Tuesday, May 27, 2014

RIL-0801

Here are some recent links:

Bob,
I am following up on your inquiry, which was recently received by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Public Document Room (NRC/PDR).  Below listed is the link for RIL-0801.


Here is an ML number

I’ve attached a copy of RIL-0801 to this e-mail.  The accession number is ML081350225.

And here is another link

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0813/ML081350225.pdf

Monday, May 26, 2014

A set of ML numbers 10 CFR 50.46c


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And here is another reference, this one from the great EPRI:

http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/conference-symposia/ric/past/2009/slides/presentations/thu-1030-1200-revising-title-10/presentation-format/yueh-slides.ppt#313,13,

Sunday, May 25, 2014

Pool side reprocessing under 50.59

Ultrasonic Fuel Cleaning at Vallecitos, Fall 2003???

I wonder if this ever happened. It would be fun to see the safety analysis for ultrasonic fuel cleaning of 16 discharged BWR fuel assemblies in a pool at Vallecitos.  Maybe they pulled it off under 50.59.

Following is from this blog on August 25, 2007:

First BWR planning to ultrasonically clean fuel:

Quad Cities Unit 2
Planned Date: Spring 2004
Purpose: Dose rate reduction
* Mock-up testing taking place at Vallecitos, 16 discharged assemblies will be cleaned on a pre-trial basis in Fall 2003. Anticipate cleaning first reload assemblies in Spring 2004.

Ultrasonic Fuel Cleaning - Westinghouse

 Following is from a Westinghouse document that I found on GOOGLE.  Maybe I'll edit it sometime, maybe not.  Go to the following link to study the original with figures and art work.  This is dated November 2012 and
"... departs from the original ultrasonic fuel cleaner design to provide improvements ..."

http://www.westinghousenuclear.com/Products_&_Services/docs/flysheets/NS-FS-0085.pdf

Nuclear Services/Field Services  November 2012   NS-FS-0085
Background
Ultrasonic fuel cleaning technology was originally developed for pressurized water reactors (PWRs) to help eliminate what is currently referred to as crud-induced power shift (CIPS). CIPS occurs when boron-containing crud deposits form on the upper portions of fuel assemblies, resulting in unwanted local flux depressions. Ultrasonic fuel cleaning combined with a CIPS-specific core design allows PWR reactors to operate with higher duty cycles.
The High Efficiency Ultrasonic Fuel Cleaning (HEUFC) system, developed by Dominion Engineering, Inc., departs from the original ultrasonic fuel cleaner design to provide improvements in both cleaning effectiveness and efficiency.
Description
The new HEUFC system consists of a single-chamber cleaning fixture, support frame, filtration system, pump, electrical distribution skid, transducer cabinet and laptop computer. The system can be installed in the spent fuel pool, transfer canal or cask pad, and is controlled from a clean poolside area.
At the start of a fuel cleaning evolution, a fuel assembly is moved above the cleaner with the spent fuel handling tool and then lowered. As the fuel enters the cleaning fixture, the transducers are turned on. The ultrasonic energy generated by the transducers induces cavitation on the fuel rod surfaces, removing crud deposits. A laptop computer is used to control and monitor the cleaning process.
High Efficiency Ultrasonic Fuel Cleaning
©2012 Westinghouse Electric Company LLC. All rights reservedWater enters the top and bottom of the cleaner and exits at the center of the cleaning zone through a suction hose. A pump draws the corrosion products through the suction hose and sends them to the filtration system. The fuel assembly is lowered until the top nozzle nears the top lead-in, and then is raised back up through the cleaning zone to remove additional deposits. The insertion/removal can be repeated if necessary.
High Efficiency Ultrasonic Fuel Cleaner
A high efficiency ultrasonic fuel cleaner is made up of two “L” shaped transducer banks joined together to make a square assembly that is approximately five feet tall. The cleaner, which is open at the top and bottom, rests in a support frame. Topside wall clamps provide anchor points for the suspension cables from which the cleaner and support frame hang.
In addition to the cleaning fixture, the support frame can hold a four-face visual system, lights and a bottom nozzle inspection camera for simultaneous cleaning and inspection of fuel assemblies. The control station for the four-face system contains two monitors, one for the bottom nozzle camera and one for the four-face inspection cameras, as well as equipment for recording and post-processing the video data.
Installed fuel cleaner
Westinghouse Electric Company
1000 Westinghouse Drive
Cranberry Township, PA 16066
www.westinghousenuclear.com
November 2012 NS-FS-0085
Box Dimensions (without four-face option)
• Cleaning fixture box (1972 kg): 231 x 147 x 232 cm (L x W x H)
• Electronics box (2570 kg): 303 x 216 x 182 cm (L x W x H)
Filtration and Pumping
Option 1: Combination Pump/Filtration Skid
The skid consists of two redundant filter banks, each with one pump and four filters. Modular pumps can be removed for maintenance and decontamination. The skid includes flow control valves and process instrumentation that measures flow rate, temperature and gamma dose rates.
Option 2: Fuel Assembly Size Metal Filter with Separate Pump Skid
The all metal filter module (AMFM) is built to be handled with the spent fuel tool like a fuel assembly. It is replaced when the maximum allowable differential pressure across the filter is reached, which is projected to be between seven and 10 uses. The AMFM rests in the racks during use and for storage, and the separate single pump skid can be suspended from the spent fuel pool wall.
Box Dimensions (combination pump/filtration skid)
• Filter/pump skid box (2880 kg): 253 x 100 x 234 cm (L x W x H)
Benefits
• Enables higher duty operating by removing boron-containing crud deposits, minimizing CIPS
• Contributes to dose reduction
• Performed without unlatching the fuel assembly from the spent fuel handling tool, decreasing fuel moves required for cleaning
• Approximate two-and-a-half- minute cleaning time per assembly
• Cleaning is performed on a 24-hour continuous-coverage basis and can occur during or after core offload
• Setup, cleaning and operations conducted on separate trips to not interrupt customer’s outage schedule
• HEUFC has been analyzed and found to be completely safe for the fuel. Actual use supports this, with no adverse effects on the fuel during subsequent cycles
• The HEUFC system is not a permanent plant fixture and does not constitute a plant modification
• Wetted system components have been electropolished to reduce contamination buildup, minimize crud traps and facilitate decontamination
Experience
HEUFC has been used successfully at multiple plants.
Option 1: Combination pump/filtration skid
Option 2: AMFM (left) and single pump skid (right)

Friday, May 23, 2014

The 10 CFR 50.46C Racket, Edit later

As copied below NRC had a meeting to discuss draft documents related to the performance of nuclear reactor cores under accident conditions.  ML14128A076  Inverso

May 13, 2014


SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF THE APRIL 29-30, 2014, PUBLIC MEETING ON
THE 10 CFR 50.46C PROPOSED RULE AND DRAFT
REGULATORY GUIDANCE (TAC NO. ME2908)

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) held a two-day Category 3 public meeting on
April 29-30, 2014, to discuss the Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section
50.46c proposed rule and associated draft regulatory guidance.
Following is from the last paragraph of the report of the two day meeting:


The attendees noted that the following topics should be the subject of future public meetings:
 

• Risk-informed alternative: Alternative detailed discussion including proposed
approaches by non-pilot entities that may differ from the pilot approach (e.g., addressing long-term core cooling only for in-vessel effects) (1 full day in June)
 

• Open items needing resolution before implementation: Implementation/compliance
requirements, long-term cooling interaction (and the need to develop an additional draft
regulatory guide on this topic), hydrogen pick up models (1 full day in June)
 

• Breakaway oxidation (including reporting requirements for breakaway
oxidation)/DG1261,1262,1263 (1.5 full days in June)
 

• Corrective action/reporting (1 full day in June

Without going into details, my forecast is that the above future meetings will not take place.  Now, if the meetings indeed do take place, I'll admit the error of my forecast and at that time I'll disclose the basis of the erroneous forecast. 
Following is the NRC's version of the two day meeting.

May 13, 2014
MEMORANDUM TO: Sher Bahadur, Deputy Director
Division of Policy and Rulemaking
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
FROM: Tara Inverso, Project Manager /RA/
Rulemaking Branch
Division of Policy and Rulemaking
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF THE APRIL 29-30, 2014, PUBLIC MEETING ON
THE 10 CFR 50.46C PROPOSED RULE AND DRAFT
REGULATORY GUIDANCE (TAC NO. ME2908)
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) held a two-day Category 3 public meeting on
April 29-30, 2014, to discuss the Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section
50.46c proposed rule and associated draft regulatory guidance. The meeting was held at the
NRC headquarters location in Rockville, Maryland. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss
several items related to the proposed rule and draft regulatory guidance to enhance
understanding and to aid in the development of public comments. The NRC did not accept
formal written comments during the meeting. On Day 1, the meeting was attended by 69
individuals primarily representing fuel vendors, utilities, private citizens, and NRC staff, 17 of
who participated through audio teleconferencing and webinar. On Day 2, 49 individuals
attended the meeting, including 15 through audio teleconferencing and webinar.
The meeting slides and handouts are available in the Agencywide Document Access and
Management System (ADAMS) under Accession Nos. ML14114A498 (NRC Slides),
ML14114A499 (NRC Slides), ML14120A017 (Industry Slides), ML14120A009 (Industry Slides),
ML14120A011 (Industry Slides), ML14120A012 (Industry Slides), ML14120A010 (Industry
Slides), ML14120A015 (Industry Slides), ML14120A018 (Industry Slides).
CONTACT: Tara Inverso, NRR/DPR
301-415-1024
S. Bahadur - 2 -
In addition to the material presented in the slides, the major areas of discussion are summarized
as follows:
Proposed Rule Background:
• A member of the public requested that the NRC differentiate between deterministic
versus probabilistic treatment within the rule. The NRC staff explained that the effects of
debris during the long-term is the only portion of the rule that can be addressed using a
probabilistic risk assessment method.
• A representative of the Nuclear Energy Institute requested that the NRC address public
comments using a resolution matrix.
• A member of the public asked whether the March 13-14, 2014, public meeting on fuel
fragmentation, relocation, dispersal was transcribed. The NRC staff explained that public
meetings are typically not transcribed, but that the meeting summary is available
(ADAMS Accession No. ML14100A131). The same member of the public mentioned
that there were many acronyms used during that meeting and she would like
clarification. The NRC staff committed to calling the individual to provide some clarity.
NRC Presentation on the Risk-Informed Alternative:
• The NRC staff noted that the draft guidance for the risk-informed alternative will be
published for comment once it is developed. The current schedule for publication is
March 2015.
• The NRC clarified that entities would be required to “characterize” defense-in-depth and
safety margins, not “quantify” them.
• A member of the public asked if there were other plants, in addition to South Texas
Project (STP), that were piloting the risk-informed alternative. Clarification of the NRC’s
previous response: Point Beach is risk-informing long-term core cooling for in-vessel
effects.
• A member of the public requested information on the calculations and models used to
predict risk.
• An industry representative questioned what “entity” meant in the risk-informed reporting
criteria rule language. The NRC replied that “entity” means combined license holder,
combined license applicant, etc. and that it was a catch-all term.
• An industry representative questioned why proposed 10 CFR 50.46c(c), “Relationship to
other NRC regulations,” only points to General Design Criterion (GDC)-35 and not
GDC-38 and GDC-41, even though there are rule language changes in those criteria.
The NRC omitted to answering this question (including the relationship between 10 CFR
50.46a, Appendix K and the GDCs) at a future public meeting.
• One member of the public questioned whether the Summer and Vogtle applicants are
using the risk-informed method. The NRC staff indicated that they are not. The same
member of the public asked whether the insulation materials used by Summer and
Vogtle can create debris. The NRC staff stated that the insulation may become debris
but that it is not problematic for sump operation.
• The NRC staff clarified that while the rule would require consideration of all operational
modes, licensees using the risk-informed approach would not necessarily need a
shutdown and low power PRA model. Consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.174, risk from
modes that are not modeled in the probabilistic risk assessment may be treated
qualitatively or with bounding techniques.
S. Bahadur - 3 -
Industry Presentations on the Risk-Informed Alternative:
• A member of the NRC staff asked whether the non-pilot plants plan to follow the same
method as STP. An industry representative explained that there may be some
differences in the scope of approach used by the non-pilots.
• An industry representative stated that absent 10 CFR 50.46c, up to 40 exemptions may
be required by the 14 units that have expressed intent to resolve GSI-191 in a
risk-informed manner.
NRC Overview of the Proposed Rule (Non-Risk-Informed Alternative Portion):
• An industry representative noted that industry’s preference is to NOT include plant
names in proposed 10 CFR 50.46c(o), “Implementation.” He noted that, as the
proposed rule language is currently written, additional rulemaking or exemptions would
be needed to update any changes in track assignments. Industry recommended further
discussions on this topic.
• A member of the public noted that there were many additional causes of embrittlement,
including contaminants, nitriding, and water hammer. An NRC representative responded
that he was confident that the NRC has considered the known causes of embrittlement
for zirconium clad fuel designs.
• Several industry representatives noted that additional public meetings were necessary to
discuss the long-term peak cladding temperature limit. Some also commented that
industry was not in favor of including a prescriptive analytical limit in the rule language.
• A member of the public noted that, now that the NRC is in a different stage of the
“nuclear renaissance,” the NRC should reconsider whether the implementation plan for
new reactors needs to be as complex as currently written in the proposed rule.
• On the topic of restructuring the Code of Federal Regulations, a member of the public
noted that there is already difficulty following the regulations. A restructure would add to
that difficulty. He further noted that Cathcart-Pawel vs. Baker-Just is a bigger concern
and referenced the work of Mr. Mark Leyse and Mr. Robert Leyse in this subject.
• On the Cumulative Effects of Regulation (CER), an industry representative noted that a
public meeting on CER and the Risk Prioritization Initiative was held on April 24, 2014.
A summary of that meeting is available in ADAMS under Accession No. ML14129A208.
• An industry representative noted that breakaway oxidation is the most onerous part of
complying with the proposed requirements, yet it is the limit that is least likely to be
exceeded. Industry proposed removing reload batch testing and reporting requirement
from the rule.
• Based on discussions concerning the applicability of the Baker-Just correlation, the
industry and public are still confused about the use of integral time-at-temperature
versus maximum local oxidation along with the use of the Cathcart-Pawel weight gain
correlation as a surrogate for cladding embrittlement (due to oxygen diffusion).
• A member of the public stated his concern that the NRC was ignoring petitions for
rulemaking (PRMs) related to the ECCS acceptance criteria. The NRC staff explained
that these PRMs (i.e., PRM-50-93/95) are being evaluated separately and stated that, to
date, four interim reports have been published by the NRC.
• A member of the public suggested that Mr. Mark Leyse should be invited to a follow-on
meeting, since Mr. Leyse is involved in many issues related to the ECCS acceptance
criteria.
• One member of the public questioned the meaning of the term “external stakeholders”
and asked whether she and her group are considered stakeholders and will have an
S. Bahadur - 4 -
opportunity to participate in decision-making. The NRC staff stated that the term
includes industry and the public.
• An industry representative recommended that 10 CFR 50.59 be allowed for use in
evaluating changes under the risk-informed alternative approach.
• An industry representative noted that some shutdown modes are based on
defense-in-depth and that numeric values could not be generated for lower modes. He
questioned whether the rule should clarify when the initiating events can occur.
Industry Presentation on the Proposed Rule (Non-Risk-Informed Alternative Portion):
• An industry representative noted that it would be beneficial to articulate the details of a
hypothetical implementation of the rule to identify any potential gaps.
• A member of the public noted that, while the industry is now requesting that the NRC
consider a graded approach (relative to the margin to the peak cladding temperature
limit) for reporting errors, the industry was not supportive of that approach during the
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking stage. The industry noted that the industry
was supportive of the approach, but not the complex grading that the NRC suggested.
• An industry representative noted that guidance was needed to provide an acceptable
method for testing long-term peak cladding temperature.
• Based on discussions, an industry standard approach for defining long-term cladding
performance (and analytical limits) does not exist. This item could become a critical path
issue for the rulemaking.
NRC Presentation on Draft Regulatory Guides (DGs) 1261, 1262, and 1263:
• An industry representative noted that all heating processes should be acceptable in the
test procedures.
• An industry representative noted the desire to reduce the number of required tests.
• A member of the NRC staff suggested that the staff may consider removing the need for
periodic testing for breakway oxidation from the rule and including it in the DG.
• Several members of the industry requested that the NRC consider whether it is
acceptable for the industry to verify acceptable cladding performance with respect to
breakaway oxidation within the quality assurance program.
• A member of the public asked whether the NRC is investigating high-burnup fuel with
respect to breakaway oxidation. The NRC clarified that the test procedures are based
on as-received materials. Thus, if as-received materials experience breakaway
oxidation, it is expected that high-burnup fuel would also experience the same
phenomenon at the conditions identified in as-received materials.
• An industry representative asked for clarification on:
o Water quality requirements in the test procedure
o Limitation on maximum steam flow
o The use of weight gain correlations
• An industry representative requested additional information on the qualification of
hydrogen pick-up models. The NRC committed to further discussion on this topic.
• The NRC noted that many aspects of the draft regulatory guides will be discussed
further in future public meetings.
S. Bahadur - 5 -
Industry Presentation on Draft Regulatory Guides (DGs) 1261, 1262, and 1263:
• An industry representative noted that the ductile-to-brittle transition is overly
conservative and could be relaxed. However, he noted that the industry still supports
the preservation of ductility as the basis for the rulemaking.
Topics for Future Public Meetings:
The attendees noted that the following topics should be the subject of future public meetings:
• Risk-informed alternative: Alternative detailed discussion including proposed
approaches by non-pilot entities that may differ from the pilot approach (e.g., addressing
long-term core cooling only for in-vessel effects) (1 full day in June)
• Open items needing resolution before implementation: Implementation/compliance
requirements, long-term cooling interaction (and the need to develop an additional draft
regulatory guide on this topic), hydrogen pick up models (1 full day in June)
• Breakaway oxidation (including reporting requirements for breakaway
oxidation)/DG1261,1262,1263 (1.5 full days in June)
• Corrective action/reporting (1 full day in June)
Enclosure:
List of Attendees
S. Bahadur - 5 -
Industry Presentation on Draft Regulatory Guides (DGs) 1261, 1262, and 1263:
• An industry representative noted that the ductile-to-brittle transition is overly
conservative and could be relaxed. However, he noted that the industry still supports
the preservation of ductility as the basis for the rulemaking.

Topics for Future Public Meetings:
 

The attendees noted that the following topics should be the subject of future public meetings:
 

• Risk-informed alternative: Alternative detailed discussion including proposed
approaches by non-pilot entities that may differ from the pilot approach (e.g., addressing long-term core cooling only for in-vessel effects) (1 full day in June)
 

• Open items needing resolution before implementation: Implementation/compliance
requirements, long-term cooling interaction (and the need to develop an additional draft
regulatory guide on this topic), hydrogen pick up models (1 full day in June)
 

• Breakaway oxidation (including reporting requirements for breakaway
oxidation)/DG1261,1262,1263 (1.5 full days in June)
 

• Corrective action/reporting (1 full day in June)

Enclosure:

List of Attendees
DISTRIBUTION:
PUBLIC RidsOgcMailCenter RidsNrrDpr MMahoney, NRR PClifford, NRR
TInverso, NRR GLappert, NRR RidsNroOd RidsResOd TBoyce, RES
ADAMS Accession Nos.:
Pkg.: ML14114A501
Notice ML14083A615
Summary ML14128A076
NRC Presentations ML14114A498, ML14114A499
Industry Presentations ML14120A017, ML14120A009, ML14120A011, ML14120A012, ML14120A010,
, ML14120A018
NRC-001
OFFICE DPR/PRMB/PM DPR/PRMB/RS DPR/DD DPR/PRMB/PM
NAME TInverso GLappert SBahadur TInverso
DATE 5/8/2014 5/13/2014 5/13/2014 5/13/2014
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
ENCLOSURE
LIST OF MEETING ATTENDEES (Day 1 - April 29, 2014)
Name Organization
Dave Medek APS
Steven Smiley STP
Tara Inverso NRC
Alysia Bone NRC
David Mitchell WEC
Chris Brown NRC
Phil Sharpe GEH
Kurshad Muftuoglu GEH
Gregg Swindlehurst GSN
Chris Hoffman PPL
Paul Leonard Industry
Yang-Pi Lin GNF/GEH
Charles Albury STP
Gregory J. Hill AEP
Erik Mader EPRI
Tom Eichenberg TVA
Mo Dingler WCNOC
Bert Dunn AREVA
Lisa Gerken AREVA
Ron Holloway WCNOC
Charles Ader NRC
Kurt Flaig PWROG
Kevin McCoy AREVA
Beth Wetzel TVA
Steve Blossom STP
Wayne Harrison STP
Pablo Garcia Iberdrola
Roger L. Thomas, Jr Duke Energy
Andy Olson Exelon
Al Strasser Aquarius
Don Williamson SCEG
Ken Yueh EPRI
Alan Meginnis AREVA
Robert Florian SNC
Jana Bergman Curtiss-Wright Scientech
Ralph Landry Private Citizen
Gordon Clefton NEI
Mitch Nissley Westinghouse
David Boirel NRC
Yun Ho Kim KHNP
Kanghoon Kim KEPCO
HoYoung Park KEPCO
JuHyun Park KEPCO
Jaehoon Jeong KEPCO
- 2 -
Name Organization
Mark Richter NEI
Nasser Nik Entergy
Steve Smith NRC
Stewart Bailey NRC
Harold Scott NRC
Paul Klein NRC
Robert Beall NRC
Michelle Flanagan NRC
Jodi Rappe Nuscale Power
Mark Handrick Duke Energy
Marvin Lewis Private Citizen
Ruth Thomas Private Citizen
Roger Andreasen Ameren
Tom Remick APS
Gilbert Zigler Enercon
Jim Smith Westinghouse
Kathleen Parish APS
Ken Frederick FENOC
Bob Leyse Private Citizen
Heinz-Gunther
Sonnenberg
GRS
Dana Knee Dominion
Ryan Sprengel Mitsubishi
Patricia Quaglia Westinghouse (Sweden)
Gretel Johnston BEST/MATRR
John Alvis Anatech
- 3 -
LIST OF MEETING ATTENDEES (Day 2 - April 30, 2014)
Name Organization
Kurt Flaig PWROG
David Mitchell WEC
Steven Smiley STP
Beth Wetzel TVA
Chris Brown NRC
Tara Inverso NRC
Dave Medek APS
Kurshad Muftuoglu GEH
Gordon Clefton NEI
Alysia Bone NRC
Yang Pi Lin GNF/GEH
Charlie Albury STP
Phil Sharpe GEH
Lisa Gerken AREVA
Pablo Garcia Iberdrola
Erik Mader EPRI
Kevin McCoy AREVA
Don Williamson SCEG
Alan Meginnis AREVA
Tom Eichenberg TVA
Robert Florian SNC
Roger L. Thomas, Jr. Duke
Gregg Swindlehurst GSN
Nasser Nik Entergy
Al Strasser Aquarius
Gregory J. Hill AEP
Ralph Landry Private Citizen
Ken Yueh EPRI
Andy Olson Exelon
Yun Ho Kim KHNP
David Boirel NRC
Mitch Nissley Westinghouse
Harold Scott NRC
Jeremy Dean NRC
Jodi Rappe Nuscale Power
Mark Handrick Duke Energy
Marvin Lewis Private Citizen
Tom Remick APS
Gilbert Zigler Enercon
Jim Smith Westinghouse
Kathleen Parish APS
Ken Frederick FENOC
Bob Leyse Private Citizen
- 4 -
Name Organization
Heinz-Gunther
Sonnenberg
GRS
Dana Knee Dominion
Ryan Sprengel Mitsubishi
Patricia Quaglia Westinghouse (Sweden)
Gretel Johnston BEST/MATRR
John Alvis Anatech

And, here are the slides, portrait, not landscape.



ML14114A498 (NRC Slides), ML14114A499 (NRC Slides), ML14120A017 (Industry Slides), ML14120A009 (Industry Slides), ML14120A011 (Industry Slides), ML14120A012 (Industry Slides), ML14120A010 (Industry Slides), ML14120A015 (Industry Slides), ML14120A018 (Industry Slides)

 Following three slides are from ML14120A012

Slide 1

10 CFR 50.46c Rulemaking
Industry Preparations

Tom Eichenberg
REG-TAC Chairman
 
NRC Public Meeting
April 29-30, 2014

Slide 3

FRN Question 1
 

Performance-Based Peak Cladding Temperature Limit

• Stated Goal - protect against loss of coolable geometry
– Brittle Failure Upon Quench
– High Temperature Ductile Failure
– Autocatalytic oxidation


• SRM Directive - achieve performance based ECCS – ML030910476, March 3, 2003.
– Prescriptive limit(s) inconsistent with the performance based directive
– 2200F
• “...provide a substantial degree of conservatism…” - FRN Volume 39 #3, January 4, 1974, pg 1002


© 2014 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved. 3




Slide 4

FRN Question 1 (continued)
 

Performance-Based Peak Cladding Temperature Limit

• Current test methodology may be adequate to higher
temperatures

– Industry coordinated LOCA round robin showed no catalytic oxidation using wide range of steam flows

 

• Vendor LOCA evaluation models already consider
exothermic heat generation
– “Autocatalytic” phenomenon is an energy balance issue

 

• Reaction energy release versus heat transfer to steam
 

• Science is well understood and no new test required
 

• Additional material data may be needed for high (>2200F)
temperature ductile failure issues


© 2014 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved. 4


My crud (fouling) reports to ACRS eleven years ago

Work on this stuff:

Following includes lots of Leyse at ACRS eleven years ago
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0818/ML081820102.pdf

 And, here is another fouling (crud) disclosure that ACRS heard about eleven years ago.  That River Bend game remains a classic that I first heard about during the summer of 2001 when I was at a conference in Davos. 
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0822/ML082280723.pdf

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WASTE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001
March 18, 2003
Memorandum To: ACRS Members
From: Howard J. Larson
SUBJECT: R.H. LEYSE PRMs
In light of your interest in those PRMs, I have obtained a copy of the LER (50-458/99-016-00) noted by Mr. Leyse (on the 3rd page of his February 10, 2003, memorandum to John T. Larkins).
Quoting Mr. Leyse's paragraph, "One measure of whether proper regulations are effected will be a determination that under the new regulations conditions similar to those already reported in certain Licensee Event Reports will henceforth constitute license violations. Very likely there is a preponderance of documented nuclear power plant operating experience that is worthy of such review, as a possible example, one candidate may be Licensee Event Report 50-458/99016-00.
Should I become aware of other pertinent information relevant to the topic, I will promptly forward it to you.
Attachments
cc: Sam Duraiswamy Medhat EI-Zeftawy John T. Larkins Sher Bahadur Mario Bonaca
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
.. •
5485 U.S. Highway 61
P. O. Box 220 St. Francisville. LA 70775
-=-Entergy
Tel 225 336 6225
Fax 225 635 5068
Rick J. King Director Nuclear Safety Assurance
March 1, 2000
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATrN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Subject: River Bend Station -Unit 1 Docket No. 50-458 License No. NPF-47 Licensee Event Report 50-458/99-016-00
File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3
RBG-45275
RBF1-00-0030
Ladies and Gentlemen:
Enclosed is the subject Licensee Event Report. The report is being filed voluntarily, due to the potential generic applicability of this condition. No commitments are identified in this report.
Sincerely,
~J{
Attachment Enclosure
·,
Licensee Event Report 50-458/99-016-00 March 1, 2000 RBG-45275 RBF1-00-0030 Page 2 of2
cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011
NRC Sr. Resident Inspector
P. O. Box 1050 St. Francisville. LA 70775
INPO Records Center E-Mail
Mr. Jim Calloway Public Utility Commission of Texas 1701 N. Congress Ave. Austin. TX 78711-3326
Mr. Prosanta Chowdhury Program Manager -Surveillance Division Louisiana DEQ Office of Radiological Emergency Planning & Response
P. O. Box 82215 Baton Rouge, LA 70884-2215
7
APPRO Y OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 06/30/2001
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
(6-1998) Estimated burden per response 10 comply wi1h this mandatory information collection request 60 hIS. Reported lessons learned ate Incorporated into the licensi~ process and fed biIck 10 industry. FOIWlIfd comments ~ardll'!ll
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT fLER) burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 F33. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington. DC 20655-0001. an to the PapelWOrkReduclion Project (3150-0104), OIIice of Management and
(See reverse for required number of
Budget, Washington, DC 20503. ., an Information collection does not displaydigits/charactersforeachblock) acurrentlyvalidOMBcontrolnumber,theNRCmaynotconduct 01' sponsor,and a person Is not required to respond to. the Infcrination collection.
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER 121 PAGE 131
River Bend Station 05000458 1 of
TITLE 141
Thermally-Induced Accelerated Corrosion of BWR Fuel
REVISION
FACILITY NAME
NUMBER
05000
00
03
FACILITY NAME
DOCKET NUMBER
05000
OPERATING
MODE (9)
20.2201(bl
20.2203(a)(2Ilvl
50.73(a)(2HiHB)
20,2203(a}(1.
20.2203(a)(3)(U
50.73(e)(2)(ii)
-I POWER
o ~
20.2203(a}(2)(U
20.2203(a)(3Iliil
50.73(a)(2}(iii
20.2203(a}(2)(ii)
20.2203(aH41
50.73(a)(2)(iv.
20.2203(aH2)(iii)
50.36(eHH
50.73(a)(2}(vl
20.2
(B)(2)(ivl
50.3
(el( )
50.73(a)(2}(vii)
NAME
D. N. Lorfing, Supervisor -Licensing 225-381-4157
CAUSE SYSTEM CAUSE REPORTABLE TO EPIX
EXPECTED YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE),
ABSTRACT ILimit to 1400 speces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (161
On April 20, 1999, with the plant in Mode 5 for a refueling outage, plant personnel documented an unusually heavy deposition of crud on fuel bundles (*AC*) removed following the preceding operating cycle (Cycle 8). A root cause investigation was performed. The information gathered and conclusions reached during the root cause process are of such relevance to the industry and the NRC that a voluntary report was deemed appropriate.
An exact root cause was not identified, but the investigation indicates that multiple factors contributed to an accelerated corrosion of the fuel cladding in the highest-powered fuel bundles during Cycle 8. The heaviest deposition was discovered on the first-cycle fuel. Corrective actions were developed through River Bend's root cause analysis process, and these will aid in preventing recurrence of the crud deposition which induced the corrosion by thermally insulating the fuel rods.
Safety significance was evaluated for the increased crud level and for the clad perforations. The significance of the perforations was low, since they are considered in the licensing basis. Significance of the elevated crud level was determined to be acceptable through a process which included engineering jUdgement, combined with analyses of various plant conditions.
NRC FORM 366 (6-1998)
NRC FORM 366A
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
16-1998)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION
FACILITY NAME 111
DOCKET 121
LER NUMBER 161
PAGE 131
River Bend Station
NUMBER 121 05000458
YEAR
ISEQUENTIALNUMBER
REVISION NUMBER
2
OF
7
1999
-
016
-00
REPORTED CONDITION
On April 20, 1999, with the plant in Mode 5 for a refueling outage, plant personnel documented an unusually heavy deposition of crud on fuel bundles (*AC*) removed following the preceding operating cycle (Cycle 8). (Crud is a colloquial term for corrosion and wear products, e.g., rust particles, that become activated when exposed to radiation.) A root cause investigation did not reveal that the higher-than-normal crud levels eXisting at River Bend Station (RBS) warranted a report pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 or 10 CFR 50.73. The information gathered and conclusions reached during the root cause process, however, are of sufficient relevance to the industry and the NRC that a voluntary report was deemed appropriate. Therefore, Entergy Operations, Inc. (EOI), is submitting a voluntary event report to document the thermally induced accelerated corrosion phenomenon discovered at RBS.
BACKGROUND
On September 18, 1998, a fuel element cladding defect was indicated by offgas (*WF*) chemistry sample data. Operations personnel requested the sample after noting an offgas pretreatment alarm (*RA*) during control rod drive (*AA*) operability testing. Immediate actions included re-sampling to verify results, informing plant management, and increasing the sampling frequency to once per day. Actions were taken in accordance with procedure ADM-0084, "Fuel Integrity Monitoring Program and Failed Fuel Action Plan." Operations personnel also verified that the thermal limits remained within the plant Technical Specifications 3.2.1, 3.2.2, and 3.3.3. A report was issued, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(vi), when the State of Louisiana was notified ofthe indication.
Additional fuel element cladding defects were indicated during the remainder of the operating cycle. These additional fuel element cladding defects were indicated by increases in the offgas activity and the guidance of ADM-D084 was followed. Reports were issued, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72{b)(2)(vi), when the State of Louisiana was notified of the indications. Reactor power in the vicinity of the indicated defects was suppressed through control rod (*AC*) insertion, and this successfully mitigated the activity release consequences of the defects. Power operation continued until April 3, 1999, when RBS shutdown for refueling outage no. 8 (RF-8).
The bundles suspected to have experienced fuel clad perforations were those first-cycle bundles loaded into the reactor core for the previous Cycle 8 operation. These first cycle bundles were manufactured with a serial number which included the designation HGE. Visual inspection and telescopic sipping of the bundles during the refueling outage confirmed that all of the perforations did occur in a total of seven HGE fuel bundles.
Upon initial visual examination of selected fuel bundles with potential fuel cladding defects, the fuel inspectors noticed an unusually heavy deposition of crud on the fuel pins. Following the identification of the crud bUildup, a multidiscipline team was instituted to determine the relationship of this material to the fuel element cladding defects. Additional fuel bundles were selected for examination, and other actions were initiated to address the issues.
7
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 16-1998)
I.ICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER)
TEXT CONTINUATION
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKETl2t LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) NUMBER (2)
REVISIONYEAR ISEQUENTIAL
River Bend Station 05000458 NUMBER NUMBER 3 OF
1999 --016 --00
INVESTIGATION
Fuel inspection was conducted at RBS during RF-8 to determine the cause and extent of the fuel cladding defects, and to determine the population of fuel bundles acceptable for use in the next cycle. Inspections included not only HGE fuel (i.e., first-burned fuel), but also GGE (twice burned) and YJ8 (thrice burned) fuel in the reactor (*RCT*) during Cycle 8. Bundles that were not operated in the core during this cycle were inspected to establish a baseline for the observations. Bundles from Cycle 6 and Cycle 7 at RBS were inspected. Inspection data were also obtained for bundles that operated in similar plants that have operated with high feedwater iron concentrations.
The following are observations specific to the HGE bundles, which were the only bundles that experienced cladding perforations.

The perforations were due to cladding corrosion, which appears to be related to the thermal effects of high crud loading. Limited spalling patterns were observed on the highest power rods.

The rods with perforations had heavy crud with clumpy formations.

The perforations were at about the 50" elevation on the rods.

The perforations were in HGE (first-burned) fuel.

The affected HGE bundles had Linear Heat Generation Rates (LHGR) at the 50" level that were in the top 3% of the entire core power levels during the first control rod sequence of Cycle 8 operation.

All but·one of the affected bundles had a shallow control blade adjacent to the bundle during the first control rod sequence.

The bundles with perforations were in the high-powered core ring.
In determining causal factors for the observations noted above, various facets were investigated. The investigation is divided into two sections: an investigation of the crud itself; and an investigation of the differences in operational parameters between Cycle 7, which had no clad defects, and Cycle 8, which had multiple clad defects.
Crud
The amount of crud observed dUring the fuel inspections was higher than normal. The observed iron deposits are the result of the input from the feedwater stream combined with a chemistry excursion which occurred during startup from RF-7. The chemistry excursion manifested itself as a conductivity excursion thatbegan at the point of heater drain (*SM*) pumped-forward operation and persisted for approximately three weeks (10/23/97 to 11/15/97). The conductivity excursion, which qualitatively accounts for the balance of the iron noted on the fuel, beyond that accounted for in the feedwater stream, is believed to have contributed to the onset of the cladding corrosion condition. At the time of the excursion, there was no reason to suspect it would affect crud deposition on the fuel.
In response to this condition, the investigation included an examination of locations that might contain an inventory of iron oxides available for future release. These areas included the main condenser (*SG*) and the condensate storage tank (*KA*) by direct visual and sampling, and the reactor vessel by running the reactor
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6-1998)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION
FACILITY NAME (1J DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) NUMBER (2)
SEQUENTIAL REVISION
River Bend Station 05000458 YEAR NUMBER
NUMBER 4 OF 7
016 ..
1999 --00
water cleanup (RWCU) (*CE*) loop aligned to the bottom head, where no flow restriction was noted. Only the condenser exhibited any significant inventory of iron oxides and copper, which was removed during RF-B. Flow accelerated corrosion (FAC) program results did not indicate unusual wear that could account for the level of iron found in the vessel.
Chemistry analysis history was reviewed for any significant anomalies that could have caused either the crud deposition, or the accelerated corrosion. The one extended period of a conductiVity spike, with a gradual return to normal over a three-week period early in the cycle, was unusual. The review indicates that plant parameters were within the EPRI guidelines for operation of the plant.
The potential for a chemical intrusion (as a direct corrosive agent) was also considered. Data for plant chemistry during RF-7, including the residual heat removal (RHR) (*BO*) chemical cleaning conducted for the first time during the outage. and the forced outage in April 1998 were reviewed. No evidence of a significant chemical intrusion thought to be capable of affecting the core was identified.
Cycle Differences
A synergy among various parameters related to plant chemistry and core operation is required, in conjunction with the iron deposits, to adequately explain the corrosion phenomenon. A review of parameters that changed in any significant way between Cycle 7 and Cycle 8 was performed.

The amount of iron input to the reactor vessel increased by -70% in Cycle 8. versus Cycle 7. due in part to the removal of low cross-linked resins from service in the condensate demineralizers (*SF*). This removal was done because of sulfate bleed-through associated with this particular resin type. An iron oxide crud layer on the fuel provides a means to concentrate soluble elements such as copper.

The amount of copper input to the reactor vessel increased by -30% in Cycle 8 versus Cycle 7. again due to the removal of low cross-linked resins from service in the condensate demineralizers. An additional source of increasing copper is the "blinding" effect of higher iron on the demineralizers copper removal efficiency. Copper has been previously implicated as an agent of local cladding corrosion in the BWR fleet. Analysis of the crud layers indicated that copper had concentrated in the crud layer adjacent to the cladding.

Zinc was injected into the feedwater system in significant quantities for the first time in Cycle 8. However, the amount of zinc injected and ultimately deposited on the fuel was unremarkable, as compared to the BWR fleet experience. There is no known corrosion or corrosive agent concentration mechanism associated with zinc injection. This is not believed to be a factor in the crud formation.

The plant operated in the Maximum Extended Load Line Limit Analysis (MELLLA) domain for the first time following RF-7. While this allowed plant operation at lower overall core flows, the locations of the fuel failures were not the locations of lowest flow. The failure locations show a strong correlation to peak nodal powers (as expected for a duty-related failure mechanism such as corrosion), but do not show such a correlation to low bundle flow. The lower flows due to MELLLA would only be a minor aggravating factor for crud deposition. Bundle inspections at other BWRs with high feedwater iron concentrations and MELLLA operation do not indicate any significant increases in crud levels due to MELLLA operation.
NRC FORM 366A
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
(6·1998)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
River Bend Station
NUMBER (2) 05000458
YEAR
ISEQUENTIAL IREVISION NUMBER NUMBER
5
OF
7
1999
-
016
..
00
ROOT CAUSE
Absent a single event or clear indication of a cause, it is concluded that an early cycle event, indicated by the prolonged early-in-cycle conductivity transient, combined with higher iron and copper levels, resulted in an unusual crud deposition that initiated the process which led to accelerated cladding localized corrosion-induced perforations. None of the individual factors, alone, have caused the corrosion phenomenon at plants in the past, as evidenced by a review of operating experience.
The higher input of iron and copper during the operating cycle, with a chemistry excursion early in the operating cycle, produced the unusual crud deposition and composition observed during the visual inspections. The concentration of copper in the crud layer provides an attack mechanism to foster the observed corrosion. It is significant to note that the crud deposition peaked at approximately the 50" level, which is where the primary clad perforations also occurred. The 50" level corresponds to the power peak for the first (A2) rod sequence in six of the seven perforation locations. The early-cycle conductivity increase occurred during the A2 rod sequence.
It is a well known relationship that Zircaloy corrosion increases with increasing clad temperature. It is not unexpected to find that the corrosion occurred in the highest-powered regions of the core. The formation of a Zircaloy oxide layer is dependent on temperature. As the crud loading on the fuel became heavier, it increased thermal resistance and raised clad temperature, which resulted in increased clad oxidation. The presence of high copper concentrations under these conditions tends to aggravate the situation. Soluble copper will concentrate in the oxide layers adjacent to the fuel rod. Differences in copper oxide growth and Zircaloy oxide growth can result in a higher insulating effect. The increased oxidation thickness results in increased thermal resistance. This becomes an autocatalytic process, which proceeds until the combination of higher temperature, crud, and copper result in clad perforation.
This process resulted in perforation only for the highest-powered bundles (the HGE batch). Measured Zircaloy oxide thickness on high power unfailed HGE bundles was up to 6-mils at the 50" level, where the cladding perforations occurred. By contrast, the lower power GGE bundles (initially inserted for Cycle 7) experienced fuel oxide layers of typically only 1 mil, which is in the normal range. This demonstrates that without power to drive the oxidation process, the crud deposition does not result in a higher thickness of Zircaloy oxide. The GGE bundles did not experience fuel perforations.
It is therefore concluded that the elevated crud and the corrosion were likely due to a combination of various plant chemistry and operating characteristics that changed substantially from Cycle 7 to Cycle 8. The corrosion mechanism is likely due to the presence of contributing agents (primarily copper) within the crud on the higherpowered bundles. Absent any of these factors, the corrosion would likely not have been experienced to the degree observed.
CORRECTIVE ACrlONS
The root cause analysis report for this condition identifies corrective actions being taken at River Bend Station to address the issues. These include immediate actions taken for the startup and operation of the reactor for Cycle 9, and long term actions to be completed throughout the operating cycle and the subsequent refueling outage. These actions are being tracked in the RBS corrective action program.
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NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6-1998)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) NUMBER (2)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION
River Bend Station 05000458 NUMBER
NUMBER
6 OF 1999 -016-00
SAFETY EVALUATION
Effects of Fuel Cladding Defects
The safety significance of the fuel cladding defects that resulted in fuel failure is low. Continuous monitoring of the reactor coolant system offgas prOVides early indication of the problem, allowing time to take the appropriate actions to monitor and mitigate the actiVity release consequences of the perforations. The plant's licensing basis and safety analysis assumes that fuel cladding defects can occur during normal operation. Even with the fuel cladding defects experienced during Cycle 8, the plant continued to operate within the bounds of its Operating License, including the Technical Specifications, and its licensing basis, including the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR). Together, these documents contain NRC-approved limitations for operating parameters such as reactor coolant system activity, gaseous radioactive effluents, and occupational radiation exposure. These limitations provide defense-in-depth protection for the public health and safety. Fuel cladding failure is not an unanticipated condition, but rather is an integral part of the licensing basis of RBS. Fuel cladding defects are acceptable to the extent that they do not jeopardize radiation protection limits established in the plant Technical Specifications and other licensing basis documents.
Effects of Crud
The safety significance of the effect of the elevated crud on Cycle 8 operation was evaluated. The results, as summarized below, demonstrate, based on previously performed analyses and engineering judgment, that the safety significance of the elevated crud levels is acceptable.

The Thermal-Mechanical evaluation is intended to provide protection to thermal mechanical limits, such as cladding strain. Increased crud on HGE would accelerate the cladding oxidation process. An assessment of the number of "failed" fuel rods (based on exceeding LHGR limits derived from the thermal mechanical limits) indicates that the dose consequences would represent only a small fraction of 10CFR100 limits, and therefore the River Bend Cycle 8 condition was of acceptable safety significance.

Given the inherent conservatism in the Safety Limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio (SLMCPR) process and the fact that suppression rods were required during the Cycle 8 operation, it is concluded that the SLMCPR would remain valid for operation in Cycle 8 under the assumed elevated crud conditions.

The evaluation of operational transients concluded that the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) operating limits that were established for Cycle 8 operation would not ensure that at least 99.9% of the rods in the core would avoid boiling transition for an abnormal operational occurrence. However, an assessment of the number of "failed" fuel rods indicates that the dose consequences would represent only a small fraction of 1OCFR1 00 limits. Therefore, the River Bend Cycle 8 condition was of acceptable safety significance.

The peak clad temperature (PCT) for HGE fuel was calculated to have been 1700°F or less. This still demonstrates substantial margin to the 10CFR50.46 PCT limit of 2200°F. Note that excluding the oxide buildup during steady state operation, the peak local clad oxidation due to LOCA would remain well below the 17% requirement of 10 CFR 50.46, as there would have been no appreciable change in the percent of clad participating in the Metal-Water Reaction under LOCA conditions.
.'
...
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6·1998) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION
FACILITY NAME C1)
DOCKET 12) NUMBER 12)
L
Eft NUMBER (6)
PAGE 13)
River Bend Station
05000458
YEAR
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER
REVISION NUMBER
7 OF 7
1999
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016
-00
Other analyses such as nuclear reactivity, over-pressure protection, and stability remain unaffected by the elevated crud.
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCE EVALUATION
Previous Fuel Cladding Defects at RBS
Previous fuel clad defects and perforations at River Bend were reviewed. No previous occurrences were applicable to the RF-8 fuel conditions, since the previous occurrences did not exhibit the heavy crud and the thermally induced accelerated corrosion.
Related Defects (Caused by Corrosion) at Other Facilities
No previous occurrences were found at other facilities that were similar to th occurrence at RBS. In the NRC's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) (NUREG-0989) for RBS, external corrosion and enid buildup on the waterside of the fuel was discussed. The NRC notes that in the late 1970s and early 1980s, certain of these types of perforations were referred to as "crud-induced local corrosion (CILC) failures." A contributor to CILC was an unusual composition of metallic crud. The NRC further notes that the corrosion was reportedly associated with a variably high copper concentration in the core coolant water and a minor anomaly in the Zircaloy cladding metallurgy, although both the water chemistry and cladding metallurgy were within allowable specifications. Crud deposits, aside from the CILC phenomenon, were expected even with improvements in newer plants such as RBS. Unlike the classic CILC, and even though a crud layer existed with high Copper concentration, corrosion levels were driven more by crud thickness rather than corrosion caused by local cladding conditions.
Note: The Energy Industry Identification System (EllS) component/system number is indicated by a parenthesis after the affected component/system. (Example: (*XX*»
Here is more:


 

Wednesday, May 14, 2014

Link to Proposed Rulemaking

Here is the link.  More later.

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-03-24/html/2014-05562.htm

And here might be another link.  However, the slides are in landscape and conversion to portrait is not easy, if at all possible via the link below.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1412/ML14120A012.pdf


Saturday, May 10, 2014

Columbia Generating Station: Failed Fuel, White Paper



Really, placing the Columbia Generating Station white paper on this blog  is not working.  Too bad they shut down the link after March 24.Energy Northwest sent me the Oxenford report, but placing it into this blog is almost impossible.  I've sent the report to the NRC with a request that it be placed in ADAMS because it has information relevant to regulatory activities.