PRM-50-93: Below we see another excuse from NRC to delay action

PRM-50-93 has been around for a few years, and its precursor PRM-50-76 goes way back. NRC has played with PRM-50-93, but has generated excuses to avoid any significant action. Following is an e-mail from March 2011 that documents another excuse for avoiding action, this time Fukushima is blamed.
Click on the following to enlarge and use your back arrow to return here.

/>


So, the above note states "... all cognizant NRR/DSS staff, who would be qualified to serve on the working group for PRM-50-93/95, are otherwise occupied in various capacities responding to the recent events in Japan." Now, there is no reference in the NRC's review of Fukushima that is dated July 12, 2011, that anyone investigated the temperature of the zirconium alloy at which hydrogen formation began. Clearly, the work on PRM-50-93/95 should have been completed a long time ago.

Naval Reactors (Bettis and KAPL) & Fukushima

Somehow the 15 page document slipped through the NRC's sticky fingers and onto the Internet. The slide below is part of the first page of that document. The point of this blog entry is not that document, however as an opening distraction, interested parties may read that document by searching under "rst assessment of fukushima daichi units"

The point of this blog entry is that the assessment of Fulushima Daiichi included data and input from Bettis and KAPL among other sources. Now, there is very little that is publicly disclosed regarding activities at Bettis and KAPL, so it is "interesting" that Bettis and KAPL are among those credited with the following from page 1 of the 15 page report, "Core is contained in the reactor pressure vessel, reactor water level is unknown. The volume of sea water injected to cool the core has left enough salt to fill the lower plenum to the core plate. (GEH, INPO, Bettis, KAPL)."

Mistakes in Scientific Studies

Wall Street Journal

The following is from August 10, 2011. The text focuses on medical stuff although the slide below covers the full range of science including chemistry, engineering, physics and several other areas.

Too bad it does not get into the NRC's goofs like Baker-Just, TRACE, etc. I wonder what the Japanese will say when they find out that the Fukushima units took off well below 2200 Fahrenheit.

Consider Nuclear Safety Analysis: Skewing down the risks via PRAs

Yes, consider nuclear safety analysis. Our NRC derails common sense with its massive excesses in requirements for probabilistic risk analyses (PRAs). Of course, the Nuclear Energy Institute does not mind. The nuclear industry has found that PRAs are an effective tool in skewing-down the risks of severe accidents. And, the ratepayers cover the expense of the never ending skewing-down processes.

NEI held a media briefing on July 13, 2011, to discuss the NRC's 90 day review by its Fukushima task force. Stephen Dolley of PLATTS expressed concern that NRC's risk informed approaches could skew risk analyses and thus place low probability events into a low risk category even though the consequences may be severe. Click on the following to enlarge and use your back arrow to return here.