I knew how to operate; of course, I knew my stuff!
The caption below refers to a photograph from today's (May 5, 2010) NRC web page.
NRC Commissioner William Ostendorff (center) recently toured the agency’s Technical Training Center, established in 1980, in Chattanooga, Tenn. where nuclear plant simulators, like the one shown here, provide hands-on training for NRC engineers.
Of course, I wonder about the quality of that hands-on training for NRC engineers. Baker-Just and Cathcart-Pawel are alive and likely the 2200 Fahrenheit game is in the NRC's simulator.
The NRC engineers' time would be better spent in a study of PRM-50-93 and its associated public comments.
The above caption says the Technical Training Center was established during 1980. Following is my experience with that Center during 1984. Click to enlarge; your return arrow gets you back.
NRC Commissioner William Ostendorff (center) recently toured the agency’s Technical Training Center, established in 1980, in Chattanooga, Tenn. where nuclear plant simulators, like the one shown here, provide hands-on training for NRC engineers.
Of course, I wonder about the quality of that hands-on training for NRC engineers. Baker-Just and Cathcart-Pawel are alive and likely the 2200 Fahrenheit game is in the NRC's simulator.
The NRC engineers' time would be better spent in a study of PRM-50-93 and its associated public comments.
The above caption says the Technical Training Center was established during 1980. Following is my experience with that Center during 1984. Click to enlarge; your return arrow gets you back.
Here is more!
THURSDAY, AUGUST 16, 2012
UHI Ultra High Risk EPRI NSAC NRC Ohi
This is the third consecutive entry in my UHI series. Here are three uploaded pages that document part of the turmoil that followed my October 3, 1984, memorandum, UHI-Ultra High Risk. Click on the page to enlarge for easier reading and access to the right side that is partially obscured.
As I said in earlier, my October 3, 1984 memo let to a lot of turmoil. The heat was on. I was fighting for survival, so I worked on the day after Thanksgiving and it was an advantage to have no others around.
The above memorandum was addressed to Lang who had been assigned to monitor (to control) the UHI investigations. So, I worked within the system, and addressed all correspondence to Lang, but I worked independently. I stayed under control because I intended to continue working for EPRI, however, my above contact with the NRC Training Center was effective and there was no way that NSAC could reprimand me for pursuing that credible source even though it alarmed Rossin and very likely others.
Rossin was apparently concerned that Taylor would think Leyse was out of control, hence his note of 11/30 (1984) in which he stopped distribution to J. J. Taylor, the head of the EPRI Nuclear Power Division.
I'll have further documentation of the very revealing UHI turmoil that raged within NSAC and EPRI. Several outside organizations became involved including at least three within the NRC. The SANDIA National Laboratory was drawn into the turmoil as a consultant to the NRC. The ACRS wrote a letter to the Commissioners of the NRC and I'll also post that later. EPRI even hired an outplacement service, Ward Associates on the famous Sand Hill Road, and later you read how that action intensified the turmoil, although I believe it worked to my advantage.
And More. It is a great 30th Anniversary!
TUESDAY, AUGUST 21, 2012
UHI Ultra High Risk, October 3, 1984: Inside Stuff, EPRI & NRC
This is my sixth consecutive entry that documents the turmoil that followed my memorandum, UHI Ultra High Risk, October 3, 1984.
This entry jumps ahead of a lot of documentation that I have and that I guess I'll have to place in book if I ever get around to writing that. On November 7, 1984, Rossin and Breen told me my position was being eliminated, but that I'd have a few months to look for work elsewhere. So, I looked elsewhere with no immediate success. I talked to Jim Keppler of the NRC and showed him my memorandum, UHI Ultra High Risk, October 3, 1984, as part of several illustrations of my experience and capabilities. Keppler asked if he could send this elsewhere in NRC and I agreed, however, I blanked out the source of the document as well as my name.
So, the following two pages are an interesting document that reveals very secret relationships between EPRI and the NRC that I was never aware of. It also reveals turmoil. I do not recall how I gained access to the following document; it most certainly was not sent to me. I am inclined to doubt that Rossin was aware of it, but I do not know that. I suspect that Layman and Lang were not aware that my position had been eliminated. On the other hand,
Rossin may have encouraged this documentation in order to justify getting rid of Leyse. Click to enlarge and back arrow to return.
This entry jumps ahead of a lot of documentation that I have and that I guess I'll have to place in book if I ever get around to writing that. On November 7, 1984, Rossin and Breen told me my position was being eliminated, but that I'd have a few months to look for work elsewhere. So, I looked elsewhere with no immediate success. I talked to Jim Keppler of the NRC and showed him my memorandum, UHI Ultra High Risk, October 3, 1984, as part of several illustrations of my experience and capabilities. Keppler asked if he could send this elsewhere in NRC and I agreed, however, I blanked out the source of the document as well as my name.
So, the following two pages are an interesting document that reveals very secret relationships between EPRI and the NRC that I was never aware of. It also reveals turmoil. I do not recall how I gained access to the following document; it most certainly was not sent to me. I am inclined to doubt that Rossin was aware of it, but I do not know that. I suspect that Layman and Lang were not aware that my position had been eliminated. On the other hand,
Rossin may have encouraged this documentation in order to justify getting rid of Leyse. Click to enlarge and back arrow to return.
I'm certainly pleased that EPRI (Layman and Lang) documented the above. This is a clear report of a basically secret set of arrangements between EPRI and the NRC and I suspect that those have continued in various forms over the years and are really intense in today's post-Fukushima world.
The second page is "interesting" as it describes the "running around" in generating a response to Keppler. The very last paragraph is also revealing as EPRI apologizes to the NRC for my contact with Keppler. Well, it is a fact that I was never a party to contacts with the NRC regarding our analyses of operating experience at nuclear power plants. It is also a fact that others who analyzed operating experience were not very adept at that work.
More later.
More later.
1 comment:
Responding to Your August 15, 2014 letter http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1418/ML14183B539.pdf
First of all I’m repeating here the proposed regulation changes to the 10 CFR 50 even Your rejection letter did not commented on this text:
Ҥ 52.47 Contents of applications; technical information.
(4) An analysis and evaluation of the design and performance of structures, systems, and components with the objective of assessing the risk to public health and safety resulting from operation of the facility and including determination of the margins of safety during normal operations and transient conditions anticipated during the life of the facility, and the adequacy of structures, systems, and components provided for the prevention of accidents and the mitigation of the consequences of accidents. Analysis and evaluation of emergency core cooling system (ECCS) cooling performance and the need for high-point vents following postulated loss-of-coolant accidents shall be performed in accordance with the requirements of §§ 50.46 and 50.46a of this chapter;”
add “Analysis and evaluation of dedicated severe accident prevention system shall be performed in accordance with the requirements of § 50.46b of this chapter”
and add new Ҥ50.46b Acceptance criteria for dedicated severe accident prevention system with the following elements: 1 the means to vent the possible stagnant steam from the volume under the reactor head and depressurize the reactor, 2 the means to inject coolant under the core to be able to pass through the core in upward motion, 3 sufficient coolant reserves to be injected under the force of gravity into the core of the reactor (from below) to achieve cold shutdown.
For PWR a siphon-free connection of the Reactor head top to the Pressurizer steam volume from where the venting of steam, depressurization is performed, a check valve in the connecting the Pressurizer to the hot leg line is proposed. All the ECCS injection lines are to be connected to the cold leg side or injecting coolant under the core, allowing free upward flow through the core.
For the BWR a direct venting of the downstream steam after the ECCS turbine driven pump to the environment in order to utilize the available coolant reserves, prevent the heat-up by this steam of the water reserves in the torus.
In both cases the gravity injection reserves could be the water reserves in the refueling – spent fuel storage ponds by keeping an elevated water level for this function. The pipe connections and the means for opening the gravity injections have to be added.
In both cases the three events when the core damage prevention depressurization starts are: 1. no information about the state of the reactor, 2. failure of forced coolant circulation through the reactor core and 3. the connection through heat transfer mediums from the core to the ultimate heat sink is severed.”
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