Insiders and The Roots of Fukushima

Of course, there are countless roots, and it may be argued that some do not apply.  The number of applicable roots grows substantially if the ways of doing business are included.  Following is stuff from decades ago that documents NRC-EPRI relationships that are not otherwise disclosed.

This entry jumps ahead of a lot of documentation that I have and that I guess I'll have to place in book if I ever get around to writing that.  On November 7, 1984, EPRI (Rossin and Breen) told me my position was being eliminated, but that I'd have a few months to look for work elsewhere.  So, I looked elsewhere with no immediate success.  I talked to Jim Keppler of the NRC and showed him my memorandum, UHI Ultra High Risk, October 3, 1984, as part of several illustrations of my experience and capabilities.  Keppler asked if he could send this elsewhere in NRC and I agreed, however, I blanked out the source of the document as well as my name.

So, the following two pages are an interesting document that reveals very secret relationships between EPRI and the NRC that I was never aware of.  It also reveals turmoil.  I do not recall how I gained access to the following document; it most certainly was not sent to me.  I am inclined to doubt that Rossin was aware of it, but I do not know that.  I suspect that Layman and Lang were not aware that my position had been eliminated.  

Click on a page to enlarge and the back arrow to return.

I'm certainly pleased that EPRI (Layman and Lang) documented the above. This is a clear report of a basically secret set of arrangements between EPRI and the NRC and I suspect that those have continued in various forms over the years and are really intense in today's post-Fukushima world. 

The second page is "interesting" as it describes the "running around" in generating a response to Keppler.  The very last paragraph is also revealing as EPRI apologizes to the NRC for my contact with Keppler.  

Isotope Separation, Boron

This summary paragraph, Proximity Separation and Deposition in the Microscale, outlines Leyse’s transformative approach to isotope separation.  Leyse’s discoveries are now applied in the new field named Microscale Process Intensification.  With one set of apparatus, and with one platinum microscale heat transfer element, Leyse’s research covered the pressure range from 2 to 45 MPa, the heat flux range from very low to 4000 W/cm² and the temperature range of the heat transfer element from 25 ^oC to 870 ^oC while bulk water temperature was maintained in the range of 20 ^oC. At the very high heat flux there is intense turbulence in the vicinity of the microscale heat transfer element. The local fluid temperatures range from the saturation temperature to intermediate temperatures.  The complex thermal hydraulics defies analysis with current tools.  A dilute solution of boric acid will decompose within the high temperature field to yield particles of insoluble boric oxide. A fraction of the particles of boron oxide thus produced will deposit on the hot element. If there is difference in the deposition rates, the mix of ¹⁰B and ¹¹B on the element will be different than nature’s blend..  

Nukiyama in microscale; text, but no slides, too bad.

This transformative presentation takes 10 minutes -- or less.  It was ahead of its time over 20 years ago and it still is.

This paper is Nukiyama in microscale over the pressure range from 200 to 6000 PSI.  Nukiyama used a platinum wire simultaneously as a heat transfer element and a resistance thermometer. 

Here is my Nukiyama element: diameter 7.5 microns, length 1.15 millimeters.

It is installed in the lower end of an upright tube that is filled with pressurized water, pure and degasified at about 20 Centigrade.  The steel tube is used for these pool boiling runs at higher pressures.

The benchtop apparatus has the pool boiling tube, the pressurizing pump, the junction box and programmed power supply, a PC with Excel for data logging, and in the back, a Rosemount recording pressure transducer.

A run takes about 11 seconds and data is recorded every tenth of a second.  Heat flux is smoothly increased and then decreased.  In this run at 1000 PSI with the water at about 20 Centigrade, the peak was over 4000 Watts per square centimeter.  The average power is about one half watt, so the energy is about 6 watt-seconds, or less than two calories for the 11 second run.  So, the temperature of a local gram of water increases by less than two Centigrade.

Following is the reduced data for the 1000 PSI run.  It doesn’t get any better than this although it gets more exciting.  The transition to phase change, I call it the Nukiyama point, is at about 2100 watts per square centimeter.  This transition is extremely sharp, there is no sluggishness.  That is also the case at the turnaround at 4100.  I want to increase the recording rate to every millisecond in further runs.  Note that the return is on the same path as the rise.  Clearly, the local temperature stays very close to 20 Centigrade, otherwise the return would not overlay. 

Here are several runs, three subcritical, one transcritical, and four supercritical. You have seen the dissection of the 1000 psi run; the 200 and 2500 of this plot are similar.  The dotted line is the transcritical run at 3000.  The four supercritical runs range from 3600 to 6000.

Here are the 3600 and 6000 runs.  The 6000 has a narrower spread between the power up and the power down.

The 3,000 transcritical run is superimposed on the runs you have just seen.  I want to expand this territory with runs having millisecond data collection.

The supercritical runs are all well-behaved in this plot.  Even the transcritical falls in its proper place.

The point of the following plot of the subcritical runs is that at 200 psi the Nukiyama point is 65 Centigrade beyond saturation while at 2500 and above, that delta T is very narrow.

With the permission of Professor Victor Yagov of Moscow, following is his recent analysis. At 200 psi he reports substantial Delta T’s, at 3000, the Delta T’s are vanishing.  Multiply Yagov’s values by 100 to get to my units.

This is the transcritical run.  Again, I want millisecond data recording next time in the search for the aspects of the jump.  Note that saturation temperature is very close to critical.

Here is limited data.  With a somewhat larger microscale element the heat fluxes at the Nukiyama points are reduced, however the temperature of the points is unchanged.  The transcritical characteristic is the same even though the pressure is 100 psi less; the saturation temperature is still very near critical.

I think this is sensational.  The procedure is to pressurize the apparatus to about 6000 psi, apply a substantial heat flux in one step, and maintain that heat flux as pressure is smoothly reduced over about 20 seconds, turn off power at about 200 psi.  Note the gradual increase in temperature as pressure is reduced, then the upward jump of over 200 Centigrade at around 3700 psi, followed by a smooth increase of another 100 Centigrade to the critical pressure, then a smooth decrease of nearly 200 Centigrade, then a downward jump of about 150 centigrade to the critical temperature. At that point the subcritical boiling begins and continues until the power is turned off. At the lowest heat flux there is a smooth continuous plot over the entire pressure range with no intervening steps. The four plots at increasing heat fluxes are neatly nested.

Here are the data points.  I captured one point during the upward jump in two runs. Of course, runs are needed with millisecond recording, etc.

Here are the plots of subcritical phase change only.  The plots are very close; however the heat fluxes are distinct.  As was measured in the constant pressure runs at subcritical pressures and also calculated by Professor Yagov, the delta T from phase change to saturation increases as the pressure is reduced.

 This shows the impact of nitrogen saturation at 1000 psi.  I never reduced these plots to heat flux and temperature; I did not need to in order to get the patent. Nitrogen reduces the heat transfer coefficient during natural circulation; however phase change heat transfer begins at a somewhat lower temperature and heat flux.  I filed this patent during 1995 and it issued during 1997, the year that Berkeley started its microscale journal. 

INL CAB October 27, 2016

The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Site Environmental Management (EM) Citizens Advisory Board (CAB) held its quarterly meeting on Wednesday, February 17, 2016, at the Hilton Garden Inn in Idaho Falls, Idaho. An audio recording of the meeting was created and may be reviewed by calling CAB Support Staff at 208-557-7886.


Public Comment 

Robert Leyse, Sun Valley, commented that in the June 2016 meeting minutes McBride asked if DOE regrets having waited to begin pilot testing at Hazen Laboratories until the Inspector General suggested it. Leyse noted that he addressed the CAB a year ago, and provided a series of links that are available in the October 2015 meeting minutes.

Those links show the following: In a report dated September 11, 2006, a review commissioned by DOE-ID and chaired by David S. Cosin, PhD, reported several findings including Finding One of their report: “Documentation, data reduction and analysis are incomplete for the pilot scale testing carried out to date at Hazen Laboratories. Consequently, thorough analysis of these data has not been completed; insufficient attention to these aspects of pilot testing has been the cause of other DOE program failures.” Leyse commented that IWTU can be added to those failures. Ten years ago, Hazen reporting was deficient. Leyse asked why DOE is resuming work at Hazen today. The third link reveals that on January 24, 2007, the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) had no objections to proceeding with construction of IWTU. The first link shows that during 2014, DNFSB did not authorize operation of IWTU with radioactive feed, “A lack of assurance that the facility can safely proceed with nuclear operations…” Leyse commented that it is surprising that DNFSB did not approve nuclear operations as they should never have approved construction of the facility to begin with. 

Following is the Leyse list of references that Leyse provided at the CAB meeting in Sun valley, Idaho, on October 29, 015

The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Site Environmental Management (EM) Citizens Advisory Board (CAB) held its quarterly meeting on Thursday, October 29, 2015, at the Sun Valley Inn in Sun Valley, Idaho. An audio recording of the meeting was created and may be reviewed by calling CAB Support Staff at 208-557-0843

Letter provided by Mr. Robert Leyse during the Public Comment Period:

LEYSE STATEMENT DISCLOSING DNFSB EVALUATIONS OF IWTU 
Hello, I am Robert Leyse of Sun Valley, Idaho and I want the public to know that I have found the following via GOOGLE. I am including the links so that others may check my findings. 

Link 1: 
http://www.dnfsb.gov/sites/default/files/Board%20Activities/Reports/Staff%20Issue%20Reports/I daho%20National%20Laboratory/2014/sir_2014523_24466_37.pdf 

DNFSB investigated the status of the IWTU and reported its findings to DOE May 23, 2014. It reported “…a lack of assurance that the facility can safely proceed with nuclear operations.” “Therefore, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2286b(d), the Board requests a report and briefing within 30 days, on DOE's evaluation of the need for additional independent assessment at the completion of IWTU startup testing and prior to the introduction of radioactive waste feed.”

Link 2: 
http://www.dnfsb.gov/sites/default/files/Board%20Activities/Letters/2014/ltr_2014620_24626.pdf 

This is the 30 day reply letter from DOE to DNFSB and it reports agreement that “…IWTU will benefit from an additional independent assessment…” 

Link 3: 
http://thortt.azurewebsites.net/docs/DNFSB%20Letter.pdf 

This documents a DNSFB review, January 24, 2007. “The Board has no significant safety issues with the project at this time (Critical Decision 2/3B). The final design, however, is progressing and there remain a number of items the Board believes must be addressed before the approval of final design and construction of the project.” … “The Board commends DOE for considering a potential future mission in this facility. Further, DOE convened an expert panel early in preliminary design to confirm that the design of the facility could accommodate this mission. The Board is encouraged by the project’s commitment to address this panel’s recommendations.” 

Link 4: 
http://www.cresp.org/crespII/CRESPII_Report/E_attachment/INLreview_complete_9_11_06.pdf 

This is the report of the expert panel that is praised in 4. The report lists 17 findings and associated recommendations. Here is the first of 17: “Finding 1. Documentation, data reduction and analysis are incomplete for the pilot-scale studies carried out to date at Hazen Laboratories. … Insufficient attention to these aspects of pilot-testing has been a cause of other DOE program failures.” ”Recommendation 1. Thorough documentation, data reduction and analysis of the results from pilot scale testing carried out to date should be completed as soon as possible and to the extent practical before initiating the planned next stage of pilot-scale testing.” LEYSE 

CLOSING STATEMENT Others may download the above links and also search for other links regarding the IWTU. You may easilyaccess the above links via GOOGLE at leyse nuclear power blog dnfsb.  

UHI and more, a reprint from August 20, 2008

Wednesday, August 20, 2008

UHI Upper Head Injection: Early Development Work

“Where this couldn’t be done or wasn’t enough, we proposed an upper head injection system.”
John W. Simpson, Nuclear Power from Underseas to Outer Space, ANS 1994, page 199.

Note: UHI had been removed from all of its victim nuclear plants by the time ANS published Simpson's book in 1994.

I've said a lot about UHI, Ultra High Risk, and I've said it is a very involved case. And at some point I'll put this all in some organized presentation.

The following discussion and slides relate the era during the early 1970's when UHI was in the early stages of design and development. Two systems were on the table, UHI was one, the other was In Core Spray (ICS). Each system involved the injection of emergency cooling water into the core during blowdown. (In my organized presentation all this will be clear.) The emergency cooling water was stored in a large pressure vessel and upon demand it was injected by high pressure nitrogen which was in a second large pressure vessel.

So, I bugged the project manager, Gallagher, with some questions directed to ICS, but these also applied to UHI. The problem that I identified on October 25, 1972, was the impact of dissolved nitrogen on system performance. Click on this slide to enlarge and press your return key to get back here.

Gallagher promptly responded. In the slide below, November 1, 1972, his bottom line is "In general, the effects of nitrogen saturation have not been considered."

The In-Core spray system was abandoned, and I never found out how in the world the designers expected to get by with short term pressurization of the accumulator water.

However, by January 30, 1973, the designers of the new UHI system were very well aware of the potential impact of dissolved nitrogen on UHI performance. The following two slides reveal their awareness and also the very narrowness of their awareness.

The very narrowness of the scope of their evaluation is summarized in the first sentence of the second paragraph of page 1 of their report, "The evaluation consists in determining the potential for flow choking during UHI system blowdown, the degree to which UHI system performance is affected, and the feasibility of engineering tests to confirm the calculated results." There is no recognition that the release of the large volume of nitrogen into the pressurized water reactor vessel would adversely impact the cooling of the reactor fuel elements.
As I have discussed previously, our great evaluators in our NRC also failed to recognize the hazards associated with the large nitrogen inventories. For reference, I am again attaching my appraisal of the NRC's negligent evaluation of UHI field performance. All of this will be integrated in a complete presentation sometime in the future.

Tuesday, August 19, 2008

NSF ignores independent research by individuals

I want the Committee on Science and Technology to investigate this situation.It appears that the cartel of university officials has succeeded in gaining a preferred and somewhat closed access to NSF funding.

MESSAGE TO HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Section 3(e) of the National Science Foundation (NSF) Act of 1950, as amended, states that: "...it shall be an objective of the Foundation to strengthen research and education in the sciences and engineering, including independent research by individuals, throughout the United States, and to avoid undue concentration of such research and education."

I took my great technology to UCLA. Our proposal (my technology) was declined:
CBET 0438436
MICROSCALE HEAT TRANSFER IN FLUIDS AT SUPERCRITICAL PRESSURES: EXPERIMENTS AND MATHEMATICAL MODELING
U of Cal Los Angeles
Declined 08/19/2004

Without my knowledge, UCLA then submitted Proposal Number 0553571 which was a modification of the above declined proposal, but which still had my great technology as its keystone. UCLA won $399,740. I was surprised to find this out when I scanned active awards at NSF.

This certainly amazed me. I asked NSF's OIG to look into this and recently I was told, “We opened a file in response to your email received in this office on April 17, 2008. We have determined that there is insufficient substance to an allegation of misconduct to proceed in this case. The case has been closed and no further action will be taken.”

I want the Committee on Science and Technology to investigate this situation.

It appears that NSF avoids funding independent research by individuals. It appears that NSF resents such applications for funding. It appears that the cartel of university officials has succeeded in gaining a preferred and somewhat closed access to NSF funding.

I received no reply from the House Committee on Science and Technology, So I asked my Congressman, Mike Simpson to get after these birds. He has done so, and I suppose that at some point I will get some kind of response. Auway, here is an early response from Mike.

NRC could send me INPO-76-84

Send your worries; more myths will be fabricated at your expense!

NRC SOLICITS PUBLIC INPUT INTO HOW IT CAN INCREASE PUBLIC ACCESS TO SECURITY INFORMATION

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is seeking suggestions from the public on how it can increase its level of openness related to security at nuclear power plants and certain other facilities while still protecting sensitive information. A summary of the feedback will be posted on the NRC’s Web site, provided to the Commission and considered in the development of new openness policies.

After the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, the Commission implemented a new policy of withholding certain information. Some information previously available to the public was withheld and new information, such as certain orders to NRC licensees on security measures, was designated as classified, safeguards information or sensitive unclassified information and withheld from the public.

In 2007, the NRC began redacting and releasing many of the safety documents previously withheld, and the agency is interested in taking additional action regarding security-related inspection and license performance information. Under consideration are several approaches, including adding more detail to an annual report to Congress on security oversight and to the cover letters for security inspection reports, and by making more information available on the NRC Web site.

“We view nuclear regulation as the public’s business and believe it should be transacted as openly and candidly as possible,” said NRC Executive Director of Operations Bill Borchardt. “Ensuring appropriate openness while also controlling sensitive information recognizes that the public must know about and be able to participate in the NRC’s regulatory processes.”

Specifically, the NRC is seeking public input on a number of questions relating to what type of information the public wants. Sample questions include:

What kind of NRC security inspection and licensee performance information would enhance your confidence in NRC’s regulatory oversight effectiveness?

Is the information provided in the NRC cover letters to security inspection reports useful?

What kind of NRC security inspection and licensee performance information would enhance your knowledge as to how safe and secure you and your family are?

The questions, with background information, are available in the Federal Register notice issued today. This notice is available on the NRC’s Web site: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/doc-comment.html#3.Comments will be accepted until Sept. 12. Comments can be submitted electronically through http://www.regulations.gov/ or mailed to Chief, Rulemaking, Directives and Editing Branch, Office of Administration, Mail Stop T6D59, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001. Comments can also be delivered to Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD., between 7:30 and 4:15 p.m. on federal workdays.

Sunday, August 17, 2008

LIGHTNING: Here is a response from INPO.

CLICK on the image to enlarge. Hit your return button to get back here.


Below is my response to INPO.



Robert H. Leyse
P. O. Box 2850
Sun Valley, ID 83353

August 17, 2008

Ronn K. Smith
INPO
Suite 100
700 Galleria Parkway, SE
Atlanta, GA 30339-5943

Dear Ronn:

Thank you for your letter of August 4, 2008, responding to my request for INPO SER 76-84. I received your letter on August 14, 2008. There was a delay because it was addressed to my street address instead of my P. O. Box.

My feeling is that the long-standing INPO policy is OK; however, your board should consider releasing documents that are aged and insensitive. Also, when NRC references a specific INPO SER in its public documents, that specific INPO SER should then be released to the public.

Now that I have told you how to run INPO, let’s get back to my narrow case. What has driven me nuts for decades is the INPO summary rejection of my NSAC/INPO SIGNIFICANT EVENT, SALEM 1, which was posted by NSAC on 12-AUG-2000. INPO, in a knee-jerk reaction, immediately (within hours) “suggested” the deletion of this entry.

I became aware of the INPO “suggestion” on 27 Aug 1980 and I told NSAC to “…send the completed form to INPO.” I never knew until 3-11-82 that NSAC had trashed my NSAC/INPO SIGNIFICANT EVENT, SALEM 1.

Ronn, maybe for now, INPO may answer the following question: Is the Salem 1 event of 06-08-00 included in INPO SER 76-84?

As an aside, NRC denied my request for the stuff under FOIA. I’ve appealed that and we’ll see what happens.

Bob Robert H. Leyse

Wednesday, August 13, 2008

Petitions to NRC by Mark Edward Leyse

This list is for my convenience. I am particularly attracted to Item 5. The NRC has been sitting on Item 5 since March 2007.

1.
(81)
G20080162/EDATS: OEDO-2008-0178 - Mark Edward Leyse Ltr. re: 10 C.F.R. Section 2.206 Request for Emergency Shutdown of Indian Point Units 2 and 3: the Current Power Levels of Both Plants were Qualified by Emergency-Core-Cooling-System
ML080710121
2008-03-07
54

2.
(80)
G20070508 - Mark E. Leyse Ltr Re: Overrule Decision of the Petition Review Board.
ML072140819
2007-08-21
5

3.
(80)
G20080162/EDATS:OEDO-2008-0178-Ltr-March 7, 2008 Letter to Mr. Reyes in re: petition of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulation (10 CFR) Section 2.206 of the NRC Regulations.
ML081500352
2008-06-05
34

4.
(80)
G20070508 - Mark Edward Leyse Ltr. re: Indian Point, Units 2 & 3
ML072000374
2007-07-17

5.(80)
2007/03/15-Petition for Rulemaking PRM-50-84 Submitted by Mark Edward Leyse re adddressing corrosion of fuel rod cladding surfaces and a change in the calculations for a loss-of-coolant accident.
ML070871368
2007-03-15
45

6.
(80)
G20070273 - Mark Edward Leyse Petition for an Enforcement Action Re: 10 CFR 2.206 - Indian Point, Units 2 and 3
ML071150299
2007-04-25
44

7.
(80)
G20070273 - Mark Leyse Ltr from Jennifer Golder Re.: Petition for an Enforcement Action Re: 10 CFR 2.206 - Indian Point, Units 2 and 3
ML071500238
2007-05-31
35

Monday, August 11, 2008

How things work: H. Tracy Hall, 1919-2008

H. Tracy Hall, 1919-2008; Scientist Created Artificial Diamonds

Click on the following for the very intriguing games of the great Tracy Hall.
http://www.htracyhall.org/history/bio.htm


Following are some highlights from the above:

It would be safe to say that there is no American whose life is not significantly impacted by the uses of industrial diamonds. Much of the credit for this can be given a young farm boy who enjoyed reading about Thomas Edison in the public library.

In July 1970, Dr. Hall presented his PERSONAL EXPERIENCES IN HIGH PRESSURE. Following are selected quotes:
On December 16, 1954, I discovered how to make diamonds.

The way to discovery was not easy …

I attempted many hundreds of indirect (mainly "carbon releasing") approaches a period of about a year but to no avail, and I was becoming discouraged. Then, one wintry morning, I broke open the sample cell after removing it from the Belt. It cleaved near a tantalum disk used to bring in current for resistance heating. My hands began to tremble; my heart beat rapidly; my knees weakened and no longer gave support. My eyes had caught the flashing light from dozens of tiny triangular faces of octahedral crystals that were stuck to the tantalum and I knew that diamonds had finally been made by man.

In April of 1955 I decided to leave the company that I had aspired to work for in my youth. There were several reasons for doing this, most compelling among them the continued lack of financial support for the things I wished to do. I had come to "understand'' the politics of the expensive double-ram press. After committing itself to this approach, management could not face a cheap alternative. But after synthesizing diamond I expected that money to be no object and could understand no longer.

Wednesday, August 6, 2008

How could Obama make it worse?

Look at this trash!

Press Release 08-133

NSF Issues Solicitation for Basic, Human Sciences Research on Social and Behavioral Dimensions of National Security, Conflict and Cooperation
First call for proposals under recent Memorandum of Understanding between the Foundation and Department of Defense

The National Science Foundation releases a call for research projects to support national security. Credit and Larger Version

August 4, 2008

The National Science Foundation (NSF) has issued a solicitation that represents a partnership between NSF and the Department of Defense (DoD) to support basic research projects that can address areas of strategic importance to national security as one part of DoD's Minerva Initiative launched in the spring by the Secretary of Defense.

The solicitation follows a Memorandum of Understanding signed by NSF and DoD in June that facilitates support of such research collaborations.

The solicitation, "Social and Behavioral Dimensions of National Security, Conflict and Cooperation" (NSF 08-594), will support high-quality, basic, human sciences research of investigator-initiated research projects and/or the development of joint workshops.

All project proposals submitted through this solicitation will be reviewed using NSF's standard process of merit evaluation based on peer review, meaning proposals will be evaluated for their intellectual merit and broader impact.

"To secure the national defense was one of the original missions we were given when we were chartered in 1950," said David Lightfoot, assistant director of NSF's Social, Behavioral and Economic Sciences Directorate. "We've always believed that sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists and other social scientists, through basic social and behavioral science research, could benefit our national security."

By partnering on this solicitation, the NSF and DoD seek to: 1) develop the DoD's social and human science intellectual capital in order to enhance its ability to address future challenges; 2) enhance the DoD's engagement with the social science community; and 3) deepen the understanding of the social and behavioral dimensions of national security issues.

A Letter of Intent (LOI) must be submitted prior to the submission of a full research proposal and the deadline for LOIs is Sept. 30, 2008. LOIs are not required for workshop proposals. The deadline for formal proposals is Oct. 30, 2008.

The Minerva Initiative is an effort led by Secretary Gates to build bridges between the academic social science community and the Department of Defense. To achieve that vision, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has piloted a number of approaches to engage the social science community, including partnering with NSF on this solicitation. A Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) was released by the Department of Defense in June and represents a completely separate funding mechanism from this solicitation.
-NSF-

Tuesday, August 5, 2008

Lightning: INPO's Early Stumble; a Staggering Start.

Lightning is also the centerpiece of the next several entries in this blog. Here is my perspective on this including further documentation.

“Bill LaValle – If this is not a significant event, than maybe I should be out of this business! Suggest we send the completed form to INPO. Leyse 27 Aug 1980”
Why did INPO originally stiff-arm my finding that the Salem lightning strike was indeed a Significant Event? I submitted my write-up on August 12, 1980, and INPO rejected it that same day. INPO had no logic in its rejection; it was a brief and emotional response. As I found out about two years later, NSAC went along with INPO’s rejection. So why did INPO react so quickly and emotionally in its rejection, and why, about four years later, did INPO finally publish a Significant Event Report that apparently covered lightning strikes at several units including Salem-1?

Here is my recent perspective. During August 1980, INPO existed for less than one year, and its staff refused to report the Salem-1 lightning strike as a Significant Event because they feared the reaction of the Admiral who ran the place. The nuclear power utilities set up INPO because Jimmy Carter’s Kemeny Commission mandated the formation of something like INPO. The utilities also knew that in the public’s view, Rickover was unimpeachable. The utilities then used Rickover as a public relations tool when they selected his choice, an Admiral Wilkinson, to dominate INPO. Wilkinson was obviously a master of the Rickover games.

Now, a lot has been written about folk hero Rickover, but much of it is not concretely documented. However, here is some concrete evidence of Rickover in action. Following is a direct quote from the book by John W. Simpson, Nuclear Power from Underseas to Outer Space, American Nuclear Society, 1994.

From page 79:

“AI-W had its share of Rickover incidents. He liked to put people down and make them feel their lack of expertise. At one meeting on reactor metallurgy, John Steifel, the project manager was the victim. The meeting convened late in the afternoon, broke for dinner, then continued into the evening. All during this time Rickover told Steifel to sit in one corner of the room and to not interrupt. Phil Ross, Steifel’s right hand man on technical matters, was told to do the talking – even at dinner. Rickover wanted to give the impression that he considered Steifel a technical idiot.”

So, that is mode of domination that the staff at INPO was facing when they feared disclosing the lightning strike at Salem-1 as a Significant Event. After a few years, INPO’s first leader completed his tour of duty, and his replacement was likely less treacherous. INPO then became free to recognize that lightning strikes led to Significant Events at nuclear power plants and it issued INPO Significant Event Report SER 76-84.

I’m still trying to get a copy of SER 76-84. INPO and EPRI have not acknowledged my request, and the NRC is working on my appeal for its release under FOIA.

Sunday, July 27, 2008

Nuclear Industry Organizations (copied from web)

Nuclear Industry Organizations


Key organizations specifically related to the U.S. nuclear industry are: (1) Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, and (2) Nuclear Energy Institute



On a global scale, two key organizations are (1) International Atomic Energy Agency, and (2) World Association of Nuclear Operators



The functions of these agencies differ, as follows.



Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)
700 Galleria Parkway, Atlanta, GA 30339



The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations was formed after the Three Mile Island (TMI-2) event in 1979. A number of US industry leaders recognized that the industry must do a better job of policing itself to ensure that an event of this magnitude should never happen again. INPO was formed to establish standards of excellence against which the plants are measured. An inspection of each member plant is typically performed every 18 - 24 months. The Institute's programs include:



SEE-IN (an information sharing network)
EPIX (an equipment failure database)
National Academy for Nuclear Training
Events Analysis
Human Performance
Accreditation
Evaluations



INPO maintains a secure private website accessible only by the member utilities. INPO serves as the US center for the WANO organization described later.



Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)
Suite 400; 1776 I Street NW; Washington, DC 20006-3708


NEI serves as an intermediary between the utilities and the NRC on generic issues. NEI also serves as a spokesman for the nuclear utilities.



International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Wagramerstrasse 5; P.O. Box 100, A-1400; Vienna, Austria


The IAEA is the United Nations organization that monitors compliance by the member states with nuclear safeguards agreements. IAEA also promotes nuclear safety on a global scale. IAEA teams conduct OSART inspections at nuclear plants to evaluate nuclear operational safety.



World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO)


WANO was formed after the Chernobyl event to provide a role similar to INPO on a global basis.





WANO has regional centers in Atlanta, London, Paris, Tokyo, and Moscow.



WANO maintains a secure private website accessible only by the member utilities.

Friday, July 25, 2008

WOW! Nuclear Information Management Team

WOW! Maybe I'll ask this team to get INPO Significant Event Report SER 76-84 and put it into the open literature so that we may have it. Anyway, the following showed up in GOOGLE when I tried to find the mailing address for the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). (Way back, our grade schools taught the discipline of diagramming sentences; I've tried that exercise on the following, and it is almost hopeless.)

Nuclear Information Management Strategic Leadership
The Nuclear Information Management Strategic Leadership (NIMSL) Community of Practice is the leadership team responsible for serving as a focal point for nuclear Information Management activities associated with the sub-process of Information Management as identified in the Standard Nuclear Performance Model. These sub-processes currently include: Records Management, Document Control, Procedures, and Office Services Activities. The Standard Nuclear Performance Model is a comprehensive model that includes Institute of Nuclear Power Organizations (INPO), Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) process descriptions and provides a consistent basis for describing how work is done at nuclear power plants for process areas. It also enables plants to compare their methods to those of other plants to determine efficiency and cost-effectiveness. The model was published in 1998 and is maintained and updated by the Electric Utility Cost Group (EUCG) and NEI; reference the Standard Nuclear Performance Model for a listing of process and sub-process areas. The Information Management Community of Practice (sub-process SS003) was formed in August 2002, reference Charter; this Community of Practice is supported by INPO.

An NEI Nuclear Records Benchmarking Report (SS003) was completed and issued in 2002. The NIMSL Committee was also formed in 2002 with a subsequent process modeling project resulting in the publication of July 2003 NEI report, AP-907 – Information Management Process Description. This report describes the processes and performance measures associated with the management of information at nuclear power plant facilities. NIMSL projects and subsequent white papers and published reports fall under the umbrella of AP-907; these documents can be viewed under Publications.

NIMSL focuses on information sharing, promoting common interests and issues, coordinates a consistent direction in industry-wide Information Management initiatives, and serves as a forum for communications with Special Issues Groups such as: Nuclear Information and Records Management Association (NIRMA), Utility Procedure Development Association (UPDA), Information Technology and Configuration Management Communities of Practice, as well as the following: EUCG, NEI, and INPO.

Thursday, July 24, 2008

Lightning, NSAC and INPO, (how things work!)

NSAC: Nuclear Safety Analysis Center, A defunct branch of the Electric Power Research Institute.

INPO: Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, A very active and somewhat secretive group that is funded by operators of nuclear power plants.

Right after the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 during April, 1979, the nuclear utility members of EPRI mandated the immediate formation of NSAC at Palo Alto, California. INPO was formed several months later, headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia.

I was with NSAC when I classified the consequences of a lightning strike at Salem Unit 1 on June 8, 1980, as a Significant Event and my report was entered into our communications system on August 12, 1980, as an NSAC/INPO SIGNIFICANT EVENT. See the first slide below, click on the slide to enlarge, and use your back arrow to return here.


INPO immediately objected to my entry and worked overtime to demand its rejection. See the second slide. I insisted that the entry should be maintained.




My writeup was indeed deleted, as I found out on March 11, 1982, a few months short of two years later when NSAC's file manager gave me the hard copy (slide 1) from her personal files. (NSAC management did not appreciate her diligence and she was assigned to another group at EPRI.)

Well, it is really amazing, HOW THINGS WORK! It turns out that on November 5, 1985, the NRC issued an Information Notice regarding lightning strikes. In contrast to INPO's rejection of my above SER that is dated 12-Aug-8o, the NRC included the lightning strike at Salem on June 9, 1980, in this Information Notice that is dated November 5, 1985.

BUT WHAT IS EVEN MORE FUN: the NRC referenced INPO report, INPO SER 76-84, in its Information Notice. Very likely, the INPO Signifcant Event Report, SER 76-84, includes the Salem event that INPO effectively censored on 12-AUG-80. It is also interesting that it apparently was not until 1984 that INPO admitted that lightning strikes induced significant events. And, very likely, the NRC became aware of the significance of lightning strikes when it became aware of INPO SER 76-84 in the course of its confidential communications with INPO.
Here is NRC Information Notice 85-86; note the reference to INPO SER 76-84. Also, the NRC's writeup of the lightning strike at Salem is less inclusive than my Significant Event Report of August 12, 1980.
SSINS No.: 6835 IN 85-86
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

November 5, 1985 Information Notice No. 85-86:
LIGHTNING STRIKES AT NUCLEAR POWER GENERATING STATIONS
Addressees: All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a construction permit (CP).
Purpose: This notice is provided to alert recipients of a potentially significant problem of reactor trips and instrument damage caused by lightning strikes. It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicabilityto their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude a similar problem occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required. The NRC is continuing to evaluate pertinent information. Recipients of this notice will be notified of additional information or if specific actions are required.

Description of Circumstances: A number of plant trips and instrumentation problems attributable to lightning have occurred over the past 6 years. Since solid state circuitry designs are being increasingly employed in safety related systems, the impact of lightning induced line surges on those circuits is emphasized in this notice. Descriptions of several of the more significant events are presented below. Events involving lightning strikes of switchyards and the consequential impact on power distribution systems are not covered by this notice. However, INPO SER 76-84 covers this latter subject as well as summarizing earlier INPO documents dealing with lightning strikes at nuclear power plants.

Zion Power Station Units 1 and 2
On August 17, 1979, both units tripped simultaneously during a severe lightning storm. Investigation indicated that a lightning strike in close proximity to the plant caused either a momentary surge or interruption in the ac power supply circuits to the rod control power supply cabinets. This transient tripped the overload protection devices for the dc power supply cabinet, resulting in a power interruption to the control rod stationary gripper coils, 8511010020 . IN 85-86 November 5, 1985 Page 2 of 4 which caused the rods to drop into the core. The resulting high, negative flux rate initiated the reactor trip signal. Tests verified that noise induced on the ac input to one power supply would actuate the overvoltage protection trips on the main and auxiliary power supplies. In addition to the noise spikes, one Unit 2, 24-V positive power supply was damaged by the lightning strike and had to be replaced. The following corrective actions were initiated:
o The control rod system neutral was isolated from the station ground.
o The overvoltage protection trip setting was changed from 27 to 29 V. o A low-pass filter was installed on the input to each 24-V positive power supply.
o A volt trap (a voltage suppressor circuit designed to reduce large voltage surges and noise induced