The Safeguards Racket and Licensing of the General Electric Test Reactor

About 55 years ago, a young expert wrote the following

  
The above was followed 10 days later, July 3, 1958, by another young expert.  Maybe there was a kind of contest.  Or maybe neither knew  the other (Wolfe did not send a copy to Andersen, and Andersen did not send a copy to Wolfe).

As readers will find out in entry below (A Wild Game at the General Electric Test Reactor, January 25, 1963) an intense blast was in the cards. With more luck than sense, the card did not fall.

The game is played somewhat like this.  The racketeers say that the severe accident is not credible.  This is stated several times. Then the severe accident is described with rather absurd assertions and the public is thus to be convinced that such a terrible occurrence could not possibly unfold. 

Following is copied (excerpted) from the GETR analysis in support of its application for relicensing for operation at 50 MW, an increase from 30 MW.  This was placed in ADAMS in response  to Leyse FOIA 2008-0249.

Readers may view the complete document at

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0817/ML081710059.pdf

Reactor Safety Evaluation For GETR

Volume II APED-5000-A

Pages 194-224

Dated July 1965

7. 3.5 Maximum Credible Accident

With the reactor operating at full power, the loss of coolant would result in a rapid rise in fuel element temperature. The fuel first becomes steam blanketed in the central regions of the core which causes the fuel to rise rapidly above the melting point.

 The entire fuel-bearing portion of the core is assumed to be molten before the ensuing steam explosion disperses the core.

 A chemical reaction is assumed to occur between the hottest molten particles, representing 10% of the aluminum in the fuel bearing portion of the core, and the water vapor present.

The post-accident analysis of SL- I and the SPERT-1 data show, respectively, that only 2. 8 and 0. 4% of the aluminum will react with water. However, for conservatism, a 10% aluminum-water reaction is assumed.

The reactor pressure vessel is assumed to be ruptured by either the steam or hydrogen from the highly exothermic aluminum-water reaction. The hydrogen formed by the reaction of metal with water and the core fission products are thus released to the containment building atmosphere. The steel missile shield prevents the expulsion of any credible reactor parts from pool-pressure vessel area. The hydrogen which issued from beneath the missile shield is assumed to ignite and burn when it mixes with the air in the containment vessel.

The above excerpt follows the typical licensing game of "showing" that even with what are presented as conservative analyses, there is no chance that a dangerous accident could take place.  This is a generic game of deception,
however, even in this sham of "conservatism" the analysts had to assume only 10% aluminum-water reaction and that the steel missile shield was in place.

At this point, readers should move to my earlier entry of August 13, 1013, (A Wild Game at the General Electric Test Reactor, January 25, 1963)