UHI Ultra High Risk, October 3, 1984 28th Anniversary

So, today is the 28th Anniversary of my infamous memo.

Where are all of the participants now?

Some are hiding and some are lost.  Sandia still is alive and I'm working on getting the unfinished business taking care of.

Right now I have to leave town, but I'll be back to celebrate this 28th anniversary!

UHI Ultra High Risk, October 3, 1984: Unfinished Business

Yes there is unfinished business.  I've discussed the work by Sandia.  Duing 2006, I did not get approval to present a POWER POINT discussion of this.  Here is the abstract that I submitted.  The report by Sandia was very restricted in scope by the NRC, very likely because the NRC then, like now, did not really have any skills in analyzing field experience and relating that to risks. There is a CATCH, those who may be good at it are not allowed to do it. 

Here is the abstract that I submitted to the program manager at INL during June 2006.

the

UHI Ultra High Risk October 3, 1984, OHI and Watts Bar

UHI Ultra High Risk, October 3, 1984, Led to an Abnormal Occurrence Report to Congress

This is my seventh consecutive entry in matters stemming from my EPRI-NSAC Memorandum, UHI Ultra High Risk, October 3, 1984.

Yes, my NSAC Memorandum, UHI Ultra High Risk, led to an Abnormal Occurrence Report to Congress.  Here it is, click on it to enlarge and back arrow to get back here.

So, on January 28, 1985, Denton as Director of the Office of Nuclear Regulation, reports, "This condition is beyond the design bases for the plant and is not specifically analyzed in the safety analysis report."  Denton continues: "The effect of nitrogen in the reactor during a LOCA has not yet been analyzed, however, NRR is placing a work order with Sandia National laboratory (SNL) to assess the effect of isolation valve failure during a large LOCA in a UHI plant."

A year later, Sandia submitted its analysis to NRC, but noted that the report had information proprietary to Westinghouse, and NRC did not make the report available to the public. 

I  left the matter alone for about 10 years, but then I went after the NRC for the report.  Nothing was producing results, so I faxed the following to the Chairman, NRC on May 30, 1994.

And on June 17, 1994 I was sent the following reply.  It reveals that NRC had not even had a copy of the Sandia report and that "extraordinary measures" were required to "locate and acquire" a copy of the letter report.  What in the world did  NRC do with this Sandia report that was highlighted in the Abnormal Occurrence Report to Congress?  We will never know.  Moreover, I was not promptly sent the report once NRC found it. 

After a while, I was sent a somewhat illegible copy of the report. Following is from page 13 or is it 15? It is not obvious from the poor copy. This Sandia letter report suggests that failure of the UHI isolation valves to close may be beneficial because of the addtitonal water that is injected into the upper head. 

About six years ago I was not successful in getting NRC to perform evaluations of the UHI situation that prevailed during 1984.  Following is an e-mail exchange that I had with Dean Dobranich of Sandia who had performed the analyses of UHI for the NRC during 1985.   Work at Sandia proceeded during 1985 and was reported to NRC in periodic contacts during 1985 and in a letter report during January 1986.

NRC did not adequately fund Sandia for the UHI analyses and the scope of work was far too narrow.  For example, with four out of four liquid level detectors reverse connected there was no way of determining the amount of water that would be injected.  In the extreme, but not improbable case, there would be no water injected.  More likely, there would be some water available, however, the amount would likely be substantially less than 1800 cubic feet.  Instead of 1800 cubic feet of water, there might be 400 cubic feet of water and 1400 cubic feet of high pressure nitrogen.

Moreover, the water would be saturated with dissolved nitrogen which would be released during the injection.

UHI Ultra High Risk, October 3, 1984: Inside Stuff, EPRI & NRC

This is my sixth consecutive entry that documents the turmoil that followed my memorandum, UHI Ultra High Risk, October 3, 1984.

This entry jumps ahead of a lot of documentation that I have and that I guess I'll have to place in book if I ever get around to writing that.  On November 7, 1984, Rossin and Breen told me my position was being eliminated, but that I'd have a few months to look for work elsewhere.  So, I looked elsewhere with no immediate success.  I talked to Jim Keppler of the NRC and showed him my memorandum, UHI Ultra High Risk, October 3, 1984, as part of several illustrations of my experience and capabilities.  Keppler asked if he could send this elsewhere in NRC and I agreed, however, I blanked out the source of the document as well as my name.

So, the following two pages are an interesting document that reveals very secret relationships between EPRI and the NRC that I was never aware of.  It also reveals turmoil.  I do not recall how I gained access to the following document; it most certainly was not sent to me.  I am inclined to doubt that Rossin was aware of it, but I do not know that.  I suspect that Layman and Lang were not aware that my position had been eliminated.  On the other hand,
Rossin may have encouraged this documentation in order to justify getting rid of Leyse. Click to enlarge and back arrow to return.

I'm certainly pleased that EPRI (Layman and Lang) documented the above. This is a clear report of a basically secret set of arrangements between EPRI and the NRC and I suspect that those have continued in various forms over the years and are really intense in today's post-Fukushima world. 

The second page is "interesting" as it describes the "running around" in generating a response to Keppler.  The very last paragraph is also revealing as EPRI apologizes to the NRC for my contact with Keppler.  Well, it is a fact that I was never a party to contacts with the NRC regarding our analyses of operating experience at nuclear power plants.  It is also a fact that others who analyzed operating experience were not very adept at that work.

More later.

UHI Ultra Risk, October 3, 1984: EPRI and Duke Followup

This is my fifth consecutive entry that documents the actions and turmoil that were in response to my NSAC memorandum, UHI Ultra High Risk, October 3, 1984.

Sugnet was a trusted expert in PRA studies and Breen assigned him to discuss UHI with Duke Power Company who operated several plants having UHI.  Here is Sugnet's brief memo following his discussions with Duke.  Click on it for enlargement.

It is interesting Sugnet described his contact as an "... informal discussion ... ."
Sugnet does not say that Leyse regarded UHI as Ultra High Risk.  Sugnet focuses on the assertion that UHI was essentially eliminated from the Duke PRA for McGuire. He concludes that, "We can probably obtain more detailed information from Duke Power if it becomes necessary."

NSAC management was satisfied with the Sugnet document.  Now, I believe that Sugnet's discussion with Duke generated some interest in Duke in looking further into the operational aspects of UHI at McGuire as well as its other UHI units.  I infer this because on October 31, 1984, (six days following the Sugnet memo) McGuire Unit 1 was shut down in order to correct a condition of excessive dissolved nitrogen in the UHI accumulator water.  Excessive dissolved nitrogen was also found in the UHI accumulator water at McGuire Unit 2, and the UHI system was isolated from the primary system and the operating power was reduced to 45 percent of the rated power in order to compensate for the loss of UHI capability.  At Unit 1, it was found that all four UHI level transmitters were improperly installed (apparently about 6 months earlier) and that UHI valves would fail to isolate on low level!


Following are three pages that document the above.  The third page is the Duke PNO, November 2, 1984, that reports the problems with UHI.

UHI Ultra High Risk and ACRS Ohi-1 and Ohi-2

This is my fourth consecutive entry regarding UHI-Ultra High Risk, my NSAC Memorandum of October 3, 1984. Below is a note that I received from the planet's top reporter of nuclear power matters:



The above references an ACRS Subcommittee on March 7, 1985 - about 5 months following my infamous memorandum of October 3, 1984. However, it took more than another year before the Full ACRS issued its letter condoning the removal of the UHI system from nuclear power plants having an ice condenser containment. 

And as I have documented in my first entry of this series, Kansai Electric Power was apparently never alerted by Westinghouse or our NRC about the dangers of UHI.  Kansai did not seek authorization to

remove UHI from Ohi-1 and Ohi-2 until November 1990.

 

UHI Ultra High Risk EPRI NSAC NRC Ohi

This is the third consecutive entry in my UHI series.   Here are three uploaded pages that document part of the turmoil that followed my October 3, 1984, memorandum, UHI-Ultra High Risk.    Click on the page to enlarge for easier reading and access to the right side that is partially obscured.

As I said in earlier, my October 3, 1984 memo let to a lot of turmoil.  The heat was on. I was fighting for survival, so I worked on the day after Thanksgiving and it was an advantage to have no others around.

The above memorandum was addressed to Lang who had been assigned to monitor (to control) the UHI investigations.  So, I worked within the system, and addressed all correspondence to Lang, but I worked independently. I stayed under control because I intended to continue working for EPRI, however, my above contact with the NRC Training Center was effective and there was no way that NSAC could reprimand me for pursuing that credible source even though it alarmed Rossin and very likely others.

Rossin was apparently concerned that Taylor would think Leyse was out of control, hence his note of 11/30 (1984) in which he stopped distribution to J. J. Taylor, the head of the EPRI Nuclear Power Division. 

I'll have further documentation of the very revealing UHI  turmoil that raged within NSAC and EPRI. Several outside organizations became involved including at least three within the NRC. The SANDIA National Laboratory was drawn into the turmoil as a consultant to the NRC.  The ACRS wrote a letter to the Commissioners of the NRC and I'll also post that later.  EPRI even hired an outplacement service, Ward Associates on the famous Sand Hill Road, and later you read how that action intensified the turmoil, although I believe it worked to my advantage.

Upper Head Injection (UHI) Ultra High Risk

For some reason, parts of the right side of my uploaded memorandum are cut off in today's earlier entry.  Here are the two pages in reduced size. The larger earlier entry is more readable, however, for the record this reduced size includes all of the right side including J. J. Tayor's handwritten remark,   "nothing wrong with this approach."  And as I mention in the earlier entry, the yellow highlighting is also courtesy J. J. Taylor as is the remark in the left column, "speculation."

(I've recently determined that if the reader clicks on the page an enlarged version appears.  Then click the back arrow to get back here.)

Ohi Nuclear Power Plant and Upper Head Injection

Fukushima led to the shutdown of all nuclear power plants in Japan.  Recently, the two nuclear power plants, the Ohi Units 3 and 4, operated by Kansai Electric Power Company have been allowed to resume operation.  However, Ohi Units 1 and 2 remain shut down.

Following is an excerpt from a document from November 1990 that I have kept on file:

On October 3, 1984, I documented threats from the Upper Head Injection System, UHI, that is referred to as "upper core spray system" in the Ohi plants.  Following is the two page memorandum.

The above memorandum of October 3, 1984, led to substantial turmoil within the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (NSAC), the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and elsewhere. UHI systems were removed from all installations in the USA, (Duke Power Company and the Tennessee Valley Authority). However, in spite of all of the international programs at NRC, EPRI, INPO, and WANO, the word obviously never got to Kansai Electric Power Company until very much later, six years following my memorandum. 

Somewhat as an aside, the above copy is the copy that J. J. Taylor, the boss of the EPRI Nuclear Power Division routed to A. D. Rossin who was running NSAC.  The yellow highlighting is Taylor's as are also the two handwritten notes in the margins, "nothing wrong with this approach" and "speculation."

I have loads of documents in my file.  Maybe I'll write a book.  I worked at EPRI for another 10 years, until late 1994, but I was not in NSAC following my reporting of threats from UHI. My new assignment was in the Coal Combustion Systems Division where I managed to get EPRI to fund my  exploratory research in microscale heat transfer to pressurized water at ultra high heat fluxes. 

As I left EPRI about ten years following my UHI work,I negotiated the release of the files of my exploratory research and the apparatus. As an aside, I then I had time to reduce and report the fantastic results:

http://www.millpress.nl/shop/abooks/THERMES/THERMES/195.pdf

And, I took my ideas and apparatus to UCLA where my results were confirmed:

http://boiling.seas.ucla.edu/BOILING/Publications/Conf_LMWD2003

"Made in Japan." Made in Japan?

It was not made in Japan. 

See page 1 of 8 of the following:

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1009/ML100950085.pdf

Please read page 1 of 8, ignore the rest.

Hardened vents and filtered vents: July report soon?

On February 27, 2012, NRC Chairman Jaczko issued the following:

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/cvr/2012/2012-0025vtr-gbj.pdf

In the fourth paragraph on page 2 of 3 of the above reference we read "... important that the Commission make a decision on the topic of filtered vents this summer ... ."

Now that the NRC has a new Chairman, it is likely that the Jaczko-inspired focus on filtered vents will "go away."
A policy paper from the staff was expected from the staff in July 2012 according to the above document.

And here is a notice of a meeting of July 12, 2012 that I missed:

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1218/ML12180A009.pdf

Here are slides from the July 12, 2012, meeting.  Fretz of NRC e-mailed these July 24, 2012:

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1220/ML12206A263.pdf
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1220/ML12206A266.pdf

And here is the order for hardened vents. March 12, 2012:

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12054A694.pdf

And here is the ACRS Fukushima subcommittee meeting of May 28, 2012:

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1218/ML121850039.pdf

From page 117 of 292:

MR. LEYSE:  Yes, this is Bob Leyse and I'll be damned brief because I have said this before.
          In terms of a holistic approach, the 2200 degree Fahrenheit criterion that all plants are licensed under, for example, Palo Verde, the Baker-Just equation is based on specimens, zircaloy specimens, that you can handle, walk around in your pocket as pocket change.
          In contrast to that, NRC is funding a huge program at Sandia in which bundles of fuel rods, 49-rod bundles, and earlier I guess, some BWR bundles, are tested in air only.  For a fraction of the cost of that stuff, you could do the kind of tests that would show in terms of U. S. data that the 2200-Fahrenheit limit is too high.
          End of comment.

Following is a page that I have likely posted earlier. 

Hardened vents and filtered vents: July report soon?

On February 27, 2012, NRC Chairman Jaczko issued the following:

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1206/ML120610153.pdf

In the fourth paragraph on page 2 of 3 of the above reference we read "... important that the Commission make a decision on the topic of filtered vents this summer ... ."

Now that the NRC has a new Chairman, it is likely that the Jaczko-inspired focus on filtered vents will "go away."
A policy paper from the staff was expected from the staff in July 2012 according to the above document.

And here is a notice of a meeting of July 12, 2012 that I missed:

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1218/ML12180A009.pdf

Here are slides from the July 12, 2012, meeting.  Fretz of NRC e-mailed these July 24, 2012:

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1220/ML12206A263.pdf
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1220/ML12206A266.pdf

And here is the order for hardened vents. March 12, 2012:

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12054A694.pdf

And here is the ACRS Fukushima subcommittee meeting of May 22, 2012:

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1218/ML121850039.pdf

From page 117 of 292:

MR. LEYSE:  Yes, this is Bob Leyse and I'll be damned brief because I have said this before.
          In terms of a holistic approach, the 2200 degree Fahrenheit criterion that all plants are licensed under, for example, Palo Verde, the Baker-Just equation is based on specimens, zircaloy specimens, that you can handle, walk around in your pocket as pocket change.
          In contrast to that, NRC is funding a huge program at Sandia in which bundles of fuel rods, 49-rod bundles, and earlier I guess, some BWR bundles, are tested in air only.  For a fraction of the cost of that stuff, you could do the kind of tests that would show in terms of U. S. data that the 2200-Fahrenheit limit is too high.
          End of comment.

Following is a page that I have likely posted earlier. 

Fukushima Nuclear Accident Analysis Report

This interim report by Tokyo Electric Power, Inc, December 2, 2011 is at

http://www.nrc.gov/japan/ml12103A092.pdf


A word search under hydrogen yields 87 entries and is a great way to initially scan the report.

Wall Street Journal Excerpts Fukushima Seismic

Was there significant seismic damage at Fukushima prior to the tsunami? Perhaps not, but it is under review.  

PRM-50-93 Quick access to the NRC delays

Here is PRM-50-93:

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0932/ML093290250.pdf

Submitted November 17, 2009
Docketed November 23, 2009

Many delays characterise the NRC review of this. 

Here is a delay that was described by NRC over a year ago in an internal e-mail dated March 23, 2011. 

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1121/ML11216A081.pdf 

Go to page 371 of 899, and the fastest way to get there is via a word search on PRM.  The e-mail discloses that "... all qualified NRR/DSS staff who would be qualified to serve on the working group for PRM-50-93/95 are otherwise occupied ... recent events in Japan."

NO NUKES JAPAN vs Columbia Generating Station

In-core thermocouples and SAMGs

On June 6, 2012, Mark Leyse succinctly discussed his Petition for Rulemaking, PRM-50-105, with the ACRS Full Committee. Go to the following link, pages 130-135 of 313 to read Leyse's discussion, and pages 276-278 to read his slides.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1216/ML12165a614.pdf

And, the following link is Leyse's PRM-50-105:


http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1206/ML12065a215.pdf

 Excerpts from PRM-50-105 and ACRS:

Nureg/CR-6980, Nov 1997 - Feb 2003, Published April 2012

Letter Borchardt of NRC to Idaho Senator Risch

Here it is:

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12059A117.pdf

Obama decreed that his feds run an open government, and in this letter, EDO Borchardt declares that this is the case at NRC.  Borchardt tells Risch that Leyse need not ask Risch to collect information.

Borchardt declared (lines 7 and 8, second paragraph), "Mr. Leyse can fuly participate in the NRC's activities through direct contact with the agency, as he has in recent years."

Of course, Borchardt's letter is loaded with false assertions regarding the NRC's  long history of openness.  A great example is this blog's entry of 5/26/12, At last, NUREG/CR-6980.

NRC Fukushima Inside Documents ML11304A106

So, I almost lost this!  Pages 222, 223, and 224 of 505

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1130/ML11304A106.pdf


Here is another interesting reference, that discusses turmoil at NRC as Fukushima developed.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1130/ML11305A209.PDF 


Some search leads for NRC ADAMS  (MELCOR Gaunt, Fukushima Gaunt)

ML060520260 and unrelated MELCOR Junk

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0605/ML060520260.pdf

Important stuff.  96, 97, 27, 28, 90, 354, 125, 124,   (all of 372) ...

Unrelated junk expressions that I've heard:

MELCOR as a feeder ....

MELCOR drives training ...

The facts reveal that MELCOR is bunk.

On Memorial Day 2012

At last, NUREG/CR-6980

I've been after this for several years.  Finally, here it is: RBHT Reflood Heat Transfer Experiments Data and Analysis

Document A
http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/search.cfm?q=ML12128A368


The Report, NUREG/CR-6980, covers the period Nov 1997- Feb 2003, but it was not published until April 2012!  It is a somewhat useless report, and I was aware of that likelihood well before the NRC released it.

In the FORWARD to the report, page 7 of 599, we read, "With improved data and code models for an LBLOCA, we can more accurately predict the consequences of LBLOCA accidents and provide better technical bases for regulations associated with such accidents.  As a result, this study will help to achieve the NRC's strategic performance  goals of making the agency's regulations more efficient, effective, and realistic."

It has been no secret that the NRC's Rod Bundle Heat Transfer (RBHT) at Penn State is essentially useless for modelling an LBLOCA because the test section includes no zirconium alloy structures, especially the fuel rod simulators which have inconel cladding.  The RBHT has been operated with cladding temperatures less than 1800 degrees Fahrenheit, well below the NRC's Appendix K limit of 2200 degrees Fahrenheit. 

Aside from the fundamental defects in the design of the RBHT and the very limited scope of its test program (the low temperatures of the tests and the absence of zirconium alloy structures), the report NUREG/CR-6980 does not include any discussion of the test results.  For example, in one run, there were very large temperature oscillations.  I have sent the following e-mail to the lead investigator at Penn State's Applied Research Laboratory. 

It is unfortunate that the report does not discuss this temperature cycling.  The data is about 10 years old and Professor Hochreiter, the originator of RBHT is no longer available to discuss this.  If NRC had not withheld the data for about 10 years, there would perhaps have been meaningful responses to significant  inquiries.  As matters stand, there is very likely no motivation on the part of the investigators to return to this old data.

There is more to this situation, and I will add to this.  On MAYDAY 2002, I submitted a Petition for Rulemaking to the NRC and on May 8, 2002, it was docketed as PRM-50-76.

Document B

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0222/ML022240009.pdf

Right now I'll jump ahead to the NRC review of my PRM-50-76 because it relates to NUREG/CR-6980.  The document is "TECHNICAL SAFETY ANALYSIS OF PRM-50-76."  It is a rather lengthy document and it castigates PRM-50-76.

Document C 
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0412/ML041210109.pdf

On page 10 of 18 of this so-called technical analysis , it is asserted that the expense of PRM-50-76 would have only "marginal benefit" in comparison with the activities at Pennsylvania State University and elsewhere. "This would be a minimum requirement before considering the expense of high temperature Zircaloy tests, which would have marginal benefit in terms of increased understanding of LBLOCA heat transfer and metal-water reaction kinetics.  Current programs at Pennselvania State University (PSU)and Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and elsewhere are far more cost effective."  (Please note that the spelling of Pennsylvania is the NRC's.)

For the moment, let's reflect on the timing of the documents.  PRM 50-76 was docketed on May 8, 2002.  The NRC's Technical Analysis of PRM-50-76 is dated April 29, 2004. Although NUREG/CR-6980 is dated April 2012, it covers the Penn State activities from November 1997 - February 2003.  The point is that the NRC should have been aware that the program at Pennsylvania State University was totally outside of the realm of the Zircaloy bundle tests that are called for in PRM-50-76.

At this point the reader is asked to return to page 10 0f 18  of Document C. (Update later)

And here is a Risch document.

Dopcument D

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ml1206/ml12060A144.pdf

Document E  Leyse e-mail to chairman (PM-50-76)

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1005/ML100500035.pdf

Document F  SECY-05-0113  20 pages

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/cvr/2005/2005-0113vtr.pdf

Document G  SECY-05-0113  32 pages

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0502/ML050250359.pdf

DOE ORNL CASL

Here are the slides

http://www.ornl.gov/sci/nsed/docs/CASL_Overview.pdf

DOE and $125 million Another OBAMA white elephant

Following is copied from a set of
DOE slides; my comments will follow sometime.

https://ric.nrc-gateway.gov/docs/abstracts/kothe-d-hv-th28.pdf

Thermal Hydraulics R&D Plans and Efforts

within CASL: The Consortium for Advanced
Simulation of Light Water Reactors


CASL is a DOE Energy Innovation Hub for
Modeling and Simulation of Nuclear Reactors

CASL Charter



Mission


Provide leading edge modeling and simulation capabilities to improve the
performance of currently operating Light Water Reactors


Vision


Predict, with confidence, the safe, reliable performance of nuclear reactors, through comprehensive, science-based modeling and simulation technology that is deployed and applied broadly within the U.S. nuclear energy industry


Goals


1. Develop and Effectively Apply Modern Virtual Reactor Technology


2. Assure Nuclear Safety and Address Operational and Design Challenges


3. Engage the Nuclear Energy Community Through Modeling and Simulation


4. Deploy New Partnership and Collaboration Paradigms

NRC Safety Research Program and Obama Open Government

Tomorrow I will send the following to Idaho's Senator Risch.

Dear Senator Risch:



Please encourage the NRC to now release SECY-12-0013 to the American Public. Details are below:


NRC recently published the ACRS review of its research program. There are leads to closed material. Here is the identification of the ACRS open report:


REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF THE NRC SAFETY RESEARCH PROGRAM


NUREG-1635, Vol. 10 APRIL 2012 ML12094A142


And, here is an example of the closed performance of Obama’s "open" government:


From Page 83 0f 84 of ML12094A142 (Page 71 of the report):


Reference 2.


Memorandum to the Commissioners
from R. W. Borchardt, Executive Director for Operations,


Subject: SECY-12-0013,


“Agency Long-Term Research Activities for Fiscal Year 2014,"
(Official Use Only Document - Sensitive Internal Information - Limited to NRC unless the Commission Determines Otherwise)


Very likely, a wide assortment of insiders has access to SECY-12-0013 (including the twenty foreign governments that NRC has enrolled in its Severe Accident Research Program). The American Public should also have access to this. Furthermore, interested Americans should be encouraged to participate in suggesting the scope of the NRC research activities. For example, my PRM-50-76 has been in the hands of NRC since MAYDAY 2002; nevertheless, NRC ignores the dangers to the American Public of zirconium oxidation and hydrogen release during loss-of-coolant accidents.




Robert H. Leyse

2002 docs, Hochreiter, Hache, Myers others

Contents of CD distributed at NSRC 2002.
Accession Number: ML023050480
Date Released: Wednesday, November 6, 2002
Package Contents
The following links on this page are to Adobe Portable Document Format (PDF) files. To obtain a free viewer for displaying this format, see our Plugins, Viewers, and Other Tools.
ML023050477 - Readme. (1 page(s), 10/29/2002)
ML023040648 - Bessiron Slides - Main Outcomes of the Patricia Program Presented at NSRC in Washington, DC on 10/29/2002. (14 page(s), 10/29/2002)
ML023040652 - Bessiron Summary - Main outcomes from the PATRICIA programon clad to coolant heat transfer during RIAs. (2 page(s), 10/29/2002)
ML023040653 - Hache Slides entitled, "Oxidation of Zr Alloys in High Pressure Steam & Some Results Under Atmospheric Pressure" presented at Nuclear Safety Research Conference 2002 in Washington, DC on October 28-30, 2002. (38 page(s), 10/29/2002)
ML023040656 - Hache Summary - Oxidation of Zirconium Alloys in High Pressure Steam & Some Results Under Atmospheric Pressure. (2 page(s), 10/29/2002)
ML023040657 - Hochreiter Slides - Penn State/US NRC Rod Bundle Test Facility & Reflood Heat Transfer Program (RBHT). (35 page(s), 10/29/2002)
ML023040658 - Hochreiter Summary - US NRC/PSU Rod Bundle Heat Transfer Program. (3 page(s), 10/29/2002)
ML023050060 - McGrath Slides entitled, "Investigation of the Impact of In-Reactor Short-Term Dry-Out Incidents on Fresh & Pre-Irradiated Fuel Cladding." (26 page(s), 10/29/2002)
ML023050061 - McGrath Summary - Investigation of the Impact of In-Reactor Short-Term Dry-Out Incidents on Fresh & Pre-Irradiated Fuel Cladding. (2 page(s), 10/29/2002)
ML023050065 - Meyer Slides - LOCA Ductility Tests. (14 page(s), 10/29/2002)
ML023050070 - Meyer Summary - LOCA Ductility Tests. (2 page(s), 10/29/2002)
ML023050073 - Nakamura Slides. (22 page(s), 10/29/2002)
ML023050077 - Nakamura Summary. (2 page(s), 10/29/2002)
ML023050083 - Pierron Slides - Influence of Hydride Distribution on Failure of Zircaloy-4 Sheet. (18 page(s), 10/29/2002)
ML023050086 - Pierron Summary - Influence of Hydride Distribution on the Failure of Zircaloy. (2 page(s), 10/29/2002)
ML023050234 - Tsai Slides - Characterization of High-Burnup PWR & BWR Rods. (25 page(s), 10/29/2002)
ML023050236 - Tsai Summary - Characterization of High-Burnup PWR & BWR Rods. (2 page(s), 10/29/2002)
ML023050238 - Yan Slides - LOCA Research Results for High-Burnup BWR Fuel. (39 page(s), 10/29/2002)
ML023050240 - Yan Summary - LOCA Research Results for High-Burnup BWR Fuel. (2 page(s), 10/29/2002)
ML023050244 - Yegorova Slides - Understanding LOCA-Related Ductility in E110 Cladding. (18 page(s), 10/29/2002)
ML023050248 - Yegorova Summary. (3 page(s), 10/29/2002)
ML023050429 - Pierron Slides A - Influence of Hydride Distribution on Failure of Zircaloy-4 Sheet. (18 page(s), 10/29/2002)
ML023050464 - Meyer Slides A - LOCA Ductility Tests. (15 page(s), 10/29/2002)

Baker-Just, ANL-6548, WAPD-104, BMI-1154, Zirconium Fire (Bundles)

The following is from
Zirconium Fire Testing at Sandia
ML11031A000, page 58 of 226

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1103/ML11031A000.pdf
Phase 2 will address radial heating and burn propagation and
will include effects of fuel rod ballooning. Five full-length
assemblies will be constructed in which the center assembly
will be of the same heated design as used in Phase 1. The four
peripheral assemblies will be unheated but highly prototypic,
incorporating prototypic fuel tubes and end plugs. These
boundary conditions experimentally represent a “cold neighbor”
situation, which complements the bounding scenario covered by
Phase 1. The peripheral fuel rods will be filled with high density
MgO ceramic, sized to precisely match the thermal mass of spent
fuel. Studies using this test assembly will conclude with a fire
test in which the center assembly is heated to ignition, which
eventually propagates radially to the peripheral assemblies. All
of the fuel rods in two of the four peripheral assemblies will be
pressurized with helium so that these fuel rods will balloon when
the zirconium-alloy cladding reaches a high enough temperature.
The two peripheral assemblies without pressurized rods will serve
as a control for evaluating the effect of ballooning.

Here is one reference that was released on January 3, 2012: (ML113140453) - RES Staff Presentation Handouts Materials NRC-RES/EPRI Coordination Meeting Friday, September 30, 2011, (23 page(s), 12/22/2011). The release on January 3, 2012, disclosed that the corrosion testing of full-length heated bundles of zirconium alloy assemblies is being done at Sandia, it has 12 foreign participants, the full length assemblies are 17 by 17 arrangements of PWR fuel geometry, and testing is being done in air only.

The following cross sections of the zirconium clad heater bundles at Sandia are copied (and enlarged) from ML113140453, page 4 of 23.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1131/ML113140453.pdf

Analysis Support
As in the previous BWR study, all stages of testing will use
MELCOR modeling results. Pretest MELCOR modeling results
will be used to guide the experimental test assembly design and
instrumentation. MELCOR modeling results will also be used
to choose experimental operating parameters, such as the applied
assembly power. At each step in the testing, improvements
will be made to the MELCOR model to continually increase
confidence in the modeling validity.

TH28 Thermal-Hydraulic and Severe Accident Research

Regulatory Information Conference (RIC) Thursday, March 15, 2012

TH28 Thermal-Hydraulic and Severe Accident Research

The session will focus primarily on the NRC’s efforts to address current issues in the areas of thermal hydraulics and severe accidents, including experimental and analytical tool development programs. In particular, presenters will discuss the following topics:

The NRC’s use of computational fluid dynamics codes

Use of SCALE to generate neutrons cross sections libraries in support of PARCS/TRACE reactor analysis activities

Coupled calculation in TRACE-PARCS code

MELCOR, the severe accident code

Overview of DOE’s thermal-hydraulics modeling and simulation R&D within the Consortium for Advanced Simulation of LWRs (CASL)

SESSION CHAIR: Michael Scott, Deputy Director, Division of Systems Analysis, NRC/RES

SPEAKERS/PANELISTS:
Computational Fluid Dynamics for Nuclear Safety AnalysisChristopher Boyd, Sr. Technical Advisor for Computational Fluid Dynamics, Division of Systems Analysis, NRC/RES
Use of SCALE to Generate Neutrons Cross-Sections Libraries in Support of PARCS/TRACE Reactor Analysis ActivitiesMourad Aissa, Sr. Criticality Safety/Reactor Physics Engineer, Division of Systems Analysis, NRC/RES
TRACE/PARCS Coupled CalculationsNathanael Hudson, Reactor Systems Engineer, Division of Systems Analysis, NRC/RES
Development and Applications of MELCORHossein Esmaili, Sr. Reactor Systems Engineer, Division of Systems Analysis, NRC/RES
Thermal Hydraulics Modeling and Simulation R&D within the Consortium for Advanced Simulation of LWRs (CASL): A DOE Energy Innovation HubDouglas Kothe, Director, Consortium for the Advanced Simulation of Light Water Reactors (CASL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory

SESSION COORDINATOR(S):
Antony Calvo, Information Technology Specialist, Division of Systems Analysis, NRC/RES, tel: 301-251-7677, e-mail: Antony.Calvo@nrc.gov

PRM-50-76: Nuclear Regulatory Commission Defective Actions

Here is the PRM-50-76 that Robert H. Leyse submitted on MAYDAY, 2002.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0222/ML022240009.pdf


Here is NRC's Technical Analysis of PRM-50-76:

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0412/ML041210109.pdf

Here is the submittal to the Commissioners that requests approval of the denial of PRM-50-76, June 29, 2005, ML050250359.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0502/ML050250359.pdf

Here is the voting record, August 5, 2005

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/cvr/2005/2005-0113vtr.pdf

Here is the Staff Requirements Memorandum, August 5, 2005, ML052170385.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0521/ML052170385.pdf

Here is the denial of PRM-50-76, August 25, 2005.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0522/ML052220454.pdf

Here is a letter from McGinty to Leyse
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1009/ML100950085.pdf
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1009/ML100950085.pdf
Following is page 1 of a letter from Timothy McGinty, Director, Division of Policy and Rulemaking, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, to Robert Leyse, April 16, 2010, ML100950085. This letter describes the release of documents that were referenced in the June 29, 2005, request to the Commissioners to deny PRM-50-76, but which were not published in the Federal Register notice of the denial. Robert Leyse did not become aware of this discrepancy until early in 2010 and he then called for the release of the documents. However, NRC never disclosed this to the Commissioners and this omission was also never published in the Federal Register. Note that McGinty writes, "The NRC staff decided to remove the references because (1) they did not constitute a significant part of the basis for denying the petition0n and (2) the reports were not then available in the NRC's files."

April 16, 2010
Robert Leyse
P. O. Box 2850
Sun Valley, ID 83353
Dear Mr. Leyse:
Between February 7, 2010, and February 23, 2010, you sent a series of e-mails to the
Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and to other NRC employees,
including General Counsel Stephen Burns and staff from the Public Document Room. You
requested that the NRC make the following documents publicly available:

Bostrum, W.A., WAPD-104, “The High Temperature Oxidation of Zircaloy in
Water,” March 1954.

Lemmon, Jr., A.W. BMI-1154, “Studies Relating to the Reaction Between
Zirconium and Water at High Temperatures,” 1957.

In your February 17, 2010, e-mail to the General Counsel, you alleged that these two
documents were not made publicly available by the NRC staff in contradiction to the listing of
these two documents in a table describing the availability of documents in a draft Federal
Register Notice (FRN) of denial of a petition for rulemaking. The draft FRN was provided to the
Commission in SECY-05-113, “Denial of a Petition for Rulemaking to Revise Appendix K to
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50 and Associated Guidance Documents
(PRM-50-76),” June 29, 2005.

Although these reports were listed in the draft FRN of denial, they were not referenced or listed
in the final denial of the petition for rulemaking (see 70 FR 52893; September 6, 2005). The
NRC staff decided to remove the references to these two documents in the final FRN because
(1) they did not constitute a significant part of the basis for denying the petition and (2) the
reports were not then available in the NRC's files. You should also be aware that WAPD-104
was prepared in 1954 for the Atomic Energy Commission’s office for naval reactors. When the
NRC was created in 1974, records related to naval reactors were assigned to the Energy
Research and Development Administration (which is now the U.S. Department of Energy).
Nevertheless, the NRC has been able to obtain copies of the above reports. They are now
publicly available in the NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access Management System (ADAMS)
at the following ADAMS Accession numbers:

WAPD-104—ADAMS Accession No. ML100900446

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1009/ML100900446.pdf

BMI-1154—ADAMS Accession No. ML100570218

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1005/ML100570218.pdf

Here is the Baker-Just Report, ANL-6548, that is based on WAPD-104 and BMI-1154.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0505/ML050550198.pdf

Accident Management Advisory Tools (AMAT)

It will be interesting to see of this goes anywhere. AMAT was discussed at the full ACRS on March 9-10, 2012. Apparently the game is to plug in AMAT at the start of an event or during the event in order to gain insights into what may happen.

A few decades ago, ACRS discussed Instrumentation to Follow the Course of an Accident and they may have written a letter or two.

After TMI-2, some vendors sold Safety Panel Display Systems.