Friday, February 10, 2012

NRC ECCS Zircaloy Bundle at Sandia - ACRS & EPRI

I addressed the full ACRS on Thursday, February 9, 2012, as follows:

I’m Bob Leyse, L-E-Y-S-E, and I’ll use 2 minutes.

The two slides are from an NRC presentation at a closed meeting with EPRI, September 30, 2011. NRC released these on January 3.

I first became aware of this activity on December 23, 2011, and I asked NRC to tell me more, however I have received no response. I wondered, “How is NRC going to cover up the fact that the reaction between zirc and water, in a bundle test, takes off well below 2200?” I got my answer after January 3. As you may read on the NRC slides, the extensive corrosion tests with zircaloy bundles are in air only.

The NRC-EPRI closed meeting discloses that the testing is being done at Sandia, it has 12 foreign participants, the full length assemblies are 17 by 17 arrangements of PWR fuel geometry, and testing is being done in air only.

ACRS need not spend much time on this item in its review of the NRC Safety Research Program. There is enough disclosure in the closed meeting, reference ML113140453, pages 3, 4 and 5, so that ACRS may recommend termination of the work.

You may click on the link ML113140453, below, to view the slides on pages 3, 4, and 5, to view the featherbedding at SANDIA:

ML113140453 - RES Staff Presentation Handouts Materials NRC-RES/EPRI Coordination Meeting Friday, September 30, 2011. (23 page(s), 12/22/2011)

I also considered the following brief, but longer presentation that has more facts:

I’m Bob Leyse, L-E-Y-S-E, and I have 5 minutes.

The two slides are from an NRC presentation at a closed meeting with EPRI, September 30, 2011. NRC released these on January 3.

I first became aware of this activity on December 23, 2011, and I asked NRC to tell me more, however I have received no response. So, I’m encouraging ACRS to inform the public and Congress about this research.

I first wondered, “How is NRC going to cover up the fact that the reaction between zirc and water, in a bundle test, takes off well below 2200?” I got my answer after January 3. As you may read on the NRC slides, the extensive tests with zircaloy bundles are in air only.

On October 18, 2010, I told the Thermal Hydraulics Subcommittee, “It is not sound science to combine the testing of single short rods of zirconium alloy with the testing of multi-rod stainless or Inconel assemblies in order to ascertain the performance of ECCS having thousands of zirconium alloy full-length rods.”

On Mayday, 2002, I sent NRC my PRM-50-76, calling for further tests with zirconium clad bundles in water-steam. NRC denied that PRM, asserting that sufficient bundle tests had been performed at NRU, Canada, via a contract with Pacific Northwest Laboratories. On January 25, 2012, NRC reported that these Canadian tests were not well suited for reflood assessment of TRACE. NRC now applies more recent tests from the Pennsylvania State University Rod Bundle Heat Transfer (RBHT) facility, with modern grid spacers and more measurements.

However, since it has no zircaloy, RBHT is sterile and unresponsive.

Return to the slides.
On January 19, 2012, I wrote to Idaho Senator James E. Risch:
Please have the NRC tell us about the corrosion testing of full-length heated bundles of zirconium alloy assemblies. The release on January 3, 2012, disclosed that the testing is being done at Sandia, it has 12 foreign participants, the full length assemblies are 17 by 17 arrangements of PWR fuel geometry, and testing is being done in air only. Why is NRC reluctant to perform the Sandia tests in water-steam as called for in PRM-50-76?

ACRS should tell NRC to stop the work at SANDIA and to redirect the work.

1 comment:

Aladar said...

It is important to note that the very hot hydrogen liberated by the Zr-H2O reaction with its very high specific volume plays an important role in pressurizing BWR containments. The containment pressure data from the Fukushima plants is confirmed by our calculations to show this. This is why we know that the MAAP assumption about Zr-H2O reaction occurring inside a corium mass and contributing to the melt progression with only one-third of the hydrogen liberated from the corium is >>> not <<< the correct scenario. The Zr-H2O reaction occurs before the corium is produced and thus essentially all the hydrogen goes up and out of the reactor core and most of it goes out the reactor vessel thru the SRVs into the suppression pool and works its way backwards into the drywell via the vacuum breakers. That is the realistic BWR scenario that is supported by the data from the Fukushima accident.