836 and seven in ML13316A85.
Also, I note that ML13304B836 does not reference ML13221A011
of August 9, 2013.
Tuesday, November 26, 2013
The one percent and BWR Mark I and II
Speaks for Itself
Note: The following is a copy of ML13326B085. Unfortuately, the spacing is altered from the document that is on NRC's ADAMS.
http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/search.cfm?q=ML13326B085.&s=
OR
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1332/ML13326B085.pdf
Response to Mr. Leyse’s email dated October 14, 2013 regarding corrections to
ML13221A011 related to basis for venting capacity in Order EA-13-102.
The NRC staff prepared “Basis for Venting Capacity in Order EA-13-109, ‘Order to Modify
Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under
Severe Accident Conditions’” (ML13221A011) in response to an inquiry received by the NRC in an e-mail dated July 25, 2013 from Mr. Robert H. Leyse. This document was provided to
Mr. Leyse in an email dated August 9, 2013. The subject of the inquiry and related response
was the design goal requirement in EA-13-109 of 1% decay heat removal capacity of the severe accident capable hardened containment vent system (HCVS) for boiling water reactors with Mark I and Mark II containments. In an e-mail dated October 14, 2013, Mr. Leyse stated the
following in regards to the response provided in the subject document:
1) It contains an erroneous statement related to the basis for the venting capacity and,
therefore, requests the staff to delete the statement from ML13221A011.
2) Document should Include the ADAMS Accession number for a document referenced
within, namely Reference 3.
3) The release (or ADAMS placement) date of document ML13221A011 be corrected from
August 9, 2012 to August 9, 2013.
4) ML13221A011 should acknowledge that it was a response to an e-mail inquiry from Mr.
Leyse on 7/25/2013 and that additional corrections were also made to the same
document as requested by Leyse in an e-mail dated 10/14/2013.
Item 1:
The statement in ML13221A011 that Mr. Leyse views as erroneous reads
The design analysis included a vent design objective of venting approximately
1% of decay heat for a 56 psi saturated steam pressure.
The statement is part of a paragraph that provides the basis for venting capacity in Order
EA-13-109, “Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents
Capable of Operation under Severe Accident Conditions.” However, the context of that
sentence is that it provides a description of the basis for the vent modification at the Pilgrim
Nuclear Power Station (PNPS), as contained in Enclosure 1 to Generic Letter (GL) 89-16. That
enclosure contains a statement in Section 3.2.1, Objective of Design Change that reads
For 56 psi saturated steam conditions in the torus, approximately 1% decay heat
can be vented.
The meaning conveyed by these statements is consistent, and therefore, the staff believes that
the referenced statement in ML13221A011 is not erroneous. The PNPS and the GL 89-16
hardened vent system was not required to accommodate 1% steam flow plus a worst case
hydrogen generation rate while maintaining containment pressure below its design pressure
value.
For additional information, the NRC has issued the interim staff guidance (ISG) document
JLD-ISG-2013-02 (ML13304B838) for the implementation of Order EA-13-109, which endorses the industry guidance in NEI 13-02 with some clarifications. The industry guidance is an attachment to the ISG. Section 4 of NEI 13-02 contains the requirements for sizing the vent,
which includes considerations of suppression pool heat capacity, and simultaneous venting of
steam, hydrogen, and other non-condensable gases, including auditable analysis/calculations
that are required to be performed by the individual licensees in support of the vent sizing.
Items 2, 3, and 4
For Item 2, the staff agrees with Mr. Leyse that adding an ADAMS accession no. ML13017A234to Reference 3 will be useful. For Item 2, the staff thanks Mr. Leyse for pointing out the erroneous date on page 3. The correct date should be August 9, 2013 and not August 9, 2012. Finally, the staff recognizes that the response included in ML13221A011 was prepared in an email inquiry by Mr. Robert H. Leyse, bobleyse@aol.com to OPA.Resource@nrc.god on July 25, 2013 and this supplemental response is also prepared in response to Mr. Leyse’s email dated October 14, 2013.
November 20, 2013
ADAMS Accession No.: ML13326B085
Note: The following is a copy of ML13326B085. Unfortuately, the spacing is altered from the document that is on NRC's ADAMS.
http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/search.cfm?q=ML13326B085.&s=
OR
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1332/ML13326B085.pdf
Response to Mr. Leyse’s email dated October 14, 2013 regarding corrections to
ML13221A011 related to basis for venting capacity in Order EA-13-102.
The NRC staff prepared “Basis for Venting Capacity in Order EA-13-109, ‘Order to Modify
Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under
Severe Accident Conditions’” (ML13221A011) in response to an inquiry received by the NRC in an e-mail dated July 25, 2013 from Mr. Robert H. Leyse. This document was provided to
Mr. Leyse in an email dated August 9, 2013. The subject of the inquiry and related response
was the design goal requirement in EA-13-109 of 1% decay heat removal capacity of the severe accident capable hardened containment vent system (HCVS) for boiling water reactors with Mark I and Mark II containments. In an e-mail dated October 14, 2013, Mr. Leyse stated the
following in regards to the response provided in the subject document:
1) It contains an erroneous statement related to the basis for the venting capacity and,
therefore, requests the staff to delete the statement from ML13221A011.
2) Document should Include the ADAMS Accession number for a document referenced
within, namely Reference 3.
3) The release (or ADAMS placement) date of document ML13221A011 be corrected from
August 9, 2012 to August 9, 2013.
4) ML13221A011 should acknowledge that it was a response to an e-mail inquiry from Mr.
Leyse on 7/25/2013 and that additional corrections were also made to the same
document as requested by Leyse in an e-mail dated 10/14/2013.
Item 1:
The statement in ML13221A011 that Mr. Leyse views as erroneous reads
The design analysis included a vent design objective of venting approximately
1% of decay heat for a 56 psi saturated steam pressure.
The statement is part of a paragraph that provides the basis for venting capacity in Order
EA-13-109, “Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents
Capable of Operation under Severe Accident Conditions.” However, the context of that
sentence is that it provides a description of the basis for the vent modification at the Pilgrim
Nuclear Power Station (PNPS), as contained in Enclosure 1 to Generic Letter (GL) 89-16. That
enclosure contains a statement in Section 3.2.1, Objective of Design Change that reads
For 56 psi saturated steam conditions in the torus, approximately 1% decay heat
can be vented.
The meaning conveyed by these statements is consistent, and therefore, the staff believes that
the referenced statement in ML13221A011 is not erroneous. The PNPS and the GL 89-16
hardened vent system was not required to accommodate 1% steam flow plus a worst case
hydrogen generation rate while maintaining containment pressure below its design pressure
value.
For additional information, the NRC has issued the interim staff guidance (ISG) document
JLD-ISG-2013-02 (ML13304B838) for the implementation of Order EA-13-109, which endorses the industry guidance in NEI 13-02 with some clarifications. The industry guidance is an attachment to the ISG. Section 4 of NEI 13-02 contains the requirements for sizing the vent,
which includes considerations of suppression pool heat capacity, and simultaneous venting of
steam, hydrogen, and other non-condensable gases, including auditable analysis/calculations
that are required to be performed by the individual licensees in support of the vent sizing.
Items 2, 3, and 4
For Item 2, the staff agrees with Mr. Leyse that adding an ADAMS accession no. ML13017A234to Reference 3 will be useful. For Item 2, the staff thanks Mr. Leyse for pointing out the erroneous date on page 3. The correct date should be August 9, 2013 and not August 9, 2012. Finally, the staff recognizes that the response included in ML13221A011 was prepared in an email inquiry by Mr. Robert H. Leyse, bobleyse@aol.com to OPA.Resource@nrc.god on July 25, 2013 and this supplemental response is also prepared in response to Mr. Leyse’s email dated October 14, 2013.
November 20, 2013
ADAMS Accession No.: ML13326B085
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