Sunday, December 25, 2011

Bob Leyse at Hanford Works, August 1950

So, it was my first job as a brand new Chemical Engineer out of the University of Wisconsin. The canyon building is 800 feet long.

Below is the graphite moderated reactor and supporting facilities. It was a great game. I worked at these reactors for most of my almost three years at Hanford Works.



Friday, December 9, 2011

"Xenon got us now." GETR

GETR, the great General Electric Test Reactor.

It was a great test reactor and it operated from about 1959 for over 10 years before it was permanently shut down based on some seismic games.

Anyway, in the course of operating, questions arose on the need for rapid shutdown in the case of loss of secondary water flow. (To keep stuff brief, I'm not going into the plant hydraulics.) Just prior to the planned shutdown for refueling, the staff settled the questions on the need for fast response to loss of secondary flow as follows:
1. Secondary flow was turned off with GETR at full power.
2. The reactor operator observed the game, but otherwise did nothing.
3. With secondary flow off, the primary system temperatures increased and the power level decreased.
4. After a while the reactor operator announced, "Xenon got us now."
5. At that point, the six control rods were inserted and the scheduled shutdown activities began.

Aside from the above, following are two photos of plant engineer, Don Hughes, in action during the construction of GETR during 1958.


Friday, December 2, 2011

Meltdown at Fukushima

Here is my letter to the Wall Street Journal.

Meltdown in Japan

The reactor core meltdown in Japan, WORLD NEWS, WSJ, December 1, is covered very well. However, the U. S. Nuclear Reactor Commission (NRC) gets into the act with its deceptive remarks. NRC is quoted, “This was not all unexpected. It really does nothing to change our assumptions – because we based our decisions on very pessimistic scenarios.” The NRC does not license our nuclear power plants on the basis of very pessimistic scenarios. The NRC believes that hydrogen production begins when reactor core temperatures exceed 2200 degrees Fahrenheit. In fact, hydrogen production begins well below 2200, and the rate of hydrogen production speeds up rapidly as the core temperatures soar to meltdown.

Maybe the NRC could open up and tell us what they have really produced prior to the WSJ disclosures. Tell us Mr. Chairman of the NRC, at what temperature of the Fukushima reactor core did hydrogen production begin? And how fast was hydrogen produced? And what was the time-pressure history in the Fukushima reactor pressure vessel? And what was the pressure in the Fukushima reactor pressure vessel when the pressure vessel was breached? And when the molten reactor core breached the reactor pressure vessel, how fast was the molten core squirted out?

Robert H. Leyse
Sun Valley, Idaho

Friday, November 25, 2011

June 1955, Shipping Bolts in Expansion Joints at 105-C

Yeah: R, P, L, K, C at the Savannah River Plant, Aiken, South Carolina. The feds owned it and duPont provided the brains.

First I found those shipping bolts in the main piping of the heavy water reactor, 105-C.


Then I nosed around a bit and I found several more in the 36 inch cooling water piping in the pipe tunnels. One was stretched.

So I wrote a memo and Marvin said it was great work. I referred to the need for evaluating the "... stresses in the affected pipe runs ... ."


Wednesday, November 16, 2011

Fukushima: Hydrogen Detonation & Destructive Missiles

Click on the following and then click on download and you will have the report by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO).

http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/safetyandsecurity/reports/special-report-on-the-nuclear-accident-at-the-Fukushima-Daiichi-nuclear-power-station

After you download the INPO report, you may do a search on "missile" or "missiles" but you need not do that because you will have zero finds. However, next do a search on "debris" and you will have 35 hits. The hits include debris from the tsunami and also debris from the hydrogen detonations.

A search on "explosion" yields 51 hits, a search on "detonation" yields 0 hits.

A search on "hydrogen explosion" yields 8 hits.

The search on "debris" yields the following paragraph on page 13 of 104:

At 1536, an explosion occurred in the Unit 1 reactor building. This explosion was most likely caused by the buildup of hydrogen that had been generated in the Unit 1 reactor core and leaked into the reactor building. The explosion injured five workers, and debris from the explosion struck and damaged the cables and mobile generator that had been installed to provide power to the standby liquid control pumps. The debris also damaged the hoses that had been staged to inject seawater into Unit 1 and Unit 2. Fieldwork was suspended as workers were evacuated to the Emergency Response Center for accountability. Some of the debris was also highly contaminated, resulting in elevated dose rates and contamination levels around the site. As a result, workers were now required to wear additional protective clothing, and stay times in the field were limited. The explosion significantly altered the response to the event and contributed to complications in stabilizing the units.

Note that "... debris from the explosion struck and damaged ..." . It would be more precise to report that missiles from the hydrogen detonation struck and disabled robust equipment including the cables and a mobile generator that had been installed to provide power to the standby liquid control pumps.

A search on "hydrogen explosion" yields the following paragraph on page 36 0f 104:

A large hydrogen explosion occurred in the Unit 3 reactor building at 1101 on March 14. The explosion destroyed the secondary containment and injured 11 workers. The large amount of flying debris from the explosion damaged multiple portable generators and the temporary power supply cables. Damage to the fire engines and hoses from the debris resulted in a loss of seawater injection. Debris on the ground near the unit was extremely radioactive, preventing further use of the main condenser backwash valve pit as a source of water. With the exception of the control room operators, all work stopped and workers evacuated to the Emergency Response Center for accountability.

Again, it would be precise to substitute "hydrogen detonation" for "hydrogen explosion" and "energetic missiles from the hydrogen detonation" for "flying debris from the explosion." Energetic missiles will disable robust equipment including multiple portable generators and fire engines and hoses, flying debris may not.

Thursday, November 10, 2011

PRM-50-76: MAYDAY 2002 ML022240009

It is not difficult to petition the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. It is useless.
So, Click on the blue link to view the original PRM-50-76. The battling continues.

[PDF] Petition of Robert H. Leyse re: changes to 10 CFR Part 50 ...
Page 1. 20B6227740 JAN LEYSE DOCKET NUMBER DOCKETED PETITIONRULE USNRC Secre y((oFRS g3 May 8,2002 (3:15PM) ... pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0222/ML022240009.pdf - 2010-09-18

And here is NRC's defective Technical Analysis. Click on the following blue link to read that.

[PDF] Memo to Matthews/Black-Technical Safety Analysis of PRM ...
... OAR in ADAMS? (Y or N) Y ADAMS ACCESSION NO.: ML041210109TEMPLATE NO. ... C:\ORPCheckout\FileNET\ML041210109.wpd Page 3. ... pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0412/ML041210109.pdf - 2010-09-22

The above technical analysis is substantially flawed, and after a while I e-mailed the following to the Chairman NRC. Click on the blue link below and go to page 2.

[PDF] LTR-06-0529 - E-mail Robert H. Leyse re: PRM-50-76, A ...

I never heard back from the NRC, so I told my Senator Larry Craig to get after the NRC. The NRC responded to Senator Craig about 6 months later and that response was over four years ago. Senator Craig never told me about the NRC response, however, I ran across it on ADAMS a few weeks ago, ADAMS ML070540103. Click on the blue link below to view that.

[PDF] G20070046/LTR-07-0040 - Sen. Larry Craig Ltr. re Appendix ...



And today, November 16, 2011, I am adding to this set of documents. Below is an e-mail that I sent to Idaho Senator Risch, requesting that he get after the NRC to respond to my needs for assorted details relevant to PRM-50-76.












So today, January 14, 2012, I am again adding to this entry. NRC responded (unsatisfactorily)and the NRC response is below, a cover letter and the response follow.

You may also read an enlarged access to the following via ADAMS:



[PDF] G20110784/LTR-11-0597/EDATS: SECY-2011-0582 ...
Page 1. Enclosure Response to Constituent Questions from SenatorJames E. Risch Letter of November 3, 2011 1. The ... pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1133/ML11336A055.pdf - 2011-12-30




Among the deficiencies in the NRC response is the disclosure that the two NRU tests have also been discarded by the NRC. So, I wrote a straightforward letter to Senator Risch requesting further action on that: WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR THAT REJECTION? I'll have to again request action by the Senator.

Total Hydrogen: PRM-50-103

Click on the blue to study the well-documented facts.

Search Results
Results 1 - 1 of about 1 for ML11301A094. Search took 0.01 seconds.
[PDF] NRDC's Petition for Rulemaking PRM-50-103 from C. Jordan ...
Page 1. PRM-50-103 DOCKETED USNRC NRDC October 27, 2011 (8:53am) THE EARMIS BEST DEFENSE OFFICE OF SECRETARY ... pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1130/ML11301A094.pdf - 2011-11-07

Tuesday, November 8, 2011

Zircaloy-water autocatalytic well below 2200 degrees F

Earlier entries include the following; read the red print.

Following are conclusions and recommendations from the Epstein report GEAP-3279. Note Item 3 under Conclusions, "The heat evolved from the zircaloy-water reaction at temperatures above 2000 degrees Fahrenheit is significant and produces an autocatalytic effect."

Here is another.

OECD LOFT-T-3804, "OECD LOFT Project, Quick-Look Report

...http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0719/ML071940358.pdf

Anyway, the following is page 30 of that report (also page 50 of 298) which you unfortunately cannot easily read because BLOGSPOT.COM again has screwed up it enlarging capability. However, the URL immediately above brings up the report and you can get page 50 of 298 although several earlier pages do not show up. Here is the key sentence, the last sentence in the second paragraph:"It can be concluded from examination of the recorded temperatures that the oxidation of zircaloy by steam becomes rapid at temperatures in excess of 1400 K (2060 degrees Fahrenheit)."

Sunday, November 6, 2011

Indian Point 2 and Indian Point 3: Marketing Dominates Licensing and Regulation

So, look at chapter 12 of the PSAR for each of those units.

Indian Point 2, ML100341270, 12/06/1965, entered in ADAMS 06/03/2010
and
Indian Point 3, ML093180473, 04/26/1967, entered in ADAMS 06/01/2010

It was nice of NRC to place those PSARs into ADAMS during early June 2010 and I wonder why NRC did that. Nevertheless it is revealing to compare the two documents.

In the case of Unit 2, the 1965 document, a word search on "zirconium water reaction" yields 18 hits. However, in the case of Unit 3, the 1967 document, that word search yields 2 hits and one of those is in the title of the Baker-Just reference. In 1965 the marketing gang missed the negative implications of "zirconium water reaction," but by 17 months later they caught up with that.


And here is and entirely separate set of facts that is interesting and revealing, but precisely what does it reveal? If you enter GAEP-3279 at the very front of the NRC’s web page and hit the search bar, you get this:

Search Results
Results 1 - 4 of about 4 for GEAP-3279. Search took 0.05 seconds.

[PDF] 1.0 Site and Environment., 1.1 Summary of Conclusions.
... (1) Baker, L., ANL 6548 (2) Epstein, LF, Metal-Water Reactions, VIIIGEAP-3279 (3) Lustman, B., Zirconium-Water Reactions WAPD-137 ... pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1000/ML100040297.pdf - 2010-09-24

[
PDF] ANL-6548, "Studies of Metal-Water Reactions at High ...
Page 1. 6 5 4 :~ ANL-6548 i1 cF z ! .-- * 4 JL x).L * .- .. itlm1 STUDIES OFMETAL-WATER REACTIONS AT HIGH TEMPERATURES III. ... pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0505/ML050550198.pdf - 2010-09-23


[PDF] Chapter 12 to Indian Point,Unit 2 PSAR, "Safety Evaluation."
... (1) Baker, L., ANL 6548 (2) Epstein, LF, Metal-Water Reactions, VIIIGEAP-3279 (3) Lustman, B., Zirconium-Water Reactions WAPD-137 ... pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1003/ML100341270.pdf - 2010-09-25

[PDF] Chapter 12 to Indian Point,Unit 3 PSAR, "Safety Evaluation."
Page 1. CHAPTER 12 SAFETY EVALUATION 12.1 CORE ANDCOOLANT BOUNDARY PROTECTION ANALYSIS 12.1 ... pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0934/ML093480173.pdf - 2010-12-02

However, it you go to an ADAMS simple search you get this:


ANL-6548, "Studies of Metal-Water Reactions at High Temperatures, III: Experimental and Theoretical Studies of the Zirconium-Water Reaction."
ML050550198
05/30/1962 12:00:00 AM
tjb2
89
Publicly Available
Argonne National Lab (ANL)
4,025 Kb
03/04/05
08:57:22 AM

Chapter 12 to Indian Point,Unit 2 PSAR, "Safety Evaluation."
ML100341270
12/06/1965 12:00:00 AM
Retrofit
05000247
60
Publicly Available
Consolidated Edison Co of New York, Inc
3,072 Kb
06/03/2010 03:14:10 PM

1.0 Site and Environment., 1.1 Summary of Conclusions.
ML100040297
06/01/1966 12:00:00 AM
wjd1
05000247
477
Publicly Available
US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
21,862 Kb
06/02/2010 10:47:52 AM

Chapter 12 to Indian Point,Unit 3 PSAR, "Safety Evaluation."
ML093480173
04/26/1967 12:00:00 AM
Retrofit
05000286
82
Publicly Available
Consolidated Edison Co of New York, Inc
3,506 Kb
06/01/2010 03:23:56 PM

In each case you get the same four references (ML numbers), but there are differences in the data. For ML050550198, entry dates are 2010-09-23 and 03/04/2005. For ML100341270, entry dates are 2010-09-25 and 06/03/2010. For ML093480173, entry dates are 2010-12-02 and 06/01/2010. For ML100040297, entry dates are 2010-09-24 and 06/02/2010.

What may be useful is that in the first set of four references, the blog user may bring up each document by clicking on the blue URL, that is not allowed in the second set.

Wednesday, November 2, 2011

Indian Point 2, Chapter 12, 12/06/1965

IP-2

Chapter 12 to Indian Point,Unit 2 PSAR, "Safety Evaluation."

Below is one page and references. Too bad, BLOGSPOT has screwed up its enlarging capabilities, however, you may view the following on page 6 of 60 if you open the above URL.


OK, today is November 3, 2011, and I will be adding to this. Below are items from the GEAP-3279 (Epstein) reference that is cited in the INDIAN POINT Chapter 12.

Following are conclusions and recommendations from the Epstein report GEAP-3279. Note Item 3 under Conclusions, "The heat evolved from the zircaloy-water reaction at temperatures above 2000 degrees Fahrenheit is significant and produces an autocatalytic effect."

Saturday, October 29, 2011

LOFT: Zircaloy-Steam Rapid at 2060 degrees Fahrenheit, ADAMS ML071940358

Here is the LOFT Report: See page 50 of 298.

The reference is:

Adams, J. P., et. al., "QUICK LOOK REPORT ON OECD LOFT EXPERIMENT LP-FP-2," OECD LOFT-T3804, ADAMS ML071940358, September 1985.


OECD LOFT-T-3804, "OECD LOFT Project, Quick-Look Report ...

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0719/ML071940358.pdf


Anyway, the following is page 30 of that report (also page 50 of 298) which you unfortunately cannot easily read because BLOGSPOT.COM again has screwed up it enlarging capability. However, the URL immediately above brings up the report and you can get page 50 of 298 although several earlier pages do not show up. Here is the key sentence, the last sentence in the second paragraph:

"It can be concluded from examination of the recorded temperatures that the oxidation of zircaloy by steam becomes rapid at temperatures in excess of 1400 K (2060 degrees Fahrenheit)."


Thursday, October 20, 2011

NRC Entertains Us: Denial of Leyse PRM-50-76

It's no secret that NRC has denied my PRM-50-76. I've been looking into that denial since then and now I believe I have nabbed those clowns red-handed. For an opener to this disclosure, please view my e-mail to Chairman NRC that is dated 10/13/2006, via the blue link below. ADAMS ML062930252.

[PDF] LTR-06-0529 - E-mail Robert H. Leyse re: PRM-50-76, A ...


Sometimes that will not open, so I've also copied that one page below.

For emphasis, I am repeating the main paragraph of my e-mail dated October 13, 2006. The NRC stated that, "More than 50 tests were conducted to evaluate the thermal-hydraulic and mechanical deformation behavior of a full length 32-rod nuclear bundle during the heatup, reflood and quench phases of a large break LOCA." And that, "The NRC is reviewing the data from this program to determine the value of using it to assess the current generation of codes such as TRAC-M (Reference 20), now renamed TRACE."

Click on the following to view NRC's Technical Safety Analysis of my PRM-50-76.






http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0412/ML041210109.pdf







Click on the following to view NRC's response my e-mail to NRC Chairman and note that, "The agency intends to compare the data from two of the NRU tests to TRACE predictions of those experiments as part of its overall assessment of the code."







http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0705/ML070540103.pdf

Click on the following to view NRC funded work that NRC covered-up, see Figures 17 and 18.
http://www.inl.gov/technicalpublications/Documents/3318092.pdf


Recall that in its letter to Senator Craig, the NRC said that it "... intends to compare the data from two of the NRU tests to TRACE predictions ..." Indeed,the NRC had already compared two sets of NRU data to its code predictions as disclosed in its contractor report, INEEL/EXT-99-00571, during 1999, well in advance of my submittal of PRM-50-76 dated May 1, 2002. It is also "interesting" that report INEEL/EXT-99-00571 is currently in non-public ADAMS although it may become available to the public (in response to my request).

http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purv/10188341-UM0U6M/native/

Tuesday, October 18, 2011

Well said

"A problem well stated is a problem half solved."

Charles F. Kettering,
inventor and engineer (1876-1958)

Monday, October 17, 2011

Sunday, October 9, 2011

Cladding-steam and bundles: ANL 7609

Argonne performed single rod and also small bundle tests (four rods) with zircaloy clad fuel rod simulators.

From ANL-7609 we learn: "A true simulation of loss-0f-coolant accident conditions requires a large number of fuel rods to achieve a realistic thermal environment for each rod." (page 24 of 38)

Then on page 25 of 38, Argonne describes the assembly: These rods were assembled on 0.6 in. centers in a square lattice by means of Teflon end plugs. Two W%-Re/W26-Re thermocouples were positioned between the grooved UO2 pellets and the cladding, one facing the center of the bundle and the other facing the perimeter. This assembly was then installed inside a quartz steam jacket (1 9/16 in. ID).

The text continues its case for multirod assemblies:

The temperature gradient observed between inner and outer edges of each rod, and the subsequent longitudinal rupture of the cladding along the inner walls of the four-rod bundle, indicate the desirability for additional experiments using more rods per bundle - for example, a center rod with at least one, and preferably two, outer rows of rods.

You may view ANL-7609; especially pages 24 and 25 of 38:
http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/4132278-dAViPP/

The NRC reviewers of my denied petition for rulemaking, PRM-50-76, missed this pertinent ANL document. I will so inform the five NRC Commissioners. The NRC must also include this reference in reviewing the pending PRM-50-93. And it is especially relevant to the Fukushima case.

Thursday, October 6, 2011

Zircaloy and Science





Romano Salvatori 1971 Some history of W nuke plants

Safety Related R & D for Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors as of 1971.


Again,somebody has messed up the enlargement capability of this blog, so following is a larger version of the body of the above letter from Westinghouse to the Atomic Energy Commission.

The report from Salavatori to Morris includes a SCHEDULE OF COMMERCIAL OPERATING DATES as of 1971 and the plants are listed in the following three slides. Fifty-one are listed with commercial operating dates ranging from 1969 through 1980. Only five of these units were in operation prior to 1971.











Tuesday, October 4, 2011

Sunday, September 18, 2011

Is all of blogspot.com under attack?

On August 28, 2011, I pasted a copy of an e-mail and the system does not properly enlarge it when the copy clicked upon. Instead, the copy remains at the same size with a mammoth black surrounding. Something is wrong.

For convenience of my readers, I am typing the body of the e-mail, March 23, 2011, that is from Shana Helton, chief of NRC's Rulemaking Branch to William Ruland. Here is the body of the e-mail:

Subject: Input for EDO tracking of delays: Delay of Petition for Rulemaking
PRM-50-93/95 due to Japan events

Bill,

Dick Dudley, the project manager for the subject petition (PRM), was discussing staff availability with Tim Collins, Sher Bahadur, and Tony Mendiola. Sher recommended we alert you to the fact that all cognizant NRR/DSS staff who would be qualified to serve on the working group for PRM-50-93/95, are otherwise occupied in various capacities responding to the recent events in Japan.

Therefore, this PRM will be significantly delayed. Our understanding it that the draft SRM regarding activities studying the Japan events would involve staff efforts up to 9 months from issuance of the SRM. We will evaluate what the new schedule for this SRM might be, but in the meantime, we are providing this info to you for any list of delayed/deferred activities you are providing/have provided to the EDO.

Shana

Sunday, August 28, 2011

PRM-50-93: Below we see another excuse from NRC to delay action

PRM-50-93 has been around for a few years, and its precursor PRM-50-76 goes way back. NRC has played with PRM-50-93, but has generated excuses to avoid any significant action. Following is an e-mail from March 2011 that documents another excuse for avoiding action, this time Fukushima is blamed.
Click on the following to enlarge and use your back arrow to return here.

/>


So, the above note states "... all cognizant NRR/DSS staff, who would be qualified to serve on the working group for PRM-50-93/95, are otherwise occupied in various capacities responding to the recent events in Japan." Now, there is no reference in the NRC's review of Fukushima that is dated July 12, 2011, that anyone investigated the temperature of the zirconium alloy at which hydrogen formation began. Clearly, the work on PRM-50-93/95 should have been completed a long time ago.

Thursday, August 18, 2011

Naval Reactors (Bettis and KAPL) & Fukushima

Somehow the 15 page document slipped through the NRC's sticky fingers and onto the Internet. The slide below is part of the first page of that document. The point of this blog entry is not that document, however as an opening distraction, interested parties may read that document by searching under "rst assessment of fukushima daichi units"

The point of this blog entry is that the assessment of Fulushima Daiichi included data and input from Bettis and KAPL among other sources. Now, there is very little that is publicly disclosed regarding activities at Bettis and KAPL, so it is "interesting" that Bettis and KAPL are among those credited with the following from page 1 of the 15 page report, "Core is contained in the reactor pressure vessel, reactor water level is unknown. The volume of sea water injected to cool the core has left enough salt to fill the lower plenum to the core plate. (GEH, INPO, Bettis, KAPL)."








Sunday, August 14, 2011

Mistakes in Scientific Studies

Wall Street Journal



The following is from August 10, 2011. The text focuses on medical stuff although the slide below covers the full range of science including chemistry, engineering, physics and several other areas.



Too bad it does not get into the NRC's goofs like Baker-Just, TRACE, etc. I wonder what the Japanese will say when they find out that the Fukushima units took off well below 2200 Fahrenheit.








Saturday, August 6, 2011

Consider Nuclear Safety Analysis: Skewing down the risks via PRAs

Yes, consider nuclear safety analysis. Our NRC derails common sense with its massive excesses in requirements for probabilistic risk analyses (PRAs). Of course, the Nuclear Energy Institute does not mind. The nuclear industry has found that PRAs are an effective tool in skewing-down the risks of severe accidents. And, the ratepayers cover the expense of the never ending skewing-down processes.

NEI held a media briefing on July 13, 2011, to discuss the NRC's 90 day review by its Fukushima task force. Stephen Dolley of PLATTS expressed concern that NRC's risk informed approaches could skew risk analyses and thus place low probability events into a low risk category even though the consequences may be severe. Click on the following to enlarge and use your back arrow to return here.

Friday, July 29, 2011

An Impact of Fukushima - Delay in 50.46a

Fukushima struck and our NRC found it convenient to delay stuff, although life extensions and power level increases are proceeding as business as usual.

Click on the following to enlarge and use your back arrow to return here.


Tuesday, July 19, 2011

NEI Briefing for Press - Fukushima 90 Day Report



Click on the following to enlarge and use your return arrow to get back here.

Monday, July 18, 2011

NRC now says move fast but they go slow on PRM-50-93

Here is the latest. The great chairman of our NRC tells the public very little, but now he says because of Fukushima the troops must move fast in a lot of uncoordinated actions. In the meantime several petitions by Mark Leyse, highlighted by PRM-50-93, are on the wayside. Jaczko has lots of time for the press on matters of less severity than PRM-50-93.

Click on the following to enlarge and use your back arrow to return here.

Friday, July 15, 2011

Who will beckon to USA nuke refugees?

Click to enlarge and use your back arrow to return here.

A Fast Reaction by NEI

NEI has likely been well on top of NRC Fukushima reactions as the "work" has progressed. As soon as NRC published its first "comprehensive" report, NEI jumped in fast. Click on the following to enlarge and use your return arrow to get back here.



NEI has likely been well on top of NRC Fukushima reactions as the "work" has progressed. As soon as NRC published its first "comprehensive" report, NEI jumped in fast. Click on the following to enlarge and use your return arrow to get back here.

Sunday, July 10, 2011

NUKE Fukushima Steering Committee and PRM-50-93

Very interesting. EPRI, INPO and NEI are focused on Fukushima. NRC claims to lead this stuff but they are elsewhere. However, the focus should be on PRM-50-93. Following are two charts that show the EPRI, INPO and NEI game players for Fukushima. Click to enlarge and use your back arrow to return here.

PRM-50-93 is in several earlier entries in this blog. So are my related attacks on the Baker-Just equation and the fierce defense of Baker-Just by the NRC, NEI, and several elements of the industry. Following is one of several NRC responses to my actions related to PRM-50-93. Again, click to enlarge and use your back arrow to return here.

Saturday, July 9, 2011

Times change. Vogtle overrun, who pays? Japan marketing July 2010

Here are two items, Vogtle now and marketing of nuke exports by Japan one year ago. Click to enlarge and use your back key to return. Very interesting.



Friday, July 8, 2011

A Partial Reaction to Fukushima

Click to enlarge, use your back arrow to return.

Thursday, June 16, 2011

"All 3 cores to some degree are ex vessel"

So, yesterday, June 15, 2011, Borchardt of NRC told his commissioners and the public that according to the IAEA, "... all three reactors, the cores, to some degree are ex-vessel ..."

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
BRIEFING ON THE PROGRESS OF THE TASK FORCE REVIEW OF NRC PROCESSES AND REGULATIONS FOLLOWING THE EVENTS IN JAPAN
JUNE 15, 2011
9:30 A.M.
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Following is copied from the transcript

from Borchardt:

Early last week, the government of Japan released its IAEA report 14 on the event. The report indicates that all three reactors, the cores, to some 15 degree, are ex-vessel. The NRC staff has contemplated this scenario for some 16 time, due to the duration of each of the reactors went without core cooling. 17 However, it's still too early to tell, and we don't have specific evidence to show 18 the exact condition, and how much of any of the cores went ex-vessel in those 19 three units. And it's important to realize that, as more and more new information 20 comes available, and I think this will continue for months to come, our 21 understanding of the specific events and what actions need to be taken will be 22 further refined.

Virgilio talked and disclosed an industy effort, EPRI, NEI and others but no details, as follows:

Finally, what I want to do is recognize that the nuclear industry 8 developed their strategic plan for following up to the Fukushima events. They 9 developed that strategic plan and established a steering committee consisting of 10 representatives from EPRI, IAEA, NEI, and others. And we'll continue to monitor 11 those activities and continue to consider their input, along with the input of all the 12 stakeholders, as we move forward in the longer term effort. That's all I wanted to 13 say in terms of the background, and let me now turn it over to Charlie Miller.

Saturday, June 11, 2011

NRC, INPO, DOE, Naval Reactors, and GE

Following are excerpts from an ACRS transcript (Fukushima). It turns out that about 10 weeks after the March 11 tsunami, NEI and the DOE talk about a lot of running around, but nobody seems very adept at cutting into the fundamentals. Of course, resolution of PRM-50-93 would be useful, however, those efforts have not proceeded, or remain unreported. Well in advance of Fukushima, the NEI and NRC insisted that tools such as the Baker-Just and Cathcart-Pawel were well founded. I wonder what tools the "experts" deployed in the alleged analyses of "Hydrogen produced from zirconium oxidation of the fuel cladding."

I found out that NRC had "extended" its deadline for reviewing PRM-50-93 during ACRS and NRC staff discussions at the meeting of the ACRS Thermal Hydraulics Subcommittee on October 18, 2011. Following are a few of my remarks to Full ACRS on May 26, 2011. I have corrected the reference to PRM-50-93.

Now today we heard NEI tell us that while
4 we take this Fukushima act on we don't ignore what
5 else is going on. I would advise ACRS to be get into
6 PRM 50.93 as well as the NRC. NRC once had it as a
7 high priority item until a rather otherwise useless
8 meeting back in October of the Thermohydraulic
9 Subcommittee.

But it's a fact that made any sense what
12 Mark Leyse and myself discussed. You went through the
13 whole thing and never got into zirconium or how it
14 would react in a loss of coolant accident. Instead
15 you listened to endless presentations from Penn State
16 and others that really don't bear on what's going on
17 today or was potentially going to go on.
18 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Mr. Leyse.
19 MR. LEYSE: End of comments. Thank you.


Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
Subcommittee on Fukushima
Location: Rockville, Maryland
Date: Thursday, May 26, 2011

DR. KELLY: So there is some
2 interconnection. That may explain the mystery of
3 Unit 4, so -- but basically, what I wanted to talk
4 about was, you know, what kind of happened in those
5 first days. Of course, you know, we know the NRC
6 stood up their Emergency Operations Center. They
7 deployed people to Japan.
8 They formed this reactor safety team that
9 was really there to provide advice to the Ambassador
10 and the government as questions came in. And it was
11 principally on the -- managing the reactors and spent
12 fuel pools. I mean, that's what the NRC team was
13 principally focused on.
14 But they initiated this consortium call
15 that was twice a day, daily, you know, it was very
16 frequent, that it had participation from NRC, INPO,
17 DOE, Naval Reactors, and GE, other industry partners.

18 So there was a call that was discussing basically that
19 the appropriate accident management guidelines, as we
20 are gathering data and looking ahead, as to what was
21 next.
22 Dr. Lyons, my boss, and Chairman Jaczko
23 got together with INPO and discussed, how are we going
24 to deal with all the industry's interest in assisting
25 Japan? And so INPO agreed to be the coordinating
point for that, and they sent -- ended up sending
2 people both to -- to Japan as well as coordinating
3 things here in the U.S.
4 And so this really was a great idea,
5 because it helped get our capabilities, which are
6 great in terms of many of these areas, channeled in
7 the right direction, so that they could be deployed
8 more rapidly.
9 MEMBER CORRADINI: So INPO was the point
10 of focus, the point of contact to TEPCO.
11 DR. KELLY: Yes.
12 MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay.
13 DR. KELLY: And for all interesting in
14 assisting, it was -- INPO served as a clearinghouse
15 for that.

DR. KELLY: I was at the GE Emergency
8 Center on like the 13th of March. It turned out the
9 PSA conference was held in Wilmington. So I took the
10 opportunity to go over. I know that was really good.
11 So we've established that liaison, too. So that when
12 we need information on the GE plants we've got that
13 network in place.







Immediate Response

USNRC

􀀀Activated its Emergency Operations Center

􀀀Immediately deployed personnel to the U.S.
Embassy in Japan to support the Reactor Safety
Team (RST)

􀀀Provided expert advice to the U.S. Ambassador d
and Government of Japan ministers

􀀀Set up and coordinated consortium call that
involved NRC, INPO, DOE, and Naval Reactors

U. S. Department of Energy

􀀀 Activated its Emergency Operations Center
focused on monitoring radiation release and
impact on U.S. citizens (both in Japan and the
U.S.)

􀀀 Deployed Airborne Monitoring System aircraft
and sensors

􀀀 Provided additional DOE Embassy reps to the
two already assigned to the U.S. Embassy

􀀀 Deployed national laboratory reps from INL,
involved NRC, INPO, DOE, and Naval Reactors
PNNL and Sandia to provide technical assistance

􀀀 Assigned NE personnel to stand watch in the DOE<>R&gt;DOE EOC

INPO

􀀀Organized nuclear industry technical response to
assist TEPCO

DOE has provided a significant
response to the events at Fukushima


􀂄 During the first several weeks after the massive earthquake in
Japan, DOE provided a significant and diverse set of analysis to
support the events at Fukushima-Daiichi

􀂄 This response involved a broad set of institutions with over 200
people contributing
– DOE: Offices of NE, SC, NNSA, EM
– Laboratories: ANL, BNL, INL, LANL, ORNL, PNNL, and SNL
– Numerous universities
– Individual consultants – Secretary’s external science experts

Background on Unit 4 SFP Explosion

􀂄 Unit 4 explosion Occurred March 15, 6:00 am – Approximately 90 hours after
earthquake (Full core offloaded into pool, high heat load (~2.3 MW))

􀂄 The Unit 4 Explosion was originally attributed to hydrogen, but it has not be possible to definitively conclude this.

􀂄 An assessment of possible causes of the explosion was performed resulting three
primary causes:
– Hydrogen produced from zirconium oxidation from the fuel cladding (or other fuel assembly and storage rack structures) in the fuel storage pool
– Ignition of other flammable materials in the unit 4 building that were possibly being used for maintenance work (such as acetylene)
– Hydrogen that was transferred through the stack vent lines from the hydrogen produced in unit 3

􀂄 There were additional possible causes that have been proposed by others, but not
analyzed:
– Hydrogen production from radiolysis
– A proposed scenario based on material blockage preventing convective flow coupled with extreme boiling

Jaczko and the Government of Japan

Of course, this is all over the place, but I do not want to lose track, so I copied it here.

NRC NEWS
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Office of Public Affairs Telephone: 301/415-8200
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
E-mail: opa.resource@nrc.gov Site: www.nrc.gov
Blog: http://public-blog.nrc-gateway.gov
No. 11-102

June 10, 2011

GREGORY JACZKO, CHAIRMAN, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
GOSHI HOSONO, SPECIAL ADVISER TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN


We had very productive talks about our joint interest in nuclear safety, and the support being provided to Japan by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in dealing with the on-going situation at Tokyo Electric Power Company’s (TEPCO) Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant. Mr. Hosono expressed his sincere gratitude for the assistance the NRC provided following the accident. Chairman Jaczko extended sympathy to the people of Japan in dealing with the difficult circumstances. The NRC and the Japanese authorities have a long record of extensive cooperation in nuclear safety.

Chairman Jaczko briefed Mr. Hosono on NRC’s ongoing review of U.S. nuclear plants, and Mr. Hosono discussed the Government of Japan’s (GoJ) continuing efforts to deal with the challenges posed by the damaged Fukushima reactors and the report the GoJ recently submitted to the IAEA.

We look forward to further discussions and cooperation as this situation progresses and additional dialogue between the two Governments at the IAEA, and emphasize the importance of learning the lessons from TEPCO’s Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant accident to further the common cause of nuclear safety.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Office of Public Affairs Telephone: 301/415-8200
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
E-mail: opa.resource@nrc.gov Site: www.nrc.gov
Blog: http://public-blog.nrc-gateway.gov
No. 11-102
June 10, 2011

Friday, June 10, 2011

Draft Regulatory Guides DG-1261, DG-1262, DG-1263

OK, I listened to the following item via the bridge line. I'll add to this when I read the transcript and that will be online in a week or so. Someone discussed 1200 degrees centigrade. THERE IS NO WAY THAT A REALISTIC SPECIMEN MAY BE PREPARED AT 1200DEGREES CENTIGRADE. What I heard was the production of yet more Regulation by Myth. I'll write more after I have the transcript.


AGENDA 584th ACRS MEETING June 8-10, 2011
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 8, 2011, CONFERENCE ROOM T-2B1, 11545 ROCKVILLE PIKE, ROCKVILLE, MD
1) 8:30 AM - 8:35 AM Opening Remarks by the ACRS Chairman (Open) (SAK/EMH)
1.1) Opening Statement
1.2) Items of Current Interest
2) 8:35 AM - 10:30 AM Draft Regulatory Guides DG-1261, "Conducting Periodic Testing for Breakaway Oxidation Behavior," DG-1262, "Testing for Postquench Ductility," and DG-1263, "Establishing Analytical Limits for Zirconium-Based Alloy Cladding" (Open) (JSA/CLB)
2.1) Remarks by the Subcommittee Chairman
2.2) Briefing by and discussions with representatives of the NRC staff and Electric Power Research Institute regarding draft Regulatory Guides DG-1261, "Conducting Periodic Testing for Breakaway Oxidation Behavior," DG-1262, "Testing for Postquench Ductility," and DG-1263, "Establishing Analytical Limits for Zirconium-Based Alloy Cladding"

Sunday, June 5, 2011

Thermal Hydraulics at NRC, ACRS and Elsewhere

Stephen M. Bajorek has been with the NRC as Senior Technical Advisor for Thermal-Hydraulics approximately ten years, where he is involved in development of the TRACE code, advanced reactor analysis, and the NRC's thermal-hydraulic test programs. Prior to joining the staff he was a member of the faculty at Kansas State University in the Department of Mechanical and Nuclear Engineering. He has 15 years of industrial experience at Westinghouse Electric Corp., where he was involved with the AP600 Design Certification, thermal-hydraulic code development and licensing of the Westinghouse Best Estimate LOCA methodology. Dr. Bajorek received his Ph. D. from Michigan State University, and M.S. and B.S. degrees in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Notre Dame.

Sanjoy Banerjee is Distinguished Professor of Chemical Engineering and Director of the Energy Institute at the City University of New York and publishes extensively on nuclear thermalhydraulics. Previously he was Professor of Chemical Engineering at the University of California - Santa Barbara. Member of the U.S. NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, ACRS. Earlier in Canada, he occupied the positions of Westinghouse Professor of Engineering Physics at McMaster University and of Acting Director of Applied Science in the Whiteshell Nuclear Research Establishment. He was a founding member of the Canadian Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety. He has received the ASME Melville Medal, the IChemE (UK) Danckwerts Lecturership, the AIChE Kern Award, and the ASME Heat Transfer Memorial Award and ANS Technical Achievement Award in Thermal-hydraulics. Fellow of ANS.

Sama Bilbao y León is currently an Associate Professor and the Director of Nuclear Engineering Programs at Virginia Commonwealth University. While at Dominion Generation, she led the development and licensing of new methodologies in core thermal-hydraulics and nuclear safety analysis in support of Dominion's nuclear power stations. As Technical Head of the International Atomic Energy Agency Water Cooled Reactors Technology Development Unit, she was in charge of all IAEA activities in support of the development and near term deployment of advanced water cooled reactors and their associated fuels.

Christopher Boyd is a senior level advisor for computational fluid dynamics (CFD) within the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). He carried out the program to bring CFD tools “in-house” for the NRC during the 1990s and has spent the past 15 years utilizing these tools for nuclear safety analyses. Previously, he spent 9 years working on instrumentation development and optimization for high-speed wind tunnel testing at the Naval Surface Warfare Center. He received his Ph.D. in Mechanical Engineering at the University of Maryland in the area of thermal-fluids behavior.

Michael L. Corradini is Chair and Wisconsin Distinguished Professor of Nuclear Engineering at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is also a member of the U.S. NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), member of NRC safety review panels and of the DoE Generation IV Roadmap Project. He has published widely in areas related to vapour explosion and severe accident phenomena, jet spray dynamics and transport phenomena in multiphase systems. Member of the National Academy of Engineering and Fellow of ANS.

Thomas Downar received his Ph.D. from MIT in 1984 and from 1984-2006 was a Professor in the School of Nuclear Engineering at Purdue University. After a year as a Professor at University of California-Berkeley, he joined the faculty at the University of Michigan where he is currently a Professor and Graduate Chair in the Nuclear Engineering and Radiological Sciences Department. Professor Downar is a Fellow of the American Nuclear Society. The primary focus of his research is nuclear reactor physics and multiphysics computational methods in support of the U.S. NRC, the U.S. DoE, EPRI and several international agencies. He is the author of the U.S. NRC core neutronics simulator PARCS and has contributed to the development of the thermal-hydraulics codes TRACE and RELAP5. The coupled neutronics and thermal-hydraulics codes TRACE/PARCS and RELAP5/PARCS are used worldwide to perform the safety analysis of most every type of power reactor currently operating in the world.

Geoffrey F. Hewitt is Professor Emeritus of Chemical Engineering at Imperial College, London. Founder of the Heat Transfer and Fluid Flow Service (HTFS) at the Harwell Laboratory. He has authored and edited many books and published over 500 papers and reports. Former Editor of Multiphase Science and Technology and former Executive Editor of the Heat Exchanger Design Handbook. Recipient of the AIChE Donald Q. Kern, the ASME Max Jacob awards, the Nusselt Reynolds Prize, the Luikov Medal, the IChemE Council and Armstrong medals, the Senior Multiphase Flow Award and the Global Energy Prize. He has Honorary Doctorates from Louvain, UMIST and Heriot Watt Fellow of the Royal Academy of Engineering, Fellow of the Royal Society, and Foreign Associate of the US National Academy of Engineering.

George Yadigaroglu is Professor Emeritus of Nuclear Engineering, ETH-Zurich and President and co-founder of ASCOMP, an ETH spin-off company specializing in CMFD simulations. Was also Head of the Thermal-Hydraulics Laboratory at the Paul Scherrer Institute. Previously Professor of Nuclear Engineering at the University of California-Berkeley. Active in research and consulting and a member of several international high-level committees dealing with nuclear safety issues. ANS Technical Achievement Award. ANS and ASME Fellow. Former Associate Editor of the International Journal of Multiphase Flow.

Ghani Zigh is a Senior Technical Advisor in the U.S. NRC in the Office of Research, and is a registered PE (Professional Engineer) in the state of New York. He has been a USNRC staff member since August 2002, and involved in dry cask applications, BWR and PWR Zircaloy Fire (accident analysis), APWR advanced accumulators, fire analysis, and ultrasonic flow meters. Prior to the NRC, he worked at Parsons Brinkerhoff (PB) in Manhattan as an international consultant using CFD (Computational Fluid Dynamics) to model fire and emergency ventilation for tunnels and train stations as well as the effects of thermal pollution of power plants on oceans and rivers. He was also an adjunct professor at Stevens Institute of Technology in New Jersey where he taught undergraduate and graduate classes in Mechanical Engineering.

Monday, May 30, 2011

Leyse at ACRS Fukushima Subcommittee, May 26, 2011

May 26, 2011
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS)
Fukushima Subcommittee Meeting

Via a bridge line telephone connection, I was allowed to briefly submit spoken comments to the subcommittee. I had no notes, in fact I was surprised that the Chairman invited public comments that were not requested in advance of the meeting.

I spoke very briefly, before the Chairman, apparently disturbed by the content of my remarks as well as my aggressive attitude, cut me off. As I recall, here is the substance of my remarks, and I will update this when the transcript of the meeting becomes available.

Items:

1. NRC and the ACRS have not addressed PRM-50-93 although the matter is of greater significance than Fukushima.

2. Although NRC had assigned a high priority to the review of PRM-50-93, the NRC has not followed through.

3. I found out that NRC had "extended" its deadline for reviewing PRM-50-93 during ACRS and NRC staff discussions at the meeting of the ACRS Thermal Hydraulics Subcommittee on October 18, 2011.

4. I cited earlier discussions by NEI at this May 26, 2011, meeting in which they suggested that Fukushima would be treated as a separate activity and that existing business would proceed without interference. Likewise, the NRC must not allow its Fukushima activities to have a higher priority than reviewing PRM-50-93.

5. The brief Leyse presentations at the October 18, 2011, meeting of the Thermal Hydraulics Subcommittee were the only worthy aspects of that meeting.

I'll update this with material copied from the transcript of the May 26, 2011, subcommittee meeting when that becomes available to the public.

OK, Today June 2, 2011, I noted that the transcript of the May 26, 2011, Fukushima meeting has been posted. The transcriber has rather thoroughly screwed up my verbal remarks, hence it is a good thing that I logged the above from memory. Anyway, the following is from the transcript. One thing that is accurate is the following: Instead
15 you listened to endless presentations from Penn State
16 and others that really don't bear on what's going on
17 today or was potentially going to go on.


Official Transcript of Proceedings
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title: Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
Subcommittee on FukushimaDocket Number: (n/a)
Location: Rockville, Maryland
Date: Thursday, May 26, 20114 MR. LEYSE: Yes, this is Robert Leyse.
5 I've talked to you before.
6 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Mr. Leyse, please
7 hold off. We have some here in the room who is going
8 to make comments. So I will recognize you later.
9 MR. LEYSE: I will go to *6.

21 Okay. At this time, Mr. Leyse, if you'd
22 like to offer any comments.
23 MR. LEYSE: Just came back on. Quickly,
24 I want to say PRM 50.93 was around well ahead of
25 Fukushima and a predecessor to that was around since
1 the mid -- around 2002 or 2003. And nothing seems to
2 move.
Now today we heard NEI tell us that while
4 we take this Fukushima act on we don't ignore what
5 else is going on. I would advise ACRS to be get into
6 PRM 50.83 as well as the NRC. NRC once had it as a
7 high priority item until a rather otherwise useless
8 meeting back in October of the Thermohydraulic
9 Subcommittee, the only part really bragging, not
10 bragging.
11 But it's a fact that made any sense what
12 Mark Leyse and myself discussed. You went through the
13 whole thing and never got into zirconium or how it
14 would react in a loss of coolant accident. Instead
15 you listened to endless presentations from Penn State
16 and others that really don't bear on what's going on
17 today or was potentially going to go on.
18 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Mr. Leyse.
19 MR. LEYSE: End of comments. Thank you.
20 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Thank you very much.

Friday, May 13, 2011

Closeout Memorandum, Leyse business at NSF

This is for my record and I'll elaborate when I get the Closeout Memorandum. Update, June 2, 2011, including the Closeout Memorandum.

Dear Mr. Leyse:

This acknowledges receipt of your Freedom of Information Act and/or Privacy Act request received on May 09, 2011. We have assigned NSF OIG tracking number FOIA 11-70 to your request and expect to respond not later than June 07, 2011 (20 working days after date of receipt of request). Please contact us at oig@nsf.gov for questions on status.

From: Bobleyse@aol.com [mailto:Bobleyse@aol.com]
Sent: Sunday, May 08, 2011 9:41 PM
To: OIG
Subject: Request for closeout memorandum

I request a copy of the closeout memorandum for OIG matter that is discussed in the e-mail that I received from Kenneth L. Busch on 07/16/2008 and that I have copied below.

Robert H. Leyse bobleyse@aol.com

Subject:
Case closure

Date:
7/16/2008 10:41:40 A.M. Mountain Daylight Time

From:
kbusch@nsf.gov

Reply To:


To:
BobLeyse@aol.com

Mr. Robert Leyse

Sun Valley, ID

Via email to BobLeyse@aol.com

Dear Mr. Leyse:

We opened a file in response to your email received in this office on April 17, 2008. We have determined that there is insufficient substance to an allegation of misconduct to proceed in this case. The case has been closed and no further action will be taken.

Attached to this message you will find guidance for “Obtaining a Closeout Memorandum or Investigation Report For An NSF OIG Case.” If you decide to make a FOIA request, please note that this case did not result in criminal prosecution, civil legal action, or government-wide debarment or voluntary exclusion of anyone.

Please respect CONFIDENTIAL information in this message.

Kenneth L. Busch

Office of Inspector General

4201 Wilson Boulevard

Arlington, VA 22230

Phone 703-292-4569 FAX 703-292-9159

kbusch@nsf.gov

OK, Today, June 2, 2011, I receved the followng response from NSF for a copy of the closeout memorandum. The date of the original closeout memorandum is June 23, 2008. Today there are more facts. Things take time! I'll have more to log as I coontinue my protest.

National Science Foundation  Office of the Inspector General
4201 Wilson Boulevard, Suite II-705, Arlington, Virginia 22230
1 June 2011
VIA EMAIL
Robert H. Leyse
P.O. Box 2850
Sun Valley, ID 83353
Bobleyse@aol.com
Re: FOIA Request No. 11-70
Dear Mr. Leyse:
This letter responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552) request, which we received on 9 May 2011, for a copy of the closeout memorandum for an OIG matter referred to in correspondence from an OIG employee to you on 16 July 2008.
We enclose the responsive closeout memorandum. Under FOIA exemptions (b)(6) and (b)(7)(C), information that constitutes an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy is exempt from disclosure. To protect the privacy interests of individuals who were not, with respect to the matter or matters described in the requested records, subject to successful criminal prosecution, recent civil legal action, or debarment or voluntary exclusion government-wide, we have redacted the names, titles, and other identifying information for all such individuals other than yourself, pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(6) and (b)(7)(C).
If you are not satisfied with my decision, you may appeal to the Inspector General, Allison Lerner, by writing to her at the National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington VA 22230. Alternatively, you may appeal directly to the General Counsel of the Foundation, at the same address.1 If you wish to appeal to either the
1 For appeals to NSF‟s General Counsel, note the requirements of 45 C.F.R. § 612.9(a): “You must make your appeal in writing and it must be received by the Office of the General Counsel within ten days of the receipt of the denial (weekends, legal holidays, and the date of receipt excluded). Clearly mark your appeal letter and the envelope „Freedom of Information Act
2
Inspector General or the General Counsel, you must file your appeal within ten business days of receipt of this letter. If you submit an appeal to the Inspector General and her decision is negative, you may then appeal to the General Counsel. All appeals will be acted on within 20 business days after receipt.
Sincerely,
Stephen W. Bross, J.D.
Investigative & FOIA Attorney
Enclosure
Appeal.‟ Your appeal letter must include a copy of your written request and the denial together with any written argument you wish to submit.”

NATIONAL
SCIENCE FOUNDATION OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATION
Page 1 of 1
Case Number: P08040064

We assessed multiple allegations ofmisconduct. An individual1 submitted, as sole PI, a proposal2 to NSF. This proposal was declined for funding. Subsequent allegations that the reviewer's comments were misconduct are without substance; reviewer comments (and their relevance and propriety) are a programmatic issue that could appropriately have been raised with the NSF Program Officer at the time of review. Misconduct is also alleged in NSF's refusal to release reviews ofa funded proposae to an individual not a PI or coPI on the proposal. NSF is abiding by the consistent policy of not releasing reviews of proposals to anyone but the PI and coPI and there is no substance here to an allegation of misconduct. Finally, misconduct is alleged in funding of a proposal revised and resubmitted after its fIrst declination.4 There is no substance to an allegation of misconduct here, as the work in the resubmission is properly attributed and the review process properly completed.

Accordingly, the case is closed.

1 Robert Leyse of Sun Valley, ID.

2 DMI-0127841 "SBIRlSTTRPhase 1: Sampling Microscale Turbulence."

3 Awarded proposal ***** This proposal is essentially a resubmission of ****** and coPI R. H Leyse.

4 Leyse's efforts in ****** were to be supported through a subaward of $10,000; this proposal was declined for funding. Leyse was not coPI or senior personnel on resubmission ***** which contains much ofthe same material (properly attributed to Leyse). ***** contains no funds for Leyse either as consultant or as subaward.

/ Lrit~.~Y .,;,

Investigator/ **** /1 / Date June 23, 2008
AW"
I····..'·J'~ ,
~
Print your name; insert date MOl completed.
NSF OrG Form 4 (1lI02)















Monday, March 28, 2011

More Obfuscation is Work in Progress

Obfuscation NRC NEWS U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Office of Public Affairs Telephone: 301/415-8200 Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 E-mail: opa.resource@nrc.gov Site: www.nrc.gov Blog: http://public-blog.nrc-gateway.gov No. 11-055 March 23, 2011 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DIRECTS STAFF ON CONTINUING AGENCY RESPONSE TO JAPAN EVENTS; ADJUSTS COMMISSION SCHEDULE The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has voted to launch a two-pronged review of U.S. nuclear power plant safety in the aftermath of the March 11 earthquake and tsunami and the resulting crisis at a Japanese nuclear power plant. The Commission supported the establishment of an agency task force, made up of current senior managers and former NRC experts with relevant experience. The task force will conduct both short- and long-term analysis of the lessons that can be learned from the situation in Japan, and the results of their work will be made public. “Our focus is always on ensuring the health and safety of the American people through our licensing and oversight of plants and radioactive materials in this country,” Chairman Jaczko said. “Examining all the available information from Japan is essential to understanding the event’s implications for the United States. We will perform a systematic and methodical review to see if there are changes that should be made to our programs and regulations to ensure protection of public health and safety.” The Commission set an aggressive schedule for the task force to provide formal updates on the short-term effort in 30, 60 and 90 days. NRC senior technical staff provided the Commission a 90-minute briefing on Monday, as a first step. The staff reiterated their conclusions that the United States and its territories will avoid any harmful radiation levels as a result of the ongoing events at the Fukushima Daiichi plant damaged by the quake and subsequent tsunami. NRC inspectors who are posted at every U.S. nuclear power plant will also support the task force’s short-term effort, supplemented as necessary by experts from the agency’s regional and headquarters offices. “This work will help determine if any additional NRC responses, such as Orders requiring immediate action by U.S. plants, are called for, prior to completing an in-depth investigation of the information from events in Japan,” said NRC Executive Director for Operations Bill Borchardt. The longer-term review will inform any permanent NRC regulation changes determined to be necessary. The Commission said it hopes the task force can begin the long-term evaluation in no later than 90 days, and added that the task force should provide a report with recommended actions within six months of the beginning of that effort. The Commission also decided to revise its schedule for meetings and briefings to allow ample focus on the agency’s response to events in Japan. Open Commission meetings on the status of the NRC response to the Japan earthquake are scheduled for April 14 and 28, a meeting on the staff’s 30-day response is planned for May 3 and a meeting on the staff’s 60-day response is planned for June 16. A revised Commission meeting schedule will be posted shortly on the NRC website.

Monday, March 21, 2011

An e-mail to the NRC Commissioners Way Off Base

From: Bobleyse@aol.com
To: chairman@nrc.gov, cmrsvinicki@nrc.gov, cmrostendorff@nrc.gov, cmrmagwood@nrc.gov, cmrapostolakis@nrc.gov, stephen.burns@nrc.gov
Sent: 3/21/2011 11:47:38 A.M. Mountain Daylight Time
Subj: Way off base


So:

The Chairman asserts:

On behalf of the Commission, I want to thank all of our staff for maintaining their focus on our essential safety and security mission throughout these difficult days. I want to acknowledge their tireless efforts and their critical contributions to the U.S. response to assist Japan. In spite of the evolving situation, the long hours, and the intensity of efforts over the past week, staff has approached their responsibilities with dedication, determination and professionalism, and I am incredibly proud of their efforts.

Again, the Commissioners have wasted their time. The staff does not realize that hydrogen production began well below 2200 degrees Fahrenheit. As I have pointed out, the Staff defends Baker-Just without having studied it. So does NEI.

You guys should have instead spent your time studying PRM-50-93.

Also, it is unfortunate that you encouraged so many Americans to get out of Japan. That is another consequence of your useless codes including TRACE.

Bob Leyse bobleyse@aol.com

Monday, March 7, 2011

Donlan of Barron's, 2/28/2011, "It's a corrupting relationship, ..."

A quote from Donlan of Barron’s, February 28, 2011: “It’s a corrupting relationship, even when the partners stay within the law.” Of course, Donlan was not talking about nuclear power regulation.

In the game of regulation by myth we have corrupting relationships, and the participants survive by bending the law as they see fit.

Monday, February 28, 2011

PRM-50-93, no sweat at NRC's OGC

So, here is the latest. Click to enlarge, and use your back arrow to return. Mote later regarding this.






Sunday, February 13, 2011

CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: "You have five minutes to make your remarks."

Forward: On January 14, 2011, I addressed the ACRS in matters related to the Rod Bundle Heat Transfer program at Pennsylvania State University and also the User Need Request that is on file (ML100770218). Although ACRS allows NRC staff to use all of the time they want in generally poorly organized presentations, I was restricted to five minutes. Following is copied from the transcript of the meeting. I participated via a telephone connection. My two page handout is also here.

CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: Mr. Leyse?
MR. LEYSE: Yes, can you hear me?
CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: Yes, we can. You have five minutes to make your remarks.
MR. LEYSE: Well, do you want me to start now?
CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: Yes.
MR. LEYSE: Okay. It'll take me 10 seconds to walk to my notes, and we'll be going.
I’m Bob Leyse. I have 5 minutes. Starting with slide 1:

On December 2, 2010, I taught Full ACRS that 2200 degrees Fahrenheit is too high as a PCT to insure that thermal runaway will not occur in a LOCA.

Today I’ll focus on two items:

RBHT at Penn State and the User Need Request, Leeds to Sheron, April 26, 2010, which is a user need request for a technical analysis of PRM-50-93. November 17, 2009.

Starting with RBHT:

RBHT has apparently explored the relatively low temperature regions of LOCAs utilizing its 49 rod full length assembly with Inconel clad heaters. Very likely millions of dollars have been spent over the 13 year activity. The most recent pubic discussion of RBHT was at the ACRS Thermal Hydraulic Phenomena Subcommittee, Monday, October 18, 2010. Of course, the general uselessness of RBHT is due to its lack of data with zirconium alloy cladding in the region greater than 1800 degrees Fahrenheit that is documented in plant licenses. NRC has avoided exploring this region with multirod assemblies having zirconium alloy cladding.

NRC (outrageously) has always promoted RBHT at Penn State
as highly applicable to TRACE and licensing. However, the documents are generally not available to anyone outside of NRC and its contractors.

ACRS Consultant Wallis may have had such access because at the cited meeting of the Thermal Hydraulic Phenomena Subcommittee he observes: “Are we going to hear about this later? Because the only thing I have seen from the Penn State work was some very sort of crude results,
but they measured all kinds of stuff.”
Next, I’ll move to the user need request, I’ll cite a tie-in to Penn State’s RBHT.

In the User Need Request, Leeds to Sheron, April 26, 2010, Leeds refers to the Technical Safety Analysis dated April 29, 2004, of my PRM-50-76, docketed May 8, 2002, as an “… outstanding technical analysis … .” However, the facts reveal that NRC’s Technical Safety Analysis of PRM-50-76 is most certainly not an outstanding technical analysis. Referring to RBHT, the Technical Safety Analysis of April 29, 2004 reports, “Current programs at Pennsylvania State University … are far more cost effective.”

So, in 2004, NRC staff was praising RBHT, but more than 6 years later, Expert Consultant Wallis reported, “…Penn State work was some very sort of crude results.”

Now, since RBHT has only used inconel clad bundles, it is absurd that Leeds lauds the 2004 Technical Safety Analysis of PRAM-50-76 as an “… outstanding technical analysis … .”

Of course there is much more documentation of the defects in RBHT and the User need letter than I am covering in 5 minutes.

Slide 2 has blue and black type. The blue type is what the Thermal Hydraulic Subcommittee was told on October 18, 2010, as its list reports that are dated 2008. The black type reveals that none of the reports have been released by NRC and three of the reports have no assigned date of release.


I still have over one minute. It’s not on either slide, but in the referenced meeting of the thermal hydraulics subcommittee there was a lot of discussion of the impact of various grid features, such as mixing vanes, on test results. However, if zircaloy grids had been used for comparison with inconel, and if the tests were conducted at realistic temperatures depicted in actual plant licenses, the impact on test results would have been far greater than the relatively minor impact of mixing vanes.
Finally, I should not have been restricted to five minutes, more later on that. That’s it.

CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: Thank you, Mr. Leyse. Are there any questions for Mr. Leyse? Well, hearing none, thank you. Are there any additional questions to either the staff, or to AREVA considering the fact that this is an open session? Hearing none, we will recess at this time. Our schedule calls for us to go to a lunch recess. We will reconvene at 1:15, and at that point we will be off the record.

Following are the two slides that are in the transcript. Click on the slide to enlarge and use your back arrow to return here.

Friday, February 11, 2011

Some history -- Microscale Heat Transfer to Subcooeld Water, 200-6000 PSIA

Microscale Heat Transfer to Subcooled Water
200-6,000psia, 0-3,500W/cm2
ROBERT H. LEYSE Article first published online: 24 JAN 2006

DOI: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2002.tb05912.x
Issue
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
Volume 974, MICROGRAVITY TRANSPORT PROCESSES IN FLUID, THERMAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND MATERIALS SCIENCES pages 261–273, October 2002

LEYSE, R. H. (2002), Microscale Heat Transfer to Subcooled Water. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 974: 261–273. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2002.tb05912.x

Author Information
Inz, Inc., Sun Valley, Idaho, USA
*Correspondence: ROBERT H. LEYSE,

*Correspondence: Address for correspondence: Robert H. Leyse, Inz, Inc., P. O. Box 2850, Sun Valley, ID 83353, USA. Voice/fax: 208-622-7740; Bobleyse@aol.com.

Publication History
Issue published online: 24 JAN 2006
Article first published online: 24 JAN 2006

Keywords:microscale heat transfer;ultra-high heat flux;supercritical heat transfer;phase change heat transfer;subcritical boiling heat transfer;intense turbulence

Abstract: Exciting heat transfer phenomena have been discovered with a micron-sized heat transfer element operating in subcooled (20°C) degassed, demineralized water over a wide pressure range (200-6,000psia) at heat fluxes up to 3,500W/cm2. The platinum heat transfer element (diameter 7.5 microns, length 1.14mm) is installed within a one-cm3 stainless steel chamber. Sealed electrical terminals penetrate the chamber to effect direct current heating of the platinum element. Pressure is applied pneumatically. The adiabatic heating rate of the element is 6°C per microsecond at 3,700W/cm2; response is essentially instantaneous for the procedure described herein. The direct current voltage and current are measured from which the power and the resistance (temperature) are determined. The following procedure applies: (1) Pressurize the water-filled stainless steel chamber to 6,000psia. (2) Apply power at 3,000W/cm2. (3) Maintain constant heat flux as pressure is smoothly reduced from 6,000psia to 200psia over a period of 20 seconds. Record voltage, amperage, and pressure at 0.1 second intervals. Heat transfer phenomena thus discovered: (1) Element starting temperature of 370°C at 6,000psia smoothly increased to 380° as pressure was reduced to 3,970psia. (2) At 3,970psia the temperature abruptly stepped upward to 590°C. (3) Temperature smoothly increased to 730°C as pressure was reduced to 3,230psia. (4) In the vicinity of the critical pressure, the temperature turned around and began smoothly decreasing. (5) At 2,350psia, the temperature stepped down from 520 to 350°C. (6) Temperature smoothly decreased to 230°C at 190psia and power was then turned off. Bulk water temperature increased less than 4°C. Controlled gravity (KC-135) tests are planned.