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Sunday, June 19, 2016
Saturday, June 18, 2016
900,000 gallons of Defense Atomic Waste Remain Unstabilzed at INL
http://www.idahostatesman.com/opinion/letters-to-the-editor/article84573547.html
Idaho Statesman
Idaho Statesman
Tuesday, May 24, 2016
PRM 50-93/95: Recent email from Doyle, NRC to Mark Leyse
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Subject:
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Status
of PRM-50-93/95
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Date:
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5/24/2016
1:52:17 P.M. Mountain Daylight Time
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From:
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| To: | |
| CC: |
Mr.
Leyse,
I am writing to
provide an update on your letters dated November 17, 2009, and June 7, 2010, in
which you submitted petitions to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
In your letter dated November 17, 2009, you requested that the NRC amend the
regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part
50 and Appendix K to Part 50 to require that the rates of energy release,
hydrogen generation, and cladding oxidation from the metal-water reaction
considered in emergency core cooling system evaluation calculations be based on
data from multi-rod (assembly) severe fuel damage experiments. In addition, you
requested that the NRC create a new regulation to establish a minimum allowable
core reflood rate in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). In your
letter dated June 7, 2010, you requested that the NRC order Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Station (Vermont Yankee) to lower the licensing basis peak
cladding temperature to 1,832 degrees F in order to provide a necessary margin
of safety in the event of a LOCA.
The NRC
docketed your November 17, 2009, letter as petition for rulemaking (PRM) 50-93.
A notice of receipt and request for public comment on PRM-50-93 was published in
the Federal Register on January 25, 2010 (75 FR 3876). Your letter dated
June 7, 2010, was submitted as a petition for enforcement action under 10 CFR
2.206. On August 6, 2010, the NRC denied your § 2.206 petition because it did
not demonstrate that Vermont Yankee was in violation of any NRC regulations.
Because your § 2.206 petition asserted that there were generic inadequacies in
NRC regulations, the NRC decided to review it under 10 CFR 2.802 as a petition
for rulemaking and docketed it as PRM-50-95. Because PRM-50-93 and PRM-50-95
address similar issues, the NRC consolidated these two petitions for review as a
single petition for rulemaking activity. Another Federal Register notice
was published on October 27, 2010 (75 FR 66007), and the comment period was
reopened. The public comment period ended on November 26, 2010. Thirty-two
public comments have been received to date on the combined petitions. These
comments have been posted at regulations.gov (ID:
NRC-2009-0554).
The NRC staff
is considering the merits of your PRM and the public comments received. As
described in the NRC’s letter to you dated August 25, 2011, the NRC has decided
to increase the visibility to the public of the NRC’s review of these particular
petitions. The NRC will publicly release its draft interim reviews regarding
each group or category of issues on a periodic basis as the review progresses.
These draft interim reviews will be posted on regulations.gov. So far, the NRC
has publicly released four draft interim reviews:
- Evaluation of CORA test series (8/23/11)
- Evaluation of LOFT LP-FP-2 (9/27/11)
- Evaluation of conservatism of 2200F, metal-water reaction rate correlations, and “the impression left from run 9573” (10/16/12)
- Evaluation of request to establish minimum reflood rate (3/8/13)
The NRC staff
will consider and respond to the comments you made regarding PRM-50-93 and
PRM-50-95 at the Commission briefing on public participation in NRC regulatory
decision-making on January 31, 2013, in the review of these
petitions.
The NRC is
considering the remaining issues and will notify you as the draft interim
reviews are completed. Once the petitions have been resolved, a notice will be
published in the Federal Register explaining the Commission’s finding.
You will also receive a letter at that time notifying you of the action that the
Commission has taken.
Please feel
free to contact me at Daniel.Doyle@nrc.gov or 301-415-3748 if
you have questions.
Sincerely,
Dan
Doyle
Project
Manager
U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission
(301)
415-3748
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Leyse Patent: Method to establish the presence of dissolved gas in pressurized water
http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO2&Sect2=HITOFF&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsearch-bool.html&r=35&f=G&l=50&co1=AND&d=PTXT&s1=leyse&OS=leyse&RS=leyse
(Clicking on the above link will not bring up the patent. However, if you copy it to an email, the patent will appear when clicked on.)
Method for monitoring for the presence of dissolved gas in a fluid under pressure
The present invention relates to dissolved gases in fluids under pressure and, more particularly, to relating the electrical resistance of a sensor element to the presence of the dissolved gas.
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
The presence of dissolved gas in fluid, such as water, under pressure can lead to unacceptable performance of certain support and monitoring equipment in industry. These factors are extremely important in nuclear power plants. In both pressurized water reactors and boiling water reactors, the presence of dissolved gas in reference level pipes for water level detectors leads to outgassing and degradation of calibration. In the case of the water-filled accumulators for an emergency core cooling system, called upper head injection, the presence of substantial amounts of dissolved gas (such as hydrogen and nitrogen) degrades the ability of the system to function and provide emergency core cooling. Dissolved gas is released during rapid pressure reductions which results in expulsion of fluid from reference pipes. This leads to erroneous vessel level readings at a time when there is a critical need for accurate level measurement.
I first wrote the patent application while I was at the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). It is part of an involved situation, but below is the reaction of the nuclear power gang at EPRI. It is misleading.
The need for the invention, the determination that dissolved gas is present in systems such as upper head injection, was well known to Rossin who wrote the above. Below is a two page memorandum that Rossin received during October, 1984. The second sentence of the opening paragraph is, "For example, AEOD does not recognize that plant operation with the UHI accumulator water saturated with dissolved nitrogen increases the chance of sustained core uncovery during some accidents."
Several years following the Rossin rejection, EPRI admitted that a problem existed in water level measurements in boiling water reactors (BWRs). By that time I had been kicked out of the nuclear power division for several years. As of today, I do not have the old files, and the above patent 5,621,141 was not based on those disclosures from 1982.
(Clicking on the above link will not bring up the patent. However, if you copy it to an email, the patent will appear when clicked on.)
| United States Patent | 5,621,161 | ||||||||
Leyse
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April 15, 1997 |
Method for monitoring for the presence of dissolved gas in a fluid under pressure
The present invention relates to dissolved gases in fluids under pressure and, more particularly, to relating the electrical resistance of a sensor element to the presence of the dissolved gas.
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
The presence of dissolved gas in fluid, such as water, under pressure can lead to unacceptable performance of certain support and monitoring equipment in industry. These factors are extremely important in nuclear power plants. In both pressurized water reactors and boiling water reactors, the presence of dissolved gas in reference level pipes for water level detectors leads to outgassing and degradation of calibration. In the case of the water-filled accumulators for an emergency core cooling system, called upper head injection, the presence of substantial amounts of dissolved gas (such as hydrogen and nitrogen) degrades the ability of the system to function and provide emergency core cooling. Dissolved gas is released during rapid pressure reductions which results in expulsion of fluid from reference pipes. This leads to erroneous vessel level readings at a time when there is a critical need for accurate level measurement.
I first wrote the patent application while I was at the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). It is part of an involved situation, but below is the reaction of the nuclear power gang at EPRI. It is misleading.
The need for the invention, the determination that dissolved gas is present in systems such as upper head injection, was well known to Rossin who wrote the above. Below is a two page memorandum that Rossin received during October, 1984. The second sentence of the opening paragraph is, "For example, AEOD does not recognize that plant operation with the UHI accumulator water saturated with dissolved nitrogen increases the chance of sustained core uncovery during some accidents."
At
the Staff‘s request, the BWROG submitted a report on May 20, 1993, discussing
the impact of level 84 'P errors on automatic safety system
response and operator actions during transients and accidents initiated from
reduced-pressure conditions during plant cooldown (shutdown mode). Based on
this information, in addition to the January 21, 1993 WNP-2 event, and data
from the reference-leg de-gas testing that was conducted by the BWROG, the
staff concluded that additional short-term actions needed to be taken for
protection against potential events occurring during normal cooldown. On May
28, 1993, NRC Bulletin (NRCB) 93-03, "Reso- lution of Issues Related to
Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation," was issued, in which the
Staff requested each BWR licensee to implement additional short-term compensatory
actions, and to implement a hardware modification to
Monday, May 23, 2016
Link to Leyse-UCLA paper
http://boiling.seas.ucla.edu/BOILING/Publications/Conf_LMWD2003
Opening the above requires some steps:
1. Click on it
2. A box appears, Click on OK
3. A moving arrow then quickly directs you to the down arrow at the top right of the screen. (That moving arrow moves fast and disappears.)
4. Click on that down arrow and select Conf_LMWD2003. You will be asked:
5. How do you want to open this file?
6. Select PDF Viewer Plus SE Application and click OK
7. The document then promptly appears.
ConfLMWD2003(8).pdf
Wednesday, May 18, 2016
UHI: Relatively Recent UHI Correspondence,
Robert
H. Leyse
P. O. box 2850
Sun Valley, ID
83353
July
2, 2013
Director,
Human Resources
EPRI
3420 Hillview
Avenue
Palo Alto, CA
94304
This
augments my letter to you that is dated June 18, 2013. This letter has improved documentation of the
traceability of the shutdown of Duke Power’s McGuire Unit 1 on October 30,
1984, to my NSAC Memorandum, UHI – Ultra Hgh Risk, that is dated October
3, 1984. For your convenience I am
including Enclosures 4, 5, 6 as well as a “new” enclosure 6A.
Sugnet
documented his contact with Duke regarding UHI weaknesses on October 25, 1984,
Enclosure 4. The following two
paragraphs are copied from page 2 of my June 18, 2103 letter:
Alerted by Sugnet,
Duke checked the status of its UHI systems at McGuire Unit 1 and Unit 2. McGuire Unit 1 was then shut down on October
31, 1984, and McGuire Unit 2 was operated at 45 percent power. (Enclosure 5)
The periodic test for
dissolved gases was only every 18 months; thus it is very likely that Duke’s
activities on October 31, 1984, are traceable, via the Sugnet contact, to the
Leyse memorandum of October 3, 1984. (Enclosure 6, see yellow highlighting)
This
letter has a significant “new” attachment, Enclosure 6A. The yellow highlighting reveals that Duke
concerns with dissolved gases in its UHI system at McGuire began on October 25,
1984, the same date as the Sugnet memorandum.
The normal procedure of sampling for dissolved gases only every 18
months is also highlighted. McGuire Unit
1 was shut down on October 30, 1984, not October 31, 1984.
Robert
H. Leyse
Robert
H. Leyse
P. O. box 2850
Sun Valley, ID
83353
June
18, 2013
Director,
Human Resources
EPRI
3420 Hillview
Avenue
Palo Alto, CA
94304
I
have found the report that I asked you to send on December 31, 2012. Amy Anderson, EPRI Dallas, wrote me on February
21, 2013, that per company policy that report is no longer available for
distribution.
In
a nutshell, the following explains my interest.
Enclosed is a copy of an NSAC memorandum from Lang to Layman, December
13, 1984, in which Lang writes in the final paragraph on page 2, “I told
Lanning that NSAC valued the technical relationship with AEOD that has existed
and that while we feel free to be critical, it is not our practice to write
critical memoranda behind his back or to leak memoranda rather than to send
them directly. I expressed regret for
the situation that Lanning had outlined.” (Enclosure 1)
Now,
Director, Human Resources, the enclosed Lang to Layman memorandum does not
include a lot of facts. Leyse was
certainly never aware of any technical relationship with AEOD. On November 8, 1984, EPRI notified Leyse of
his Elimination of Position and Leyse promptly looked for work
elsewhere. Leyse telephoned Keppler of
NRC and Keppler paid for Leyse’s trip for his employment interview that took
place on November 16, 1984. Leyse
presented Keppler with documentation of his current expertise among which was
the copy of the memorandum that Lang asserts was leaked to Keppler. Keppler asked Leyse if it would be OK if he
sent Leyse’s memorandum to others in NRC and Leyse said it would be OK provided
Leyse’s identity was not disclosed. (Enclosure 2)
Quickly,
there are loads of facts. Leyse
submitted his memorandum, UHI – Ultra High Risk on October 3, 1984. Leyse discussed his UHI studies at an NSAC
Generic Issues Meeting on October 17, 1984, attended by Rossin, Breen, Layman, Wyckoff, Reuland,
Power and Vine (Rossin, Breen and Layman usually did not attend). There were no
comments from anyone although Breen appeared disturbed and said he would check
the McGuire PRA. (Enclosure 3)
Breen
assigned Sugnet to discuss these matters with his PRA colleagues at Duke. Sugnet reported on October 25, 1984, that
Duke eliminated UHI in its PRA analyses based on Duke’s “…analysis
demonstrating that it was not necessary for any LOCA.” (Enclosure 4)
Alerted
by Sugnet, Duke checked the status of its UHI systems at McGuire Unit 1 and
Unit 2. McGuire Unit 1 was then shut
down on October 31, 1984, and McGuire Unit 2 was operated at 45 percent power.
(Enclosure 5)
The
periodic test for dissolved gases was only every 18 months; thus it is very
likely that Duke’s activities on October 31, 1984, are traceable, via the
Sugnet contact, to the Leyse memorandum of October 3, 1984. (Enclosure 6, see
yellow highlighting)
The
reference to the McGuire Unit 1 UHI system in the proposed ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORT
TO CONGRESS FOR FOURTH QUARTER CY 1984 dated January 28, 1985 is significant.
(Enclosure 7)
The
Sandia work that is referenced in Enclosure 7 turned out to be deficient. The NRC did not specify the case of
improperly functioning level instruments, in which case there was no assurance
that the water-filed accumulators had 1800 cubic feet of water, or any
water. (Enclosure 8, see yellow highlighting)
Robert
H. Leyse
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