Simpson and upper head injection system (UHI)

Facts for EPRI and NRC

Simpson and upper head injection system (UHI)

From page 199 of Simpson’s book, NUCLEAR POWER FROM UNDERSEAS TO OUTER SPACE 

“Where this couldn’t be done or wasn’t enough, we proposed an upper head injection system.”  Simpson bragged about “... many competent engineers who were becoming available, including Retallick from our NERVA program.”  Actually, Retallick was not that competent, but upper head injection was subsequently well defended by John Taylor who had moved from Westinghouse to a senior position at the Electric Power Research Institute.



UHI and dissolved nitrogen - the Chexal Technical Review Panel and several related documents. 



This communication provides additional documents that are relevant to the Chexal Technical Review Panel that is the focal point of my prior letter dated August 9, 2016.  For convenience it includes three of the documents that are in the August 9, 2016 communication.

Chexal’s email that set up the Technical Review Panel is repeated below.  I was never allowed to participate in that review and I have never seen the panel’s report.  I have asked EPRI to send me that report and it appears unlikely the EPRI will ever provide that.

My communication of August 9, 2016, includes a reference that predates the Chexal directive by almost 2 years, NUCLEONICS WEEK, January 10, 1991.  The two documents below predate the Chexal email by 20 years. Leyse to Gallagher, October 1972, asks if, “… the effects  

of nitrogen saturation and outgassing have been considered in any aspect of design or operation …”

“

Gallagher to Leyse, November 1972, responds, “… the effects of nitrogen saturation have not been considered.”



Three months following Gallagher’s memo, quantitative data was provided by Poulson and Cleary as follows:







So, it is with the above background, that I remain infuriated by the NRC report. AEOD/E504, Failures in the Upper Head Injection System, February 28, 1984.  I then wrote the following on October 3, 1984, that is featured in my letter to you that is dated August 9, 2016:







I provided a copy of the above to the NRC (Keppler) under the condition that it would not expose me as the author. I blacked out portions of the document that identified its source.  Nevertheless, NRC contacted my employer.  That is documented as follows:





However, it was the responses to Leyse, October 3, 1984, that led to the McGuire discovery of no measurement of water level and likely nitrogen-filled accumulators.  Lang refers to an NSAC review that “… concluded that malfunction of the upper head injection system would not place the plant in jeopardy ….”

Lang then reported, “Lanning said that AEOD’s evaluation is similar but that detailed thermal hydraulic analysis will be performed for confirmation.” 

NSAC never admitted that the water-filled accumulator at McGuire was likely filled with nitrogen instead of water and it is likely that AEOD also did not uncover that situation.  Thus the two “separate and independent” organizations were in agreement.