Following is a note from Taylor, the head of the Nuclear Power Division at Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), to Rossin the head of the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (NSAC) which was operated by EPRI for the electric utility industry.
Below is Taylor's attached marked-up copy of my letter of October 3, 1984. Apparently Taylor analyzed the letter himself without any input from his staff. His limited notes in the margin, "nothing wrong with this approach" and "speculation" imply that he was not in agreement with aspects of the letter. His note at the end, "EPRI action ?" is partially answered in his brief note above where he demands, "... a prompt report …" This brief note includes "cc: B. Layman"; B. Layman was among a trusted set of insiders (more later on this).
Insiders and The Roots of Fukushima
Of course, there are countless roots, and it may be argued that some do not apply. The number of applicable roots grows substantially if the ways of doing business are included. Following is stuff from decades ago that documents NRC-EPRI relationships that are not otherwise disclosed.
This entry jumps ahead of a lot of documentation that I have and that I guess I'll have to place in book if I ever get around to writing that. On November 7, 1984, EPRI (Rossin and Breen) told me my position was being eliminated, but that I'd have a few months to look for work elsewhere. So, I looked elsewhere with no immediate success. I talked to Jim Keppler of the NRC and showed him my memorandum, UHI Ultra High Risk, October 3, 1984, as part of several illustrations of my experience and capabilities. Keppler asked if he could send this elsewhere in NRC and I agreed, however, I blanked out the source of the document as well as my name.
So, the following two pages are an interesting document that reveals very secret relationships between EPRI and the NRC that I was never aware of. It also reveals turmoil. I do not recall how I gained access to the following document; it most certainly was not sent to me. I am inclined to doubt that Rossin was aware of it, but I do not know that. I suspect that Layman and Lang were not aware that my position had been eliminated.
Click on a page to enlarge and the back arrow to return.
This entry jumps ahead of a lot of documentation that I have and that I guess I'll have to place in book if I ever get around to writing that. On November 7, 1984, EPRI (Rossin and Breen) told me my position was being eliminated, but that I'd have a few months to look for work elsewhere. So, I looked elsewhere with no immediate success. I talked to Jim Keppler of the NRC and showed him my memorandum, UHI Ultra High Risk, October 3, 1984, as part of several illustrations of my experience and capabilities. Keppler asked if he could send this elsewhere in NRC and I agreed, however, I blanked out the source of the document as well as my name.
So, the following two pages are an interesting document that reveals very secret relationships between EPRI and the NRC that I was never aware of. It also reveals turmoil. I do not recall how I gained access to the following document; it most certainly was not sent to me. I am inclined to doubt that Rossin was aware of it, but I do not know that. I suspect that Layman and Lang were not aware that my position had been eliminated.
Click on a page to enlarge and the back arrow to return.
I'm certainly pleased that EPRI (Layman and Lang) documented the above. This is a clear report of a basically secret set of arrangements between EPRI and the NRC and I suspect that those have continued in various forms over the years and are really intense in today's post-Fukushima world.
The second page is "interesting" as it describes the "running around" in generating a response to Keppler. The very last paragraph is also revealing as EPRI apologizes to the NRC for my contact with Keppler.
Sunday, August 19, 2012
UHI Ultra Risk, October 3, 1984: EPRI and Duke Followup
This is my fifth consecutive entry that documents the actions and turmoil that were in response to my NSAC memorandum, UHI Ultra High Risk, October 3, 1984.
Sugnet was a trusted expert in PRA studies and Breen assigned him to discuss UHI with Duke Power Company who operated several plants having UHI. Here is Sugnet's brief memo following his discussions with Duke. Click on it for enlargement.
It is interesting Sugnet described his contact as an "... informal discussion ... ."
Sugnet does not say that Leyse regarded UHI as Ultra High Risk. Sugnet focuses on the assertion that UHI was essentially eliminated from the Duke PRA for McGuire. He concludes that, "We can probably obtain more detailed information from Duke Power if it becomes necessary."
NSAC management was satisfied with the Sugnet document. Now, I believe that Sugnet's discussion with Duke generated some interest in Duke in looking further into the operational aspects of UHI at McGuire as well as its other UHI units. I infer this because on October 31, 1984, (six days following the Sugnet memo) McGuire Unit 1 was shut down in order to correct a condition of excessive dissolved nitrogen in the UHI accumulator water. Excessive dissolved nitrogen was also found in the UHI accumulator water at McGuire Unit 2, and the UHI system was isolated from the primary system and the operating power was reduced to 45 percent of the rated power in order to compensate for the loss of UHI capability. At Unit 1, it was found that all four UHI level transmitters were improperly installed (apparently about 6 months earlier) and that UHI valves would fail to isolate on low level!
Following are three pages that document the above. The third page is the Duke PNO, November 2, 1984, that reports the problems with UHI.
Sugnet was a trusted expert in PRA studies and Breen assigned him to discuss UHI with Duke Power Company who operated several plants having UHI. Here is Sugnet's brief memo following his discussions with Duke. Click on it for enlargement.
It is interesting Sugnet described his contact as an "... informal discussion ... ."
Sugnet does not say that Leyse regarded UHI as Ultra High Risk. Sugnet focuses on the assertion that UHI was essentially eliminated from the Duke PRA for McGuire. He concludes that, "We can probably obtain more detailed information from Duke Power if it becomes necessary."
NSAC management was satisfied with the Sugnet document. Now, I believe that Sugnet's discussion with Duke generated some interest in Duke in looking further into the operational aspects of UHI at McGuire as well as its other UHI units. I infer this because on October 31, 1984, (six days following the Sugnet memo) McGuire Unit 1 was shut down in order to correct a condition of excessive dissolved nitrogen in the UHI accumulator water. Excessive dissolved nitrogen was also found in the UHI accumulator water at McGuire Unit 2, and the UHI system was isolated from the primary system and the operating power was reduced to 45 percent of the rated power in order to compensate for the loss of UHI capability. At Unit 1, it was found that all four UHI level transmitters were improperly installed (apparently about 6 months earlier) and that UHI valves would fail to isolate on low level!
Following are three pages that document the above. The third page is the Duke PNO, November 2, 1984, that reports the problems with UHI.
