Nuclear Industry Organizations
Key organizations specifically related to the U.S. nuclear industry are: (1) Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, and (2) Nuclear Energy Institute
On a global scale, two key organizations are (1) International Atomic Energy Agency, and (2) World Association of Nuclear Operators
The functions of these agencies differ, as follows.
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)
700 Galleria Parkway, Atlanta, GA 30339
The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations was formed after the Three Mile Island (TMI-2) event in 1979. A number of US industry leaders recognized that the industry must do a better job of policing itself to ensure that an event of this magnitude should never happen again. INPO was formed to establish standards of excellence against which the plants are measured. An inspection of each member plant is typically performed every 18 - 24 months. The Institute's programs include:
SEE-IN (an information sharing network)
EPIX (an equipment failure database)
National Academy for Nuclear Training
Events Analysis
Human Performance
Accreditation
Evaluations
INPO maintains a secure private website accessible only by the member utilities. INPO serves as the US center for the WANO organization described later.
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)
Suite 400; 1776 I Street NW; Washington, DC 20006-3708
NEI serves as an intermediary between the utilities and the NRC on generic issues. NEI also serves as a spokesman for the nuclear utilities.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Wagramerstrasse 5; P.O. Box 100, A-1400; Vienna, Austria
The IAEA is the United Nations organization that monitors compliance by the member states with nuclear safeguards agreements. IAEA also promotes nuclear safety on a global scale. IAEA teams conduct OSART inspections at nuclear plants to evaluate nuclear operational safety.
World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO)
WANO was formed after the Chernobyl event to provide a role similar to INPO on a global basis.
WANO has regional centers in Atlanta, London, Paris, Tokyo, and Moscow.
WANO maintains a secure private website accessible only by the member utilities.
Sunday, July 27, 2008
Friday, July 25, 2008
WOW! Nuclear Information Management Team
WOW! Maybe I'll ask this team to get INPO Significant Event Report SER 76-84 and put it into the open literature so that we may have it. Anyway, the following showed up in GOOGLE when I tried to find the mailing address for the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). (Way back, our grade schools taught the discipline of diagramming sentences; I've tried that exercise on the following, and it is almost hopeless.)
Nuclear Information Management Strategic Leadership
The Nuclear Information Management Strategic Leadership (NIMSL) Community of Practice is the leadership team responsible for serving as a focal point for nuclear Information Management activities associated with the sub-process of Information Management as identified in the Standard Nuclear Performance Model. These sub-processes currently include: Records Management, Document Control, Procedures, and Office Services Activities. The Standard Nuclear Performance Model is a comprehensive model that includes Institute of Nuclear Power Organizations (INPO), Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) process descriptions and provides a consistent basis for describing how work is done at nuclear power plants for process areas. It also enables plants to compare their methods to those of other plants to determine efficiency and cost-effectiveness. The model was published in 1998 and is maintained and updated by the Electric Utility Cost Group (EUCG) and NEI; reference the Standard Nuclear Performance Model for a listing of process and sub-process areas. The Information Management Community of Practice (sub-process SS003) was formed in August 2002, reference Charter; this Community of Practice is supported by INPO.
An NEI Nuclear Records Benchmarking Report (SS003) was completed and issued in 2002. The NIMSL Committee was also formed in 2002 with a subsequent process modeling project resulting in the publication of July 2003 NEI report, AP-907 – Information Management Process Description. This report describes the processes and performance measures associated with the management of information at nuclear power plant facilities. NIMSL projects and subsequent white papers and published reports fall under the umbrella of AP-907; these documents can be viewed under Publications.
NIMSL focuses on information sharing, promoting common interests and issues, coordinates a consistent direction in industry-wide Information Management initiatives, and serves as a forum for communications with Special Issues Groups such as: Nuclear Information and Records Management Association (NIRMA), Utility Procedure Development Association (UPDA), Information Technology and Configuration Management Communities of Practice, as well as the following: EUCG, NEI, and INPO.
Nuclear Information Management Strategic Leadership
The Nuclear Information Management Strategic Leadership (NIMSL) Community of Practice is the leadership team responsible for serving as a focal point for nuclear Information Management activities associated with the sub-process of Information Management as identified in the Standard Nuclear Performance Model. These sub-processes currently include: Records Management, Document Control, Procedures, and Office Services Activities. The Standard Nuclear Performance Model is a comprehensive model that includes Institute of Nuclear Power Organizations (INPO), Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) process descriptions and provides a consistent basis for describing how work is done at nuclear power plants for process areas. It also enables plants to compare their methods to those of other plants to determine efficiency and cost-effectiveness. The model was published in 1998 and is maintained and updated by the Electric Utility Cost Group (EUCG) and NEI; reference the Standard Nuclear Performance Model for a listing of process and sub-process areas. The Information Management Community of Practice (sub-process SS003) was formed in August 2002, reference Charter; this Community of Practice is supported by INPO.
An NEI Nuclear Records Benchmarking Report (SS003) was completed and issued in 2002. The NIMSL Committee was also formed in 2002 with a subsequent process modeling project resulting in the publication of July 2003 NEI report, AP-907 – Information Management Process Description. This report describes the processes and performance measures associated with the management of information at nuclear power plant facilities. NIMSL projects and subsequent white papers and published reports fall under the umbrella of AP-907; these documents can be viewed under Publications.
NIMSL focuses on information sharing, promoting common interests and issues, coordinates a consistent direction in industry-wide Information Management initiatives, and serves as a forum for communications with Special Issues Groups such as: Nuclear Information and Records Management Association (NIRMA), Utility Procedure Development Association (UPDA), Information Technology and Configuration Management Communities of Practice, as well as the following: EUCG, NEI, and INPO.
Thursday, July 24, 2008
Lightning, NSAC and INPO, (how things work!)
NSAC: Nuclear Safety Analysis Center, A defunct branch of the Electric Power Research Institute.
INPO: Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, A very active and somewhat secretive group that is funded by operators of nuclear power plants.
Right after the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 during April, 1979, the nuclear utility members of EPRI mandated the immediate formation of NSAC at Palo Alto, California. INPO was formed several months later, headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia.
I was with NSAC when I classified the consequences of a lightning strike at Salem Unit 1 on June 8, 1980, as a Significant Event and my report was entered into our communications system on August 12, 1980, as an NSAC/INPO SIGNIFICANT EVENT. See the first slide below, click on the slide to enlarge, and use your back arrow to return here.
INPO: Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, A very active and somewhat secretive group that is funded by operators of nuclear power plants.
Right after the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 during April, 1979, the nuclear utility members of EPRI mandated the immediate formation of NSAC at Palo Alto, California. INPO was formed several months later, headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia.
I was with NSAC when I classified the consequences of a lightning strike at Salem Unit 1 on June 8, 1980, as a Significant Event and my report was entered into our communications system on August 12, 1980, as an NSAC/INPO SIGNIFICANT EVENT. See the first slide below, click on the slide to enlarge, and use your back arrow to return here.
INPO immediately objected to my entry and worked overtime to demand its rejection. See the second slide. I insisted that the entry should be maintained.
My writeup was indeed deleted, as I found out on March 11, 1982, a few months short of two years later when NSAC's file manager gave me the hard copy (slide 1) from her personal files. (NSAC management did not appreciate her diligence and she was assigned to another group at EPRI.)
Well, it is really amazing, HOW THINGS WORK! It turns out that on November 5, 1985, the NRC issued an Information Notice regarding lightning strikes. In contrast to INPO's rejection of my above SER that is dated 12-Aug-8o, the NRC included the lightning strike at Salem on June 9, 1980, in this Information Notice that is dated November 5, 1985.
BUT WHAT IS EVEN MORE FUN: the NRC referenced INPO report, INPO SER 76-84, in its Information Notice. Very likely, the INPO Signifcant Event Report, SER 76-84, includes the Salem event that INPO effectively censored on 12-AUG-80. It is also interesting that it apparently was not until 1984 that INPO admitted that lightning strikes induced significant events. And, very likely, the NRC became aware of the significance of lightning strikes when it became aware of INPO SER 76-84 in the course of its confidential communications with INPO.
Here is NRC Information Notice 85-86; note the reference to INPO SER 76-84. Also, the NRC's writeup of the lightning strike at Salem is less inclusive than my Significant Event Report of August 12, 1980.
SSINS No.: 6835 IN 85-86
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
November 5, 1985 Information Notice No. 85-86:
LIGHTNING STRIKES AT NUCLEAR POWER GENERATING STATIONS
Addressees: All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a construction permit (CP).
Purpose: This notice is provided to alert recipients of a potentially significant problem of reactor trips and instrument damage caused by lightning strikes. It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicabilityto their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude a similar problem occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required. The NRC is continuing to evaluate pertinent information. Recipients of this notice will be notified of additional information or if specific actions are required.
Description of Circumstances: A number of plant trips and instrumentation problems attributable to lightning have occurred over the past 6 years. Since solid state circuitry designs are being increasingly employed in safety related systems, the impact of lightning induced line surges on those circuits is emphasized in this notice. Descriptions of several of the more significant events are presented below. Events involving lightning strikes of switchyards and the consequential impact on power distribution systems are not covered by this notice. However, INPO SER 76-84 covers this latter subject as well as summarizing earlier INPO documents dealing with lightning strikes at nuclear power plants.
Zion Power Station Units 1 and 2
On August 17, 1979, both units tripped simultaneously during a severe lightning storm. Investigation indicated that a lightning strike in close proximity to the plant caused either a momentary surge or interruption in the ac power supply circuits to the rod control power supply cabinets. This transient tripped the overload protection devices for the dc power supply cabinet, resulting in a power interruption to the control rod stationary gripper coils, 8511010020 . IN 85-86 November 5, 1985 Page 2 of 4 which caused the rods to drop into the core. The resulting high, negative flux rate initiated the reactor trip signal. Tests verified that noise induced on the ac input to one power supply would actuate the overvoltage protection trips on the main and auxiliary power supplies. In addition to the noise spikes, one Unit 2, 24-V positive power supply was damaged by the lightning strike and had to be replaced. The following corrective actions were initiated:
o The control rod system neutral was isolated from the station ground.
o The overvoltage protection trip setting was changed from 27 to 29 V. o A low-pass filter was installed on the input to each 24-V positive power supply.
o A volt trap (a voltage suppressor circuit designed to reduce large voltage surges and noise induced by lightning strikes) was installed across the 50-ohm motor generator neutral resistor.
o A volt trap was installed across the power feed to the auxiliary power supply.
o The power feed for the auxiliary power supply was changed from the 480-V system to the control rod drive (CRD) motor generators.
Zion Unit 2 experienced additional reactor trips attributed to lightning on April 3 and July 16, 1980, before the above listed corrective actions were implemented. In these cases it was determined that the transient tripped the overload protection devices, as was the case in the trip of both units on August 17, 1979. However, no power supplies or other equipment were damaged during the latter two trips.
Again, on December 2, 1982, Zion Unit 2 reactor tripped from 100% power during an electrical storm. It was concluded that lightning induced a disturbance in the electrical system causing a reactor trip from a generator trip. Additional lightning protection for the containment building was provided and the static wire associated with the 345-kV line was isolated from the power station structural steel.
Salem Power Station Unit 1
On June 9, 1980 the reactor tripped during an electrical storm. Lightning struck at the south penetration area of reactor containment causing a transient on seven main steam pressure transmitters. Two of these pressure transmitters were damaged and had to be replaced. The transient caused a high steam line pressure differential reactor trip signal and a safety injection signal. The licensee believes the lightning strike hit main steam vent pipes which extend above the penetration area roof and the surge was carried into the building via piping connections.
Kewaunee Power Station
On August 19, 1980, two of four instrument busses lost power during an electrical storm. This resulted in a spurious safety injection (SI) actuation signal, and the unit tripped from full power. In addition to inducing the instrumentation transients, the inverter fuses were blown. These fuses were replaced, and no other evidence of equipment failure was observed.
Byron Power Station Unit 1
On July 13, 1985, when lightning struck the Unit 1 containment, the reactor tripped from approximately 11% power because of induced voltage surges in instrument and control cables in one of four containment penetration areas. The induced voltage caused failure of four rod drive power supplies, including 1 redundant pair. The failure of the redundant supplies resulted in 10 control rods dropping into the core. A power range negative-flux-rate reactor trip resulted from the rod insertion. In addition to the reactor trip, damage occurred to 30 plant instruments. The following systems were affected by the damaged instrumentation: protection channel II, one train ofthe 48-volt power supply for the solid state protection system, the meteorological tower, control rod drive, and loose-parts monitoring.
A review of cable routings showed that a significant common denominator existed in containment penetrations. All damaged instruments were associatedwith cables passing through penetrations located in one containment region. In addition to the damaged instrumentation, the lightning damaged a significant amount of security equipment.
The licensee determined that an improved lightning protection system was required to prevent recurrence of a similar incident. By installing copper conductors, external to containment, from the roof mounted lightning rods directly to ground rods in the earth, a low impedance path to ground was provided for future lightning strikes. This modification is similar to the Zion modification described above.
Arkansas Power Station Unit 2
On August 5, 1985, the reactor tripped from 100% power on a low departure- from-nucleate-boiling ratio (DNBR) signal as the result of a lightning strike transient induced in two of the core protection system channels. The licensee's followup investigation revealed no damage to the plant's electrical equipment or instrumentation measuring systems.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.
Edward L. Jordan, Director, Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response, Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
So, I sent the following request to the NRC asking them to allow me to have copy of INPO SER 76-84. Here is the e-mail and it is followed by the NRC's denial.
FOIA request for INPO SER 76-84
Date:6/22/2008 11:44:16 A.M. Mountain Daylight Time
From:Bobleyse
AttachedInformation Notice No. 85-86: Lightning Strikes at Nuclear Power references INPO SER 76-84. This discloses that NRC has INPO SER 76-84. This is my request under FOIA to be provided with a copy of INPO SER 76-84.
Information Notice No. 85-86: Lightning Strikes at Nuclear Power ...However, INPO SER 76-84 covers this latter subject as well as summarizing earlier INPO documents dealing with lightning strikes at nuclear power plants. ...www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1985/in85086.html - 23k - Cached - Similar pages
Robert H. Leyse bobleyse@aol.com
The NRC denied this request arguing that, "The information is considered to be confidential business (proprietary) Information."
This denial does not have a reasonable basis. Very likely the NRC's Information Notice 85-86 was issued only following its review by INPO and INPO then had no objection to the citing of INPO SER 76-84. I'll appeal the NRC's denial of my FOIA, and I'll report what happens.
In the meantime lightning continues. Recently I found the following in my July 2008 copy of Nuclear News. "Millstone 2 tripped off the line on May 22 (2008) because of either a lightning strike on the main transformer or a grid disturbance from a lightning strike on a transmission line offsite. ... Millstone 2 returned to service on May 28 (2008)." I'll track this in my spare time.
Vertigo (Spatial Disorientation)
Here are a few interesting paragraphs that are from the September 2008 issue of the Smithsonian's Air & Space.
Despite the best training and technology, why do pilots still die from not knowing which end is up?
On June 26, 2007, while on a training exercise off the Oregon coast, Major Gregory D. Young of the Air National Guard flew his F-15A fighter into the Pacific Ocean. The $32 million aircraft was destroyed and the pilot killed. There was no distress call, no attempt to eject, and no apparent aircraft malfunction. Young, 34, had 2,300 hours of flight time, more than 750 hours of it in F-15s.
As investigators sifted through the wreckage—what little was left—colleagues, family, and friends were left to wonder: What caused Young to guide his airplane right into the ocean at more than 600 mph? The answer, revealed in an investigative report two months later, was both profoundly unsettling and all too familiar. Young, in the prosaic terminology of the report, “experienced unrecognized (Type 1) spatial disorientation (SD), which caused him to misperceive his attitude, altitude, and airspeed. As a result, [he] was clearly unaware of his position and impacted the water.”
A U.S. Air Force review of 633 crashes between 1980 and 1989 showed that spatial disorientation was a factor in 13 percent, resulting in 115 deaths. Among crashes of high-performance aircraft, the rate was higher: 25 to 30 percent. A U.S. Navy study found that in contrast to general aviation accidents, a majority of accidents in high-performance aircraft occurred in daylight and in visual flight conditions. The pilots were an average of 30 years old, with 10 years in the cockpit and 1,500 hours of pilot-in-command or instructor time, and in the prior three months they had flown an average of 25 times—all of which shows that no amount of expertise, training, or experience immunizes against spatial disorientation.
Spatial disorientation is so insidious, and the sensations it creates so compelling, that unless you suspect you have a problem, you would never know there is one.
In addition to primary flight data (attitude, airspeed, altitude, heading), the head-up displays in military cockpits provide the pilot a continuous view of what is directly in front of the aircraft. Displays also project flight information on the helmet visor so the pilot’s head is free to move. Three-dimensional “highway in the sky” displays give a pilot’s-eye view of the terrain and project a path to follow. Today’s pilots can maintain a level of situational awareness that their predecessors never dreamed of.
But when it comes to countering spatial disorientation, the new displays create their own problems, says Bill Ercoline, a scientist at California-based Wyle Laboratories who provides human factors research for the Air Force Research Laboratory at Brooks City-Base in Texas. Studies of unusual attitude recovery using head-up displays found that HUDs can actually interfere with recovery. The field of view is narrow, the manufacturers use symbols that are not universal, and the nature of the displays is not intuitive; compounding all that, there’s simply too much information to process. “It’s like drinking through a fire hose—it’s just difficult to get the right gulp,” Ercoline says. With so many more systems to manage and monitor, pilots end up devoting less time to actually flying.
Despite the best training and technology, why do pilots still die from not knowing which end is up?
On June 26, 2007, while on a training exercise off the Oregon coast, Major Gregory D. Young of the Air National Guard flew his F-15A fighter into the Pacific Ocean. The $32 million aircraft was destroyed and the pilot killed. There was no distress call, no attempt to eject, and no apparent aircraft malfunction. Young, 34, had 2,300 hours of flight time, more than 750 hours of it in F-15s.
As investigators sifted through the wreckage—what little was left—colleagues, family, and friends were left to wonder: What caused Young to guide his airplane right into the ocean at more than 600 mph? The answer, revealed in an investigative report two months later, was both profoundly unsettling and all too familiar. Young, in the prosaic terminology of the report, “experienced unrecognized (Type 1) spatial disorientation (SD), which caused him to misperceive his attitude, altitude, and airspeed. As a result, [he] was clearly unaware of his position and impacted the water.”
A U.S. Air Force review of 633 crashes between 1980 and 1989 showed that spatial disorientation was a factor in 13 percent, resulting in 115 deaths. Among crashes of high-performance aircraft, the rate was higher: 25 to 30 percent. A U.S. Navy study found that in contrast to general aviation accidents, a majority of accidents in high-performance aircraft occurred in daylight and in visual flight conditions. The pilots were an average of 30 years old, with 10 years in the cockpit and 1,500 hours of pilot-in-command or instructor time, and in the prior three months they had flown an average of 25 times—all of which shows that no amount of expertise, training, or experience immunizes against spatial disorientation.
Spatial disorientation is so insidious, and the sensations it creates so compelling, that unless you suspect you have a problem, you would never know there is one.
In addition to primary flight data (attitude, airspeed, altitude, heading), the head-up displays in military cockpits provide the pilot a continuous view of what is directly in front of the aircraft. Displays also project flight information on the helmet visor so the pilot’s head is free to move. Three-dimensional “highway in the sky” displays give a pilot’s-eye view of the terrain and project a path to follow. Today’s pilots can maintain a level of situational awareness that their predecessors never dreamed of.
But when it comes to countering spatial disorientation, the new displays create their own problems, says Bill Ercoline, a scientist at California-based Wyle Laboratories who provides human factors research for the Air Force Research Laboratory at Brooks City-Base in Texas. Studies of unusual attitude recovery using head-up displays found that HUDs can actually interfere with recovery. The field of view is narrow, the manufacturers use symbols that are not universal, and the nature of the displays is not intuitive; compounding all that, there’s simply too much information to process. “It’s like drinking through a fire hose—it’s just difficult to get the right gulp,” Ercoline says. With so many more systems to manage and monitor, pilots end up devoting less time to actually flying.
Thursday, July 17, 2008
Heat Transfer Experiments; Rectangular Channels
Wednesday, July 16, 2008
Site: Palo Verde , Three Units.
A great aerial view. A team of skilled skydivers could land on top of all three units. Would security know?
Sunday, July 13, 2008
An old ice condenser plant-- A recent press release
July 11, 2008
NRC EXTENDS CONSTRUCTION PERMIT FOR WATTS BAR UNIT 2
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has extended the construction permit for the unfinished Unit 2 at the Watts Bar nuclear power plant to March 31, 2013. The Tennessee Valley Authority, which operates Unit 1 at the plant about 10 miles south of Spring City, Tenn., requested the extension May 8.
The NRC staff’s environmental assessment of the extension request, which found no significant impact on the environment, was published in the Federal Register on June 26. The agency issued the staff’s safety evaluation of the extension, as well as an order extending the construction permit, in the Federal Register on July 11. Any person adversely affected by the order may request a hearing by Sept. 8, specifically listing whether TVA failed to show good cause for the extension and why the NRC should not have issued the order. Those interested in filing a hearing request can find instructions in the order, which will be available on the NRC’s Web site here: http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/plant-specific-items/watts-bar.html.
TVA has informed the NRC it intends to complete Unit 2 and request an Operating license in 2012. The NRC will decide whether to issue a license for Unit 2 in accordance with the agency’s regulations. Unit 2, if completed, would be an 1,100-MWe, Westinghouse-designed pressurized water reactor essentially the same as the operating Unit 1.
And look at this great view of the site! This is from a TVA handout. I wonder what it costs to make sure that no explosives or other attack tools (like AK47's, cyanide, etc.) are in those vehicles.
NRC EXTENDS CONSTRUCTION PERMIT FOR WATTS BAR UNIT 2
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has extended the construction permit for the unfinished Unit 2 at the Watts Bar nuclear power plant to March 31, 2013. The Tennessee Valley Authority, which operates Unit 1 at the plant about 10 miles south of Spring City, Tenn., requested the extension May 8.
The NRC staff’s environmental assessment of the extension request, which found no significant impact on the environment, was published in the Federal Register on June 26. The agency issued the staff’s safety evaluation of the extension, as well as an order extending the construction permit, in the Federal Register on July 11. Any person adversely affected by the order may request a hearing by Sept. 8, specifically listing whether TVA failed to show good cause for the extension and why the NRC should not have issued the order. Those interested in filing a hearing request can find instructions in the order, which will be available on the NRC’s Web site here: http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/plant-specific-items/watts-bar.html.
TVA has informed the NRC it intends to complete Unit 2 and request an Operating license in 2012. The NRC will decide whether to issue a license for Unit 2 in accordance with the agency’s regulations. Unit 2, if completed, would be an 1,100-MWe, Westinghouse-designed pressurized water reactor essentially the same as the operating Unit 1.
And look at this great view of the site! This is from a TVA handout. I wonder what it costs to make sure that no explosives or other attack tools (like AK47's, cyanide, etc.) are in those vehicles.
Thursday, July 10, 2008
GETR Lowenstein FOIA, etc.
Here is a lengthy entry including details of an FOIA that I will submit soon.
Lines 1 through 3 of page 25 disclose, "It is our understanding that we will meet with representatives of the Division of Licensing and Regulation during the week of September 24, 1962 to discuss this report and the events described herein."
This FOIA specifes disclosure of the following files, inspection reports and records of other matters that the NRC is obligated to have in its files relative to the General Electric Test Reactor, GETR, License TR-1.
On page 1 of the following 25 page letter from GE to Lowenstein, AEC, September 7, 1962, the following records are disclosed and I want copies of those records under this FOIA.
Lines 3 and 4 of paragraph 2 disclose a report to the AEC on July 19, 1962.
Lines 5 and 6 of paragraph 2 disclose a report to the AEC on July 24, 1962.
Lines 7 and 8 of paragraph 2 disclose "... numerous visits and close liaison ..."
Lines 9 through 12 of paragraph 2 disclose "The inspectors personally participated in the examination and inspection of control rod components. Their frequent presence, their participation, and their comments provided valuable assistance to General Electric personnel in analyzing the problems encountered."
Lines 2 and 3 of paragraph 3 disclose telegrams dated July 30, 1962, and August 2, 1962.
Lines 4 through 7 of paragraph 3 disclose that "... the Commission's field inspectors had been in contact with and had regularly informed appropriate individuals in the Division of Licensing and Regulation of the events discussed herein."
Lines 3 through 5 of page 24 disclose, "A redesign of the control rods has been initiated for fabrication and installation in March, 1963. The designs will be forwarded to your office review and approval prior to installation."Lines 1 through 3 of page 25 disclose, "It is our understanding that we will meet with representatives of the Division of Licensing and Regulation during the week of September 24, 1962 to discuss this report and the events described herein."
Sunday, July 6, 2008
GETR: ACRS approves power level increase from 27 to 50 MW
I sparkplugged this power level increase shortly after I started at Vellecitos during January 1960. Others got the incentive compensation, if any.
I was present at this ACRS meeting although a GE front man gave the pitch to ACRS. Duirng a break Harry Monson of ACRS and ANL (I had previously worked in his group at ANL) asked me if I was aware of the intense damage from sodium-water reactions in failures of prototype steam generators for fast reactors. I responded that our sodium inventories in capsule experiments would be relatively low and well contained.
I was present at this ACRS meeting although a GE front man gave the pitch to ACRS. Duirng a break Harry Monson of ACRS and ANL (I had previously worked in his group at ANL) asked me if I was aware of the intense damage from sodium-water reactions in failures of prototype steam generators for fast reactors. I responded that our sodium inventories in capsule experiments would be relatively low and well contained.
GE has its money back from its enrichment game
Canadian co. joins GE Hitachi uranium enrichment partnership
June 20, 2008
HARTFORD, Conn.—A Canadian uranium producer has joined a venture of GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy to commercially enrich uranium for nuclear power plants, the companies announced Friday.
Cameco Corp., a uranium producer based in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, will invest $123.8 million to acquire a 24 percent stake in the venture, Global Laser Enrichment. General Electric will hold 51 percent and Hitachi will own 25 percent.
Enriching uranium is a key part of producing fuel for light water nuclear power plants.
Fairfield-based General Electric Co. and Tokyo-based Hitachi Ltd. launched a joint nuclear business in July 2007 to capitalize on rising demand for electricity and concerns about carbon dioxide emissions from coal-fired plants.
The rapidly rising price of oil has brought renewed attention to nuclear energy, which has been sidelined over safety concerns. On Wednesday, Arizona Sen. John McCain, the presumptive Republican presidential nominee, called for construction of 45 nuclear reactors by 2030.
The Wilmington, N.C.-based GE Hitachi said in announcing the Cameco deal that utilities will need to build between 20 and 25 reactors by 2030 to maintain the 20 percent of U.S. energy now produced by nuclear power. There are now 104 licensed nuclear reactors operating in the United States.
"We do think there are a lot of opportunities for our business," said Lisa Price, a senior vice president at GE Hitachi. "We think the environment is attractive for nuclear."
Startup of a commercial enrichment facility at GE Hitachi's headquarters is projected for 2012, "assuming commercialization goes as we hope after the testing phase," Price said.
Potential customers for the GE Hitachi-Cameco venture are not only reactors that GE Hitachi may build, but any utility with a nuclear reactor, Price said.
June 20, 2008
HARTFORD, Conn.—A Canadian uranium producer has joined a venture of GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy to commercially enrich uranium for nuclear power plants, the companies announced Friday.
Cameco Corp., a uranium producer based in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, will invest $123.8 million to acquire a 24 percent stake in the venture, Global Laser Enrichment. General Electric will hold 51 percent and Hitachi will own 25 percent.
Enriching uranium is a key part of producing fuel for light water nuclear power plants.
Fairfield-based General Electric Co. and Tokyo-based Hitachi Ltd. launched a joint nuclear business in July 2007 to capitalize on rising demand for electricity and concerns about carbon dioxide emissions from coal-fired plants.
The rapidly rising price of oil has brought renewed attention to nuclear energy, which has been sidelined over safety concerns. On Wednesday, Arizona Sen. John McCain, the presumptive Republican presidential nominee, called for construction of 45 nuclear reactors by 2030.
The Wilmington, N.C.-based GE Hitachi said in announcing the Cameco deal that utilities will need to build between 20 and 25 reactors by 2030 to maintain the 20 percent of U.S. energy now produced by nuclear power. There are now 104 licensed nuclear reactors operating in the United States.
"We do think there are a lot of opportunities for our business," said Lisa Price, a senior vice president at GE Hitachi. "We think the environment is attractive for nuclear."
Startup of a commercial enrichment facility at GE Hitachi's headquarters is projected for 2012, "assuming commercialization goes as we hope after the testing phase," Price said.
Potential customers for the GE Hitachi-Cameco venture are not only reactors that GE Hitachi may build, but any utility with a nuclear reactor, Price said.
Saturday, July 5, 2008
Inreresting ideas
Press Release 08-117 Radicals Shake Up Molecules in a Tug o' War
An unexcited deuterium molecule, before being tugged into vibration by a hydrogen atom. Credit and Larger Version
July 3, 2008
View a video representing a collision between a molecule of deuterium and a radical hydrogen atom.
Until now, it was commonly thought that colliding molecules get the shakes as the result of energy transfer solely from the smashing of the molecules, but some new research adds a second means by which colliding molecules become vibrationally excited--it is being called the "Tug o' War Mechanism."
The new experiment, transforming the textbook story, was performed in the lab of Richard Zare, chair of the Department of Chemistry at Stanford University. This work on energy transferring, or inelastic, collisions is featured in the July 3, 2008 issue of the journal Nature.
"How energy transfer occurs in molecular collisions is a topic of deep interest to chemists, for energy transfer is often the precursor to chemical transformations," Zare said. "This is the reason why I regard finding a new mechanism for energizing molecules through collisions to be of such potential importance."
"The work by Zare and his colleagues shows an interesting and unexpected result," shared Charles Pibel, director of the Physical Chemistry Program at the National Science Foundation (NSF). "The conventional wisdom had been that most collisions between molecules excite vibrational motion through a hard impact, like a piano's hammer striking a string."
But instead of molecules impacting and deflecting backwards, the Tug o' War Mechanism stretches the molecule and then releases it, starting the molecule rattling. The effect is "more like a violinist, plucking a string, pizzicato." In the collisions studied by the Zare group, a lone hydrogen atom tugs on one end of a deuterium molecule and lets go, exciting the molecular deuterium into vibration.
More generally, the Tug o' War Mechanism comes into play when a certain type of unstable species, a free radical, looms down a path for collision with another molecule. Because free radicals lack a properly balanced shell of electrons, they are more susceptible to the mechanism than other types of atoms or molecules.
Sometimes a collision between a free radical and another molecule rips apart chemical bonds and atoms are exchanged amongst the colliding partners--that is, a chemical reaction takes place. However, other times when free radicals approach other molecules, this Tug o' War Mechanism stretches the molecule without breaking the bonds.
In this way, free radicals act like renegades attempting to steal atoms from their parent molecule by tugging them away. But if a collision is not at the right angle, the radical might not be able to break the bonds of the molecule. It releases its hold on the nearest atom, or atoms, and then departs. The frustrated, or unsuccessful, chemical reaction nevertheless imparts some energy on the victim of the free radical attack. It is this energy that sets the molecule off dancing with a new vibrational pattern.
The research, funded by NSF, was led by Noah T. Goldberg at Stanford University and Stuart J. Greaves at the University of Bristol, U.K., and included Zare, Jianyang Zhang and Daniel J. Miller, all from Stanford University, and Eckart Wrede from the University of Durham, U.K.
Award Abstract #0650414 State-to-State Reaction Dynamics
NSF Org:
CHE Division of Chemistry
Initial Amendment Date:
August 14, 2007
Latest Amendment Date:
June 23, 2008
Award Number:
0650414
Award Instrument:
Continuing grant
Program Manager:
Charles D. Pibel CHE Division of ChemistryMPS Directorate for Mathematical & Physical Sciences
Start Date:
September 1, 2007
Expires:
August 31, 2009 (Estimated)
Awarded Amount to Date:
$540842
Investigator(s):
Richard Zare zare@stanford.edu(Principal Investigator)
Sponsor:
Stanford University 651 Serra Street, Room 220 STANFORD, CA 94305 650/723-2300
NSF Program(s):
SPECTROSCOPY
Field Application(s):
Program Reference Code(s):
OTHR,0000
Program Element Code(s):
1962
ABSTRACTIn this award, funded by the Experimental Physical Chemistry Program of the Chemistry Division Prof. Richard N. Zare of Stanford University and his postdoctoral and graduate student colleagues will examine chemical reactions with the most exquisite detail. Prof. Zare and his group will continue their studies of state-to-state reaction dynamics in fundamental chemical systems, seeking to identify how chemical reactions depend upon the precise distribution of molecular excitation within the reacting partners, and to probe the deposition of the energy into the chemical products. The ultimate goal of these studies is to understand, at the most fundamental level, the driving forces for chemical reactions. The centerpiece of this work will be the study of the reaction and inelastic scattering of a hydrogen atom with molecular hydrogen. Prof. Zare will continue to serve as a mentor to a diverse group of young scientists, and will continue in his wide ranging efforts at educating the public about the importance of science. In this regard, Prof. Zare's service as a host of WONDERFEST is emblematic; WONDERFEST is a Bay Area celebration of science and attracts over one thousand people a year to learn about and debate upon current topics in science.
An unexcited deuterium molecule, before being tugged into vibration by a hydrogen atom. Credit and Larger Version
July 3, 2008
View a video representing a collision between a molecule of deuterium and a radical hydrogen atom.
Until now, it was commonly thought that colliding molecules get the shakes as the result of energy transfer solely from the smashing of the molecules, but some new research adds a second means by which colliding molecules become vibrationally excited--it is being called the "Tug o' War Mechanism."
The new experiment, transforming the textbook story, was performed in the lab of Richard Zare, chair of the Department of Chemistry at Stanford University. This work on energy transferring, or inelastic, collisions is featured in the July 3, 2008 issue of the journal Nature.
"How energy transfer occurs in molecular collisions is a topic of deep interest to chemists, for energy transfer is often the precursor to chemical transformations," Zare said. "This is the reason why I regard finding a new mechanism for energizing molecules through collisions to be of such potential importance."
"The work by Zare and his colleagues shows an interesting and unexpected result," shared Charles Pibel, director of the Physical Chemistry Program at the National Science Foundation (NSF). "The conventional wisdom had been that most collisions between molecules excite vibrational motion through a hard impact, like a piano's hammer striking a string."
But instead of molecules impacting and deflecting backwards, the Tug o' War Mechanism stretches the molecule and then releases it, starting the molecule rattling. The effect is "more like a violinist, plucking a string, pizzicato." In the collisions studied by the Zare group, a lone hydrogen atom tugs on one end of a deuterium molecule and lets go, exciting the molecular deuterium into vibration.
More generally, the Tug o' War Mechanism comes into play when a certain type of unstable species, a free radical, looms down a path for collision with another molecule. Because free radicals lack a properly balanced shell of electrons, they are more susceptible to the mechanism than other types of atoms or molecules.
Sometimes a collision between a free radical and another molecule rips apart chemical bonds and atoms are exchanged amongst the colliding partners--that is, a chemical reaction takes place. However, other times when free radicals approach other molecules, this Tug o' War Mechanism stretches the molecule without breaking the bonds.
In this way, free radicals act like renegades attempting to steal atoms from their parent molecule by tugging them away. But if a collision is not at the right angle, the radical might not be able to break the bonds of the molecule. It releases its hold on the nearest atom, or atoms, and then departs. The frustrated, or unsuccessful, chemical reaction nevertheless imparts some energy on the victim of the free radical attack. It is this energy that sets the molecule off dancing with a new vibrational pattern.
The research, funded by NSF, was led by Noah T. Goldberg at Stanford University and Stuart J. Greaves at the University of Bristol, U.K., and included Zare, Jianyang Zhang and Daniel J. Miller, all from Stanford University, and Eckart Wrede from the University of Durham, U.K.
Award Abstract #0650414 State-to-State Reaction Dynamics
NSF Org:
CHE Division of Chemistry
Initial Amendment Date:
August 14, 2007
Latest Amendment Date:
June 23, 2008
Award Number:
0650414
Award Instrument:
Continuing grant
Program Manager:
Charles D. Pibel CHE Division of ChemistryMPS Directorate for Mathematical & Physical Sciences
Start Date:
September 1, 2007
Expires:
August 31, 2009 (Estimated)
Awarded Amount to Date:
$540842
Investigator(s):
Richard Zare zare@stanford.edu(Principal Investigator)
Sponsor:
Stanford University 651 Serra Street, Room 220 STANFORD, CA 94305 650/723-2300
NSF Program(s):
SPECTROSCOPY
Field Application(s):
Program Reference Code(s):
OTHR,0000
Program Element Code(s):
1962
ABSTRACTIn this award, funded by the Experimental Physical Chemistry Program of the Chemistry Division Prof. Richard N. Zare of Stanford University and his postdoctoral and graduate student colleagues will examine chemical reactions with the most exquisite detail. Prof. Zare and his group will continue their studies of state-to-state reaction dynamics in fundamental chemical systems, seeking to identify how chemical reactions depend upon the precise distribution of molecular excitation within the reacting partners, and to probe the deposition of the energy into the chemical products. The ultimate goal of these studies is to understand, at the most fundamental level, the driving forces for chemical reactions. The centerpiece of this work will be the study of the reaction and inelastic scattering of a hydrogen atom with molecular hydrogen. Prof. Zare will continue to serve as a mentor to a diverse group of young scientists, and will continue in his wide ranging efforts at educating the public about the importance of science. In this regard, Prof. Zare's service as a host of WONDERFEST is emblematic; WONDERFEST is a Bay Area celebration of science and attracts over one thousand people a year to learn about and debate upon current topics in science.
Friday, July 4, 2008
Incentive Compensation, Nuclear Safety and other related matters
This is the brief starter. A lot of books have hit the street from some key nukes that very few read (luckily for the nuke loyalists). More, a lot more, will follow showing how incentive compensation does not necessarily get into the pockets of those who have done the work. Also, it seems that vital plant fixes may have been delayed until ...
Lightning: How things work!
This will become a large file. Here are some starters.
FOIA request for INPO SER 76-84
Date:
6/22/2008 11:44:16 A.M. Mountain Daylight Time
From:
Bobleyse
Reply To:
To:
FOIA.resource@nrc.gov
CC:
BCC:
Sent on:
Sent from the Internet (Details)
Internet Address Card Attached
Information Notice No. 85-86: Lightning Strikes at Nuclear Power references INPO SER 76-84. This discloses that NRC has INPO SER 76-84. This is my request under FOIA to be provided with a copy of INPO SER 76-84.
Information Notice No. 85-86: Lightning Strikes at Nuclear Power ...
However, INPO SER 76-84 covers this latter subject as well as summarizing earlier INPO documents dealing with lightning strikes at nuclear power plants. ...www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1985/in85086.html - 23k - Cached - Similar pages
Robert H. Leyse bobleyse@aol.com
You may click on the following slides to enlarge and then use your back button to continue to the next slide.
I was on the staff of the long-defunct Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (NSAC) when I wrote the following Significant Event Report . In line with the above directive from staff at the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) the report was trashed. However, I manged to recover a copy of my original Report.
FOIA request for INPO SER 76-84
Date:
6/22/2008 11:44:16 A.M. Mountain Daylight Time
From:
Bobleyse
Reply To:
To:
FOIA.resource@nrc.gov
CC:
BCC:
Sent on:
Sent from the Internet (Details)
Internet Address Card Attached
Information Notice No. 85-86: Lightning Strikes at Nuclear Power references INPO SER 76-84. This discloses that NRC has INPO SER 76-84. This is my request under FOIA to be provided with a copy of INPO SER 76-84.
Information Notice No. 85-86: Lightning Strikes at Nuclear Power ...
However, INPO SER 76-84 covers this latter subject as well as summarizing earlier INPO documents dealing with lightning strikes at nuclear power plants. ...www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1985/in85086.html - 23k - Cached - Similar pages
Robert H. Leyse bobleyse@aol.com
You may click on the following slides to enlarge and then use your back button to continue to the next slide.
I was on the staff of the long-defunct Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (NSAC) when I wrote the following Significant Event Report . In line with the above directive from staff at the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) the report was trashed. However, I manged to recover a copy of my original Report. 
The NRC, on November 5, 1985, issued the following Information Notice regarding lightning strikes. In contrast to INPO's rejection of my above SER that is dated 12-Aug-8o, the NRC included the Lightning strike at Salem on June 9, 1980, in its Information Notice that is dated November 5, 1985. I wonder if the INPO report, INPO SER 76-80, that is referenced by the NRC in its Information Notice, includes the Salem event that INPO effectively censored on 12-AUG-80.
Here is NRC Information Notice 85-86:
SSINS No.: 6835 IN 85-86
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
November 5, 1985 Information Notice No. 85-86:
LIGHTNING STRIKES AT NUCLEAR POWER GENERATING STATIONS
Addressees: All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a construction permit (CP).
Purpose: This notice is provided to alert recipients of a potentially significant problem of reactor trips and instrument damage caused by lightning strikes. It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicabilityto their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude a similar problem occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required. The NRC is continuing to evaluate pertinent information. Recipients of this notice will be notified of additional information or if specific actions arerequired.
Description of Circumstances: A number of plant trips and instrumentation problems attributable to lightning have occurred over the past 6 years. Since solid state circuitry designs are being increasingly employed in safety related systems, the impact of lightning induced line surges on those circuits is emphasized in this notice. Descriptions of several of the more significant events are presented below. Events involving lightning strikes of switchyards and the consequential impact on power distribution systems are not covered by this notice. However, INPO SER 76-84 covers this latter subject as well as summarizing earlier INPO documents dealing with lightning strikes at nuclearpower plants.
Zion Power Station Units 1 and 2
On August 17, 1979, both units tripped simultaneously during a severe lightning storm. Investigation indicated that a lightning strike in close proximity to the plant caused either a momentary surge or interruption in the ac power supply circuits to the rod control power supply cabinets. This transient tripped the overload protection devices for the dc power supply cabinet, resulting in a power interruption to the control rod stationary gripper coils, 8511010020 . IN 85-86 November 5, 1985 Page 2 of 4 which caused the rods to drop into the core. The resulting high, negative flux rate initiated the reactor trip signal. Tests verified that noise induced on the ac input to one power supply would actuate the overvoltage protection trips on the main and auxiliary power supplies. In addition to the noise spikes, one Unit 2, 24-V positive power supply was damaged by the lightning strike and had to be replaced. The following corrective actions were initiated:
o The control rod system neutral was isolated from the station ground.
o The overvoltage protection trip setting was changed from 27 to 29 V. o A low-pass filter was installed on the input to each 24-V positive power supply.
o A volt trap (a voltage suppressor circuit designed to reduce large voltage surges and noise induced by lightning strikes) was installed across the 50-ohm motor generator neutral resistor.
o A volt trap was installed across the power feed to the auxiliary power supply.
o The power feed for the auxiliary power supply was changed from the 480-V system to the control rod drive (CRD) motor generators.
Zion Unit 2 experienced additional reactor trips attributed to lightning on April 3 and July 16, 1980, before the above listed corrective actions were implemented. In these cases it was determined that the transient tripped theoverload protection devices, as was the case in the trip of both units on August 17, 1979. However, no power supplies or other equipment were damaged during the latter two trips.
Again, on December 2, 1982, Zion Unit 2 reactor tripped from 100% power during an electrical storm. It was concluded that lightning induced a disturbance in the electrical system causing a reactor trip from a generatortrip. Additional lightning protection for the containment building was provided and the static wire associated with the 345-kV line was isolated from the power station structural steel.
Salem Power Station Unit 1
On June 9, 1980 the reactor tripped during an electrical storm. Lightning struck at the south penetration area of reactor containment causing a transient on seven main steam pressure transmitters. Two of these pressure transmitters were damaged and had to be replaced. The transient caused a high steam line pressure differential reactor trip signal and a safety injection signal. The licensee believes the lightning strike hit main steam vent pipes which extend above the penetration area roof and the surge was carried into the building via piping connections.
Kewaunee Power Station
On August 19, 1980, two of four instrument busses lost power during an electrical storm. This resulted in a spurious safety injection (SI) actuation signal, and the unit tripped from full power. In addition to inducing the instrumentation transients, the inverter fuses were blown. These fuses were replaced, and no other evidence of equipment failure was observed.
Byron Power Station Unit 1
On July 13, 1985, when lightning struck the Unit 1 containment, the reactor tripped from approximately 11% power because of induced voltage surges in instrument and control cables in one of four containment penetration areas. The induced voltage caused failure of four rod drive power supplies, including 1 redundant pair. The failure of the redundant supplies resulted in 10 control rods dropping into the core. A power range negative-flux-rate reactor trip resulted from the rod insertion. In addition to the reactor trip, damage occurred to 30 plant instruments. The following systems were affected by the damaged instrumentation: protection channel II, one train ofthe 48-volt power supply for the solid state protection system, the meteorological tower, control rod drive, and loose-parts monitoring.
A review of cable routings showed that a significant common denominator existed in containment penetrations. All damaged instruments were associatedwith cables passing through penetrations located in one containment region. In addition to the damaged instrumentation, the lightning damaged a significant amount of security equipment.
The licensee determined that an improved lightning protection system was required to prevent recurrence of a similar incident. By installing copper conductors, external to containment, from the roof mounted lightning rods directly to ground rods in the earth, a low impedance path to ground was provided for future lightning strikes. This modification is similar to the Zion modification described above.
Arkansas Power Station Unit 2
On August 5, 1985, the reactor tripped from 100% power on a low departure- from-nucleate-boiling ratio (DNBR) signal as the result of a lightning strike transient induced in two of the core protection system channels. The licensee's followup investigation revealed no damage to the plant's electrical equipment or instrumentation measuring systems.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.
Edward L. Jordan, Director, Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response, Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
Today, July 13, 2008, I found the following in my July 2008 copy of Nuclear News. "Millstone 2 tripped off the line on May 22 either because of a lightning strike on the main transformer or a grid disturbance on from a lightning strike on a transmission line offsite. ... Millstone 2 returned to service on May 28.">
Thursday, July 3, 2008
Wednesday, July 2, 2008
History, GETR, July 20, 1962
There will be more.
Subject:
RE: Fee Estimate NRC FOIA Case 2008-0264
Date:
7/8/2008 12:27:35 P.M. Mountain Daylight Time
From:
Leroy.Winters@nrc.gov
Reply To:
To:
Bobleyse@aol.com
CC:
BCC:
Sent on:
Sent from the Internet (Details)
Sir
Yes, you are correct, the NRC is obligated to maintain a copy of the information you requested, however, it still requires an extensive amount of search to locate the information you are requesting.
Per our letter to you on June 25, 2008, your request has been placed under category, "Non-excepted," which requires you to pay for search and duplication fees. There is no charge for the first two hours of search and the first 100 pages are free.
Your request has been placed in SUSPENSE until you notify us of your willingness to pay fees. If no response is received within 10 working days, the NRC will presume that you have no further interest in the NRC processing your request and will close your case.
Thanks in advance.
Leroy Winters, Jr.
FOIA Specialist
301-415-6574
301415-5130
From: Bobleyse@aol.com [mailto:Bobleyse@aol.com] Sent: Wednesday, July 02, 2008 11:19 AMTo: Leroy WintersCc: CHAIRMAN ResourceSubject: Re: Fee Estimate NRC FOIA Case 2008-0264
Mr. Leroy Winters, Jr.
I do not agree to pay the fee. The NRC is obligated to have this file under GETR license TR-1. If it will expedite your search, I will send a copy of the reference letter, GE to Lowenstein, September 7, 1962. Please let me know if I should send the GE to Lowenstein letter; it is a very lengthy (25 page) and detailed disclosure of events at GETR in the time frame of July 20,1962. The GE to Lowenstein letter is a rare and classic release, a vital historical document, and it must be retained by the NRC,
Robert H. Leyse
In a message dated 7/2/2008 7:58:07 A.M. Mountain Daylight Time, Leroy.Winters@nrc.gov writes:
Mr Leyse:
Attached is the fee estimate to process the above mentioned Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Please reply to this email or by fax whether or not you agree to pay the fee associated with processing your request.
If no response is received within 10 working days from the date of this email, the NRC will presume that you have no further interest in the NRC processing your request and will close the file on your request.
Thanks in advance.
LEROY WINTERS, JR.
FOIA Specialist
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
301-415-6574
301-415-5130 - fax
Of course, there is more to this, and I'll cover that at my convenience.
Subject:
Re: Fee Estimate NRC FOIA Case 2008-0264
Date:
7/2/2008 9:19:23 A.M. Mountain Daylight Time
From:
Bobleyse
Subject:
Re: Fee Estimate NRC FOIA Case 2008-0264
Date:
7/2/2008 9:19:23 A.M. Mountain Daylight Time
From:
Bobleyse
Reply To:
To:
Leroy.Winters@nrc.gov
CC:
chairman@nrc.gov
BCC:
Sent on:
Sent from the Internet (Details)
Internet Address Card Attached
Mr. Leroy Winters, Jr.
I do not agree to pay the fee. The NRC is obligated to have this file under GETR license TR-1. If it will expedite your search, I will send a copy of the reference letter, GE to Lowenstein, September 7, 1962. Please let me know if I should send the GE to Lowenstein letter; it is a very lengthy (25 page) and detailed disclosure of events at GETR in the time frame of July 20,1962. The GE to Lowenstein letter is a rare and classic release, a vital historical document, and it must be retained by the NRC,
Robert H. Leyse
Subject:
RE: Fee Estimate NRC FOIA Case 2008-0264
Date:
7/8/2008 12:27:35 P.M. Mountain Daylight Time
From:
Leroy.Winters@nrc.gov
Reply To:
To:
Bobleyse@aol.com
CC:
BCC:
Sent on:
Sent from the Internet (Details)
Sir
Yes, you are correct, the NRC is obligated to maintain a copy of the information you requested, however, it still requires an extensive amount of search to locate the information you are requesting.
Per our letter to you on June 25, 2008, your request has been placed under category, "Non-excepted," which requires you to pay for search and duplication fees. There is no charge for the first two hours of search and the first 100 pages are free.
Your request has been placed in SUSPENSE until you notify us of your willingness to pay fees. If no response is received within 10 working days, the NRC will presume that you have no further interest in the NRC processing your request and will close your case.
Thanks in advance.
Leroy Winters, Jr.
FOIA Specialist
301-415-6574
301415-5130
From: Bobleyse@aol.com [mailto:Bobleyse@aol.com] Sent: Wednesday, July 02, 2008 11:19 AMTo: Leroy WintersCc: CHAIRMAN ResourceSubject: Re: Fee Estimate NRC FOIA Case 2008-0264
Mr. Leroy Winters, Jr.
I do not agree to pay the fee. The NRC is obligated to have this file under GETR license TR-1. If it will expedite your search, I will send a copy of the reference letter, GE to Lowenstein, September 7, 1962. Please let me know if I should send the GE to Lowenstein letter; it is a very lengthy (25 page) and detailed disclosure of events at GETR in the time frame of July 20,1962. The GE to Lowenstein letter is a rare and classic release, a vital historical document, and it must be retained by the NRC,
Robert H. Leyse
In a message dated 7/2/2008 7:58:07 A.M. Mountain Daylight Time, Leroy.Winters@nrc.gov writes:
Mr Leyse:
Attached is the fee estimate to process the above mentioned Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Please reply to this email or by fax whether or not you agree to pay the fee associated with processing your request.
If no response is received within 10 working days from the date of this email, the NRC will presume that you have no further interest in the NRC processing your request and will close the file on your request.
Thanks in advance.
LEROY WINTERS, JR.
FOIA Specialist
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
301-415-6574
301-415-5130 - fax
Of course, there is more to this, and I'll cover that at my convenience.
Subject:
Re: Fee Estimate NRC FOIA Case 2008-0264
Date:
7/2/2008 9:19:23 A.M. Mountain Daylight Time
From:
Bobleyse
Subject:
Re: Fee Estimate NRC FOIA Case 2008-0264
Date:
7/2/2008 9:19:23 A.M. Mountain Daylight Time
From:
Bobleyse
Reply To:
To:
Leroy.Winters@nrc.gov
CC:
chairman@nrc.gov
BCC:
Sent on:
Sent from the Internet (Details)
Internet Address Card Attached
Mr. Leroy Winters, Jr.
I do not agree to pay the fee. The NRC is obligated to have this file under GETR license TR-1. If it will expedite your search, I will send a copy of the reference letter, GE to Lowenstein, September 7, 1962. Please let me know if I should send the GE to Lowenstein letter; it is a very lengthy (25 page) and detailed disclosure of events at GETR in the time frame of July 20,1962. The GE to Lowenstein letter is a rare and classic release, a vital historical document, and it must be retained by the NRC,
Robert H. Leyse
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